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The Ukraine crisis and media systems: Comparison of UK and Russian media 
coverage 
 
This study uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the framing of the 
Ukraine crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015 by the news media in 
Russia and the UK. Drawing upon the broader framework of media systems theory 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2012a; Vartanova, 2012), the thesis identifies and analyses 
how different media outlets from hybrid and liberal political regimes played a role in 
the reporting of the Ukraine crisis. The comparative analysis of the news coverage 
encompasses three news sectors from Russia and the UK that differ culturally, 
economically, and geopolitically: RT, The Moscow Times, and Pravda.ru from 
Russia and the BBC, The Guardian, and Mail Online from the UK.  
The study poses four research questions. The first and main question explores 
the extent to which the Russian and British news media coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis supports or refutes current media systems theory. The second and third 
questions relate to the attention paid and the actual frames used by the different 
media outlets from Russia and the UK, respectively. The final question focuses on 
the difference (if any) between the framing of the crisis in Russia and the UK, thus 
feeding into the analysis in response to the main research question. 
Following Godefroidt et al.’s (2016) methodological framework using 
generic, diagnostic and prognostic frames, the findings suggest that first, the Russian 
media dedicated more attention to the Ukraine crisis than the British media, 
reflecting the geopolitical interest of the Russian government. Second, both the 
Russian (RT and Pravda.ru in particular) and the British media tended to use a 
human-interest angle extensively in discussing the conflict, although in different 
light. While the former put forward the idea of humanitarianism, the latter stressed 
the importance of Ukraine’s sovereignty. The media’s articulations of humanitarian 
sentiments, however, revealed an overarching illiberal trend, by naturalising and 
justifying their host countries’ involvements in the crisis. The manufacturing consent 
thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) is useful in explaining the media performance in 
both the hybrid regime (Russia) and the liberal democracy (the UK). Finally, the 
study found The Moscow Times from Russia to be critical of the country’s policy on 
Ukraine, thus supporting the Statist Commercialised model (Vartanova, 2012). On 
the other hand, the study, to some extent, refuted the Liberal model (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004). The level of journalistic professionalism could not be substantiated 
as high as the liberal model suggests to be, mainly due to a lack of in-depth analysis 
especially when discussing Russia and President Vladimir Putin. Despite the fact that 
the British media were more likely to explain the roots of and the possible solutions 
to the Ukraine crisis than the Russian media, the former overall were identified as 
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Soon after the former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych announced the 
suspension of the country’s EU Association Agreement on 21 November 2013, the 
vulnerable equilibrium between Kyiv and Moscow was put in danger. This started 
with the ‘Euromaidan’ anti-government protests in Kyiv, followed by a series of 
conflicts between people within Ukraine, and between groups or even countries 
across Europe. This led to the establishment of Petro Poroshenko government (7 June 
2014) after the collapse of the Yanukovych regime (21 February 2014), with an 
interim administration led by Olexander Turchynov in place between the two. Since 
then, Ukraine has been involved in a protracted war with Russia, marked by a 
competition between very different perspectives on the crisis. 
 There have been a number of interpretations and understandings of the root 
causes and ongoing development of the crisis, including debates in both academic 
and policy worlds. For example, some suggest that Russia’s national economic and 
political ambitions are to blame (Haukkala, 2015; Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018); while 
others, such as Kuzmarov and Marciano (2018) argue that the US has initiated a 
political coup in Ukraine resulting in a ‘civil war’ between the new Kyiv regime and 
separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Ishchenko (2014) and Sakwa (2015) point to 
institutional weaknesses and socio-cultural controversies within the region leading to 
a ‘civil war’ in Eastern Ukraine between the new Kyiv and separatists’ forces. Others 
see Ukraine as a battleground between regional economic blocs, with Putin seeking 
economic integration in the post-Soviet space to ‘forestall the expansion of EU 
influence’ (e.g., Rutland, 2015, p. 136). This view is shared by a recent study by Van 
der Pijl (2018) who looks at the crisis through a political-economic prism. He argues 
that the crisis is a consequence of ‘the struggle of world-historical proportions 
2 
 
between two conflicting social orders: the neoliberal capitalism of the West’ and the 
‘state-directed capitalism’ of Russia (Van der Pijl, 2018, p. 3).  
These wide-ranging views on the Ukraine crisis reflect ‘the fact that conflicts 
are also always struggles over representations’ (Pantti, 2016, p. xiv). This emphasises 
the importance of examining what role was played by the media in reporting and 
constructing the crisis. This study aims to make a contribution specifically focusing 
on framing in the context of different types of political regimes and media systems. 
In doing so, the study acknowledges that media as mediators between policy-makers 
and the public may generate new realities in terms of meaning-making (Marshall & 
Kingsbury, 1996). The media are not only interested in reporting conflicts and 
sensationalised violence (Balabanova, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 2011), but are also vital to 
debate about conflict and crisis (Bennett et al., 2004), not least as politicians can use 
them to set agendas based on their own or proclaimed national interests (Gilboa et 
al., 2016).  
 
Research Rationale 
The Ukraine crisis is emblematic of the tendency for different media outlets 
to adopt distinct perspectives when covering war/conflict. It is argued that the 
conflicting sides have adopted and projected a diametrically opposed set of 
interpretations and frames on to what they consider to be ‘facts’. The dominant 
narrative about the Ukraine crisis in Western media is that Ukraine as a state was 
undergoing a democratic revolution, which was crushed by an increasingly 
authoritarian and expansionist Russia led by its President, Vladimir Putin. In 
contrast, a prevailing view among certain non-Western media (e.g., RT) is that the 
West is aggressively advancing to the borders of Russia in an attempt to shore up 
3 
 
Western economic, political, and military hegemony. While this study does not 
examine effects on audiences, it is broadly accepted that the perceptions of conflict 
may be influenced by how the media interpret and report events taking place. As 
Thussu and Freedman (2003) state, the media in wartime are interpreted ‘as 
battleground, the surface upon which war is imagined and executed’ (pp. 4-5). This 
is demonstrated in the different words used to describe the combatants in media 
reports, e.g. ‘Russian-backed separatists/rebels/insurgents’ (often used by Western 
media) or ‘self-defence forces’ (the Russian media’s preferred term). Such 
terminology can be connected to different framings which in turn have the potential 
to influence audience perceptions.  
Why do such divergent perspectives persist in the context of a media 
environment characterised by abundant and frictionless flows of information across 
borders? Clearly media coverage can be understood as the product of a complex 
relationship between politics, economy, and culture, but to what extent is this 
influenced by media system and regime type? As Balabanova’s study (2007) 
discovered, different types of media system between Bulgaria and the UK helped 
explain differences in the reporting of the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Thus, a key starting 
point is the importance for studies of framing to include media systems outside the 
usual Western democracies, especially if one considers that the media systems of the 
whole world have been undergoing significant and constant changes (Dobek-
Ostrowska, 2019). 
How do different media systems affect news coverage of international 
conflict in so-called liberal and ‘hybrid’ democracies? This study compares Russia 
and the UK to examine the different narratives of the Ukraine crisis. It uses framing 
as an approach, which has been empirically proven to be important in war reporting 
4 
 
as it highlights specific perspectives of ideas for news audiences (Entman, 1993; 
Iyengar, 1991). By selecting these two countries the thesis explores the differences 
between news coverage of media outlets from hybrid and liberal regimes. Given the 
nature of the media systems of hybrid and liberal regimes demonstrated by 
Vartanova (2012) and Hallin and Mancini (2004) respectively, the media from these 
two countires could, therefore, be expected to generate opposing meanings and 
present different constructions of the crisis. As Dimitrova & Stromback (2008) 
suggest, if the media tend to reflect the governmental lines of their host country, the 
news coverage (of the Ukraine crisis) should be different in the two countries.   
The originality of this study rests with its contribution to the critical scrutiny 
of media coverage of war/conflict. Although there are already several (comparative) 
studies on media coverage of the Ukraine crisis from different countries across the 
globe (e.g., Ojala & Pantti, 2017; Boyd-Barrett, 2017a; Szostok, Gluszek-Szafraniec, 
& Guzek, 2016; Lichtenstein & Esau, 2016; Nelson, 2019), none of these has both 
provided the scale of the current study and focused on the specific parties of Russia 
and the UK. The main research questions are as follows: 
 
1. To what extent and in what ways does the coverage of the Ukraine crisis in 
Russia and the UK support or refute media systems theory? 
2. To what extent have the selected Russian and British media paid attention to the 
Ukraine crisis between 30 November 2013 and 28 February 2015? 
3. What news frames are adopted in the mediated Ukraine crisis coverage?  
4. What are the differences between the Russian and British media that characterise 





Taken together, this study aims to connect the micro-structure of the way in 
which the different narratives of the Ukraine crisis between Russia and the UK 
contribute to the daily productions of news, with the macro-context of the broader 
structure of the media systems of hybrid and liberal regimes. This connection will 
contribute to knowledge in media studies, offering an in-depth analysis of cross-
section of news media that constitute an important component of the public sphere, 
in the domain of global conflict reporting. It demonstrates the benefits of 
comparative studies (e.g., Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2012a) by scrutinising one hybrid 
– Russian and one liberal – British news media. The incorporation of non-Western 
media therefore goes beyond the U.S. context that has been studied extensively, thus 
echoing the need to de-Westernise media research (Curran & Park, 2000) in the field 
of war reporting in particular. The choice of six media outlets – The Moscow Times, 
RT, Pravda.ru, The Guardian, the BBC, Mail Online – is the cornerstone for the field 
of Russian and British war reporting as well as for the comparative study on other 
subjects.  
Thus, the thesis contributes to understandings of the ways in which media 
outlets under hybrid and liberal regimes contributed to and shaped news coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis. The manufacturing consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) is 
expected to be evident in the Russian media coverage of the Ukraine conflict due to 
the media landscape of the country (Vartanova, 2012). The specific way in which the 
Russian media manufactured the consensus will be uncovered in this study. This is 
important as it contributes to the very limited existing scholarship on the English-
language presence of the Russian news media especially in the field of media and 
conflict. Empirical study on Russian media’s war reporting has only attracted 
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attention in recent years (e.g., Heywood, 2014; Szostok et al., 2016; Roman et al., 
2017; Nygren et al., 2018; Fengler et al., 2018; Lichtenstein et al., 2018), the 
majority of which specifically look at the Ukraine crisis. These studies, however, 
focus on Russian-language media outlets that serve only the Russophone population. 
Although recent research (e.g., Nelson, 2019) pays increasing attention to the 
English-language media outlet – RT in particular in the context of war/conflict, they 
are exclusive of the media from different political ends in Russia. Therefore, these 
studies on war reporting in Russia cannot be seen as inclusive or representative of the 
country’s media system.  
The British media, in contrast, are expected to be more liberal in the reporting 
of the Ukraine crisis. In accordance with Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) model, the 
media are at least striving to play watchdog roles by holding power accountable. 
Thus, the British media is anticipated to be possibly critical of the national foreign 
policy on Ukraine. The study explores the way in which the British media framed the 
crisis and assesses this in relation to the manufacturing consent thesis (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988) and the CNN effect theory (Robinson, 2002; Carruthers, 2011; 
Wheeler, 2000; Shaw, 1996).  
The findings shed light on the applicability of theories on media and conflict, 
and on media systems theory. As Bloemraad (2013) suggests research can benefit 
from a comparative approach that is capable of cultivating ‘concept-building’ (p. 29). 
As suggested above, the manufacturing consent thesis may be applied to explain the 
case (the Ukraine crisis) in one country (Russia), but may not be necessarily 
applicable in another (the UK). This allows the researcher to elaborate on how and 
why such differences exist by looking at the nature of media systems of Russia and 
the UK. Thus, the thesis ultimately examines the extent to which news coverage of 
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the Ukraine crisis fits in the existing literature on media systems in hybrid and liberal 
regimes, proposed by Vartanova (2012) and Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
In addition, the study uncovers the potentially buried news about the Ukraine 
crisis among media outlets in a comparative way. The comparison includes both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis aiming to examine both commonality and 
difference. It thus adds to our existing understandings of the Ukraine crisis, as there 
have arguably been two dominant and conflicting interpretations of the crisis. The 
audiences who often read news from British mainstream media are usually informed 
that Russia’s political and economic aggression had led to the Ukraine conflict. On 
the other hand, the audiences who generally rely on news sources from Russia may 
see the role of the West played in the Ukraine crisis as being at question as well. Is 
there any other understanding or facts apart from these two? This empirical study 
explores this in detail. 
Finally, the study contributes to the theoretical development of the adopted 
methodological framework consisting of generic, diagnostic and prognostic frames. 
Since the study uses the already defined frames from other researchers (Godefroidt et 
al., 2016) in their comparative study on the Syrian conflict, this provides an 
opportunity to also scrutinise whether or not these frames apply to other international 
conflicts such as the Ukraine crisis.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The introduction presents the research aims, research rationale, and the 
research questions. The chapter also sets out the overall structure of the thesis. The 
remaining chapters therefore examine the difference between the Russian and British 
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news coverage during the Ukraine crisis, thus comparing media systems of hybrid 
and liberal regimes, as follows: 
Chapter one focuses on the relationship between media and conflict by 
critically examining first media’s role within democracies in general and second 
within the context of mediated conflict. The first part of this chapter discusses the 
normative frameworks of media within democracy, underlining main functions as 
suggested by McNair (2011) and McCombs and Shaw (1972). The key functions are 
generally viewed as a classic liberal model deriving from the U.S. and the UK. 
However, the democratisation process in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, has been seen to remain fragile in many of the newcomers that 
are conceptualised as hybrid regimes. In this context, many (e.g., Mihelj & Downey, 
2012) draw attention to identifying and comparing the diverse media systems in the 
region. The second part of the chapter, therefore, follows a theoretical discussion of 
media systems models developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012a), Dobek-
Ostrowska (2015, 2019), and Vartanova (2012). Importantly, a general understanding 
of the nature of the Russian political system – a hybrid regime (Hale, 2010; Sukosd, 
2018) – is first discussed in order for the Statist Commercialised model (Vartanova, 
2012) to be comprehensively contextualised. The following parts of the chapter then 
critically examine the role of the media in the specific context of war and conflict. 
They firstly address the issues of media’s role during wartime from a political 
economy perspective – the Manufacturing Consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988). They secondly discuss the power of the media – the CNN Effect thesis, along 
with critical discussions in relation to different contextual factors discovered in 
relevant empirical studies (Entman, 2004; Robinson, 2002; Gowing, 1994; Jakobsen, 
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1996; 2000; Livingston, 1997; Balabanova, 2007; Parry, 2010, 2011; Hawkins, 2008; 
2011; Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer, & Shenhav, 2013).  
Chapter two explores the nature of the Russian and the British media and 
connects their characteristic features with the media systems models outlined in 
Chapter one, in particular the Statist Commercialised model and the Liberal model. 
Chapter three introduces the case study – the Ukraine crisis, by providing an 
overview of the crisis development from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015, 
incorporating the different foreign policies of Russia and the UK in relation to it, thus 
offering a context for the subsequent analysis.  
Chapter four discusses the mixed methodology that is adopted in this thesis 
and presents its rationale. It also outlines the design of the study including the 
selection of media outlets, time periods, and keywords. The methodology uses both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis to investigate and answer the key research 
questions.  
Chapter five presents the data from the analysis of the Russian media (RT, 
The Moscow Times, and Pravda.ru) coverage of the Ukraine crisis (n=3,622). This 
chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section is aimed at answering the 
second research section – examining the attention paid to the Ukraine crisis by the 
selected Russian media i.e. the quantitative part of the study. The second section 
focuses on the third research question in relation to the actual frames used in the 
mediated Ukraine crisis by the Russian media i.e. the qualitative dimension of the 
analysis. The set of frames that are being uncovered are presented chronologically 
alongside examples.  
Chapter six presents the data from the analysis of the British media (the BBC, 
The Guardian, and Mail Online) coverage of the Ukraine crisis (n=1,910). The 
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chapter mirrors the structure of Chapter five: it begins by looking at the attention 
paid to the Ukraine crisis by the selected British media, thus measuring the quantity 
of reporting. The second part of this chapter scrutinises the use of generic, diagnostic 
and prognostic frames respectively.  
Chapter seven offers a qualitative comparison of the findings from Chapter 
five and Chapter six. The analysis brings together the quantitative findings from the 
previous two chapters with the qualitative elements. Following the presentation 
structure from the previous chapter, the press attention, the use of generic, diagnostic 
and prognostic frames are presented in order. This answers the fourth research 
question about identifying the difference (if any) between the Russian and British 
media that characterise the narrative of the Ukraine crisis.  
Chapter eight offers an analytical comparative discussion based upon the 
revealed in Chapter seven features of the media coverage. It is split into two sections. 
First, the implications and reflections on theories of media and conflict discussed in 
Chapter one are drawn from the results and analyses. Second, the chapter discusses 
the overall findings in relation to the case study, thus answering the main research 
question (RQ1): The extent and the particular ways in which the news coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis support or refute Vartanova (2012) and Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) statist commercialised and liberal models. 
The conclusion draws together the case study findings in order to reach 
conclusions both about the nature of the media reporting of the Ukraine crisis in UK 
and Russia and the nature of modelling. It also sets out the limitations of this study 




Chapter 1  
Media Systems and War Coverage 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The centrality of media in liberal democratic societies is undisputed (McNair, 
2011). Their key roles include informing and educating about everyday issues, thus 
offering a platform for public debate (‘public sphere’ and ‘public opinion’), as well 
as for the advocacy of political views. Importantly, the media are expected to hold 
politicians accountable by playing the role of the ‘watchdog’ or ‘Fourth estate’ 
(McNair, 2011). According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), agenda-setting is another 
significant function where the media highlight and place major events on the agenda. 
As Cohen (1963) explains the agenda-setting role is not necessarily telling people 
‘what to think’, but ‘what to think about’ (p. 13). This concept has been linked 
closely to framing theory, which McCombs (1996) calls a second level of agenda-
setting (McCombs et al., 1997, p. 200). As some scholars (Entman, 1993; Bennett, 
1994; De Vreese, 2005; D’Haenens, 2005; Reese, 2001) acknowledge, the media 
interpret events and facilitate particular perceptions of said events in the public 
sphere; while Bennett et al. (2007) even argue that ‘narratives matter more than 
material reality’ to policymakers (as cited in Miller et al., 2017, p. 310). McNair 
(2011) adds that it is impossible by any means to consider the media coverage as 
neutral. This is due to the fact that ideological and partisan, or other forms of slant 
such as unwitting bias and propaganda are embedded in the media (McQuail, 1992); 
although some researchers (e.g., Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Miller et al., 2017) 
directly highlight the way media are manipulated by the economic and political 
elites, who thus protect their privileges. International conflicts have often stimulated 
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the contentious debate in relation to whether or not the media are autonomous from 
the government when covering crises. This is due to both the direct or indirect 
restrictions on the press from the powerful as well as media’s own preparedness to 
self-censor in specific circumstances. For example, Harris (1983) argues that during 
the Falklands War in 1982, the British media were greatly reliant upon military hosts 
as there were access clauses and (un)official censorship restrictions coming from 
British Ministry of Defence. Williams (1992) discusses the journalistic performance 
during the Vietnam War and suggests that there was an increasing self-censorship 
during the wartime. But official censorship was in fact expected by many of the 
journalists as they were ‘uncomfortable with taking the responsibility for what they 
wrote’ (as cited in Harrop, 2008, p. 27).  These studies exemplify that conflicts pose 
challenges to the normative journalistic practice. 
This is further exacerbated by the specific national political, economic, and 
cultural contexts within which media operate. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) 
pose the question ‘why does [the media] apparently serve different purposes and 
appear in widely different forms in different countries’ (as cited in Hallin & Mancini, 
2004, p. 1)? Hallin and Mancini (2004), Dobek-Ostrowska (2015, 2019), and 
Vartanova (2012) deal with the question by focusing on the media systems operating 
in the context of established liberal democracies, and the media systems existing in 
what have been described as ‘hybrid regimes’ (Hale, 2010; Sukosd, 2018), and 
develop five models. These include the Liberal Model, the Democratic Corporatist 
Model, the Polarised Pluralist Model, the Politicised Media Model, and the Statist 
Commercialised Model.  
This chapter – as a foundation for the study – explores the relationship 
between media and conflict. It begins with a discussion of the normative frameworks 
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of media within democracy. The second part of the chapter focuses on the political 
contexts in liberal and hybrid regimes since 1991, and situate within these the 
specific features of the media systems that have developed there. The nature of the 
media systems of liberal democracies (Europe and North America) as conceptualised 
by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and the media systems of hybrid regimes as outlined 
by Dobek-Ostrowska (2012, 2015, 2019) and Vartanova (2012) are explored. 
Finally, the chapter sets the context for the subsequent analysis of the media 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis through an examination of the link between media and 
conflict identifying the difficulties and gaps in the current research on the topic. 
 
1.2 Media and Democracy 
The media in democratic societies are understood to perform several key 
functions. Although they are not exhaustive, they are widely accepted as the key 
ones. In order to address the main questions of this study, the next section offers an 
introduction to the role of media in democracy.  
 
1.2.1 Five functions of the media in democracy. 
Inform and educate. 
 According to McNair (2011), the media must inform the public of what is 
happening around them. This can be referred to as the ‘surveillance’ or ‘monitoring’ 
functions of the media. Also, the media must educate the public on national affairs. 
This includes circulating information on the meaning and significance of the ‘facts’ 
(McNair, 2011, p. 19), and on the activities of the government including disclosing 
wrongdoings such as waste, inefficiency, corruption, and the subsequently negative 
impact on economic development (Ojo, 2003, p. 822). The media efforts should be 
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aimed at holding power to account by creating awareness, knowledge and 
understanding of particular issues, and ensuring ‘accountability, transparency, 
probity and integrity’ (Ojo, 2013, p. 429). The importance of the informative and 
educational virtues lies upon the fact that citizens without being well informed by 
media, would be incompetent to follow and understand the daily issues the 
government is dealing with. As a consequence, citizens would not take part in the 
democratic process such as for example get involved in electoral decisions. The 
underlined political participation leads to the second function of the media which is 
explained in the following section. 
 
Public sphere & public opinion. 
The ‘public sphere’ and ‘public opinion’ are two concepts strongly linked to 
media’s functions and democratic representative theory (Boyd, 2011, p. 53). While 
democratic theory highlights the importance of the individual, the political process 
stresses that individuals act collectively in determining who will govern them 
(McNair, 2011, p. 17). That is to say, the individual’s personal opinions become the 
public opinion of the people as a whole acting for the common interest. Public 
opinion, in this sense, is shaped in Habermas’ ‘public sphere’ theory. Habermas 
(1962/1991) defines the public sphere in its ideal form as ‘made up of private people 
gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state’ (p. 
176). Namely the public sphere is a platform in societies aiming to encourage 
political participation by talk (Fraser, 1990, p. 57). Thus, the success of the public 
sphere stems from the idea that every person is an equal participant in debate through 
communication. As Habermas stresses, political participation would enable the 
public sphere to produce opinions and views functioning to direct the national affairs. 
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In this sense, the public sphere is the source of public opinion needed to ‘legitimate 
authority in any functioning democracy’ (Rutherford, 2000, p. 18).  
 
Advocacy and persuasion. 
The media in a democracy function as a platform not only for citizens’ public 
opinion, but also for the advocacy of political views. The media are believed to be 
open to political parties who need a channel to deliver their policies and programmes 
to citizens. According to McNair (2011), the media also ‘actively endorse one or 
other of the parties at sensitive times such as elections’ (p. 20), especially in the print 
sector. Ezell (2001) sees the advocacy role as attempting to achieve changes within 
society by increasing public support for specific policies. Accordingly, the advocacy 
role is often connected with the notion of persuasion (McNair, 2011; Edgett, 2002). 
The persuasion role aims to change ‘individuals’ attitudes and/or to encourage 
certain behaviours or actions through emotional arousal techniques’ (Minoletti, 2003, 
p. 38). In certain political areas such as an election campaign, persuasion is related to 
broader work concerned with media influences on public opinion (Edgett, 2002). 
Edgett (2002) relates advocacy to persuasion pointing out that the former is an ‘act of 
publicly representing an individual, organization, or idea within the object of 
persuading targeted audiences to look favourably on – or accept the point of view of 
– the individual, the organization, or the idea’ (p. 1).  
 
Watchdog & fourth estate. 
The watchdog role of the media aims to protect the public’s welfare by 
monitoring the conduct of government officials, which is key to democracy. This 
function sometimes is also referred to as ‘accountability reporting’, ‘investigative 
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reporting’, ‘public-service reporting’, or ‘public-interest reporting’ (Starkman, 2014, 
p. 8). Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that in a democratic society, a free press’s 
role as a watchdog strengthens the transparency of a government decision-making 
process, thus revealing and preventing misuse of public office, malfeasance, and 
financial scandals (pp. 1802-1824). A demonstrative case is the revelation of the 
Watergate scandal during the Nixon presidency in 1972, which exemplifies the 
exercise of the watchdog role by two muckraking journalists: Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein from The Washington Post (Patterson, 2003). They spent several 
months investigating and finally uncovered high-ranking officials’ abuse of power. 
This illustrates the way in which the media served society by keeping government in 
check (Boydstun, 2013). This case contributed substantially to the fall of Nixon 
regime (Genovese, 1999, p. 111).   
In some formulations of the watchdog role, the media are portrayed as the 
Fourth Estate. The term was first used in the late-eighteenth century by Edmund 
Burke, to refer to the role of media ensuring that all other organisations – the three 
branches of government (the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary) – serve the 
public (Baran & Davis, 2011, p. 110). Therefore, properly functioning media are 
essential to keep leaders honest: once people learn about misconduct or 
incompetence, they will in theory take action against it. For instance, in the context 
of political elections, many (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990; Randall, 1998; Norris, 
2006) suggest that the media should hold the government and politicians answerable 
to the voters, and be subject to subsequent punishment if there is any misconduct. 
Jebril et al. (2013) add that, the media are perceived as contributory to ‘both the main 
dimensions of political accountability, vertical (the ability of citizens to oversee 
actions of the power holders) as well as horizontal (the system of ‘checks and 
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balances’ between state institutions, public agencies, and branches of government)’ 
(p. 7). Essentially, the media function as a means for electorates to make decisions by 
circulating information about government actions. This understanding of the press as 
the ‘fourth estate’ and the expectation for it to perform as a ‘watchdog’ – revealing 
the wrongdoings of bureaucrats and other powers within the democratic system – is 




Finally, there is an agenda-setting function of the mass media (McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972), referring to ‘the process by which attention is distributed on a given 
agenda’ (Boydstun, 2013, p. 218). It is argued that the media are assumed to play a 
particularly important role where they spotlight major world events that may call for 
actions by the governments or the international community. McCombs and Shaw 
(1972) explain that newspapers for example, highlight salient issues by setting lead 
story on the front page and displaying large headlines. Television news would 
indicate the salience through the opening story of a newscast. Such routines or 
patterns repeat every day and stress the significance of each topic. As McCombs 
(2011) puts it: ‘the news media can set the agenda for the public’s attention to that 
small group of issues around which public opinion forms’ (p. 1). Hence, the shifting 
salience of topics on the media agenda is viewed as basis for public opinion 
formation about the overall performance of leaders. Agenda-setting has been linked 
closely to the notion of framing by many researchers (Riker, 1986; McCombs et al., 
1997; Entman, 2007; Balabanova, 2015). Entman (1993) suggests that selection and 
salience constitute essential part of the framing process. Thus, a perceived reality is 
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selected and made more salient in order to ‘promote a particular problem definition, 
a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation’ from 
the daily events (p. 52). This means that particular dominant narratives/featured 
frames occur at the expense of counter narratives that are marginalised (Freedman, 
2017). Yet, the downplayed or omitted subjects are not necessarily insignificant. 
Entman (1993) notes, ‘the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, 
evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions’ (p. 54). The 
two notions – agenda-setting and framing – together may result in media bias 
(Entman, 2007, p. 164). Overall, Brown and Deegan (1998) argue that the mass 
media’s agenda-setting function is so influential that it may significantly influence 
people’s perception about the world.  
In order for these above discussed democratic functions to be fulfilled, and 
thus for a public sphere or a democracy to be real, Aalberg and Curran (2012) argue 
that public opinion is one of the key principles of democracy. They stress that access 
to information is vitally important to the health of democracy (Aalberg & Curran, 
2012, p. 3). They offer two explanations:  
 
First, it ensures that citizens make responsible, informed choices 
rather than act out of ignorance or misinformation. Second, information 
serves a “checking function” by ensuring that representatives uphold their 
oaths of office and carry out, broadly, the wishes of whose who elected them 
(Aalberg & Curran, 2012, p. 3). 
 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) similarly stress the importance of citizens 
being politically informed. They argue that more-informed citizens are more tolerant 
of democratic norms, are more likely to be keen on, follow and talk about politics, 
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and are more likely to play a part in politics such as to vote in elections (Delli 
Carpini, 1999, p. 17). Thus, in order to express political opinions and find their self-
interests, citizens demand appropriate information about current events.  
Having outlined five of the main roles of media within democracy, it is 
necessary to question whether the media deliver on them in reality. To what extent 
do the media fulfil or fail in their democratic role? Critics such as Habermas 
(1962/1991) argue that the commercialisation of the newspaper press at the dawn of 
the twentieth century is the most important cause of the failure of the public sphere. 
He regards the earlier bourgeois press as ‘primarily politically motivated’, which 
then transformed into a business enterprise making ‘critical debate’ a good that can 
be consumed (Habermas, 1962/1991, pp. 164-185). As he points out, the new social 
forces, for example, financial orientation, turned the press into an agency of 
manipulation: ‘It became the gate through which privileged private interests invaded 
the public sphere’ (Habermas, 1962/1991, p. 185). This came in parallel with the role 
that the state started playing in the private realm and everyday life where the public 
sphere was degenerated; whilst citizens were regarded as consumers who paid 
attention to consumption and private concerns rather than to democratic participation 
(Kellner, 2000). Importantly, the media’s democratic roles became transformed from 
enabling individual participation in public discussion into constructing and confining 
public discourse to those subjects authorised by media corporations (Kellner, 2000). 
The transformation of news consumption manifests itself in many ways, 
ranging from a decline in the number of journalists to ‘the collapse of local 
newspapers’ (Balabanova, 2019, p. 188). This is an implication of the fact that the 
media functioning as part of the democratisation process is at stake (McNair, 2011). 
The media’s failure in delivering on the expected roles can be traced through four 
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dimensions (Balabanova, 2015, 2017, 2019). Dumbing down (Franklin, 1997) is the 
first dimension, referring to a trend towards the over-simplification of subject matter 
to make it more appealing to the mass audience. The second dimension indicates the 
increase in tabloidisation (McNair, 2011), owing to not only the commercial stresses 
but also the pressure on journalists to prioritise entertainment over harder news 
(Barron, 2015). This leads to the third dimension – news as ‘spectacle’ (Louw, 
2010). The final dimension is the media’s increasing reliance on public relations 
material along a falling number of investigative journalism (Balabanova, 2019). All 
these dimensions feed back to the notion of commercialism that is privileged at the 
expense of the watchdog role.  
Other scholars (e.g., Entman, 1990; Postman, 1985) share a similar view by 
addressing the question of market forces. They have studied the quality of news 
media information, arguing that increased market power and shifting news values are 
seen to have traumatised the information environment. This is mainly due to the 
growing competition in the news market, which has urged journalists to dramatise 
the news in order to attract more public attention (Aalberg & Curran, 2012, p. 3), and 
to treat politics as entertainment to make it seem interesting (Aalberg & Curran, 
2012). The news media then become more profit-driven rather than what Habermas 
originally suggested – striving for truthfulness. Such increase in soft and de-
contextualised news degrades the public’s information about public affairs (Bennett, 
2003; Curran, 2010). Bennett (2003) exemplifies this point by arguing that typically 
in the U.S., the news coverage is saturated with melodrama and stereotypes, but lacks 
analysis and explanation. Consequently, the quality of news media information is 
often called into question. Curran (2010) goes further and comments that if important 
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information is unavailable to the public they would therefore be disempowered to 
make informed decisions protecting their own interests. 
Some scholars (McNair, 2011; Somerville, 2017) suggest that there is no 
impeccable relationship between the media and democratic structures. This can be 
explained by two factors. First, the concept of objectivity is disputable due to the 
unavoidable bias that occurs when selecting and organising information. Second, 
journalists themselves are prone to social forces such as politics, economics, and 
other elites (Balabanova, 2007, p. 55). Hence, the different political, economic, and 
socio-cultural contexts/conditions can help explain the differences in the role. As 
such, it is important to look at the different media systems that have been established 
particularly in Europe since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the democratisation 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter turns to look at the models developed to 
identify and compare the media systems of the so-called hybrid and liberal societies 
(Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015, 2019; Sukosd, 2012; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The next 
section begins with a general introduction of the relevant political contexts. 
 
1.3 The Media Systems 
1.3.1 The political contexts: liberal vs. hybrid regimes. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the concept of liberal 
democracy became the dominant norm across the world (Habets, 2015). While 
liberalism continued in Western European countries characterised by ‘equal 
treatment of individuals or groups by the state’ when dealing with justice and basic 
rights such as free speech (Mukand & Rodrik, 2019, p. 8); the post-communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe underwent fast and significant changes in 
their politics, society, and economy. As Herrero et al. (2017) state the changes 
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embraced ‘capitalism, democracy, and human rights in a very short period of time’ 
(p. 4802). However, some of these emerging liberal democracies – adopting a 
broadly liberal position on issues such as freedom of expression – did not shy away 
from advocating illiberal approaches for certain purposes. This is the reason why 
these less liberal (or even illiberal) regimes became often interchangeably labelled as 
‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakariah, 1997), ‘delegative democracy’ (Oates, 2013), 
competitive authoritarian systems, or hegemonic-party systems (Diamond, 2002, 
pp.21-22). Hale (2010), however, argues that neither democracy nor authoritarianism 
can accurately describe most Eurasian countries’ political systems (p. 33). He instead 
suggests that it is more fruitful to understand those countries as a type of hybrid 
regimes (Hale, 2010). Likewise, Sukosd (2018) makes a clear distinction between 
hybrid regimes and liberal democracies. He explains that despite the officially 
declared principles of a democratic constitutional state, such as pluralism, and a 
multi-party system, the systems of checks and balances fall short of the official 
declarations. Accordingly, the opposition is often marginalised thus having zero 
possibility of winning pluralist elections. As such, Sukosd (2018) continues, hybrid 
regimes cannot be called illiberal democracies, as they are not liberal or 
constitutional democracies, but are in between democratic and authoritarian political 
systems. Following this, Hale (2010) conceptualises the hybrid regime as a 
combination of contested elections with pervasive political clientelism, while other 
scholars (Carothers, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Sakwa, 2011) describe the 
system as a ‘grey zone’ between democracy and authoritarianism. 
The illiberal practice implies an impossibility of fairness and honesty. As 
Couldry (2012) points out, systems generate ‘the conditions under which the practice 
is itself possible’ (p. 39). Central to the hybrid regimes, according to Puddington 
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(2017), is the weakening of political pluralism. A hybrid regime is mostly 
characterised by its capacity for control in all spheres of society – the media, the 
judiciary, civil society, economy, and the security forces (Freedom House, Jun 
2017). The institutionalisation of media in particular becomes a powerful technique 
to legitimate the authority (Mazepus et al., 2016).  
 
1.3.2 The media systems of liberal democracies.  
 The media systems of societies are shaped by significant historical change 
associated with elements ranging from politics to economies and socio-cultures. As 
McNair (2006) puts it ‘communication systems are never in exactly the same place 
twice’ (p. xiv). In other words, the media systems cannot be simply conceptualised 
without taking into account specific examples of things in flux (Chadwick, 2017, p. 
22). Hallin and Mancini (2004) have developed three media system models mainly 
focusing on the Western liberal world. They empirically propose four dimensions 
covering four key variables to measure and compare different media systems. These 
include media markets (strong or weak development of a mass circulation press), 
political parallelism (degree and nature of the links between the media and political 
parties), journalistic professionalism, and state intervention (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 
p. 21). 
First and foremost, the differences among media systems – deeply rooted in 
the historical development of the mass circulation press, lie not only in the quantity 
but also in the nature of the newspapers. On the one hand, high and low rates of 
newspaper circulation are features of Northern and Southern Europe respectively. On 
the other, the newspapers of Southern Europe generally aim to serve a certain 
(relatively small) group that is well-educated and politically active (which might be 
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termed elites). Therefore, a horizontal process of communication characterises the 
media systems within that region. The newspapers of Northern Europe and North 
America, by comparison, are characterised by their broader public targeting 
including those outside the political world. In this sense, a vertical process of debate 
is associated with the media systems of these countries, although the horizontal 
process may simultaneously take place as well. Other aspects of media market 
structure include historical differences in literacy rates and differences in the function 
of media. For instance, there is a bigger gender gap between male and female 
readership in Southern Europe than that in Northern Europe (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004).  
The political elements of the newspapers of Southern Europe lead directly to 
the second dimension of media systems – that of political parallelism. It was not until 
the late nineteenth century when journalists started to be independent from specific 
political interests. The trend applied particularly to commercial presses as they were 
profit-driven rather than politics-oriented. Thus, advertisement played an important 
role in the financial sponsorship. Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as an ideal 
dichotomy between commercial and politicised presses. Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
point out that there is a likelihood that commercial media can be politically partisan 
whilst non-commercial media may stick to the idea of political balance (pp. 26-27). 
Regardless of the possibilities, the researchers found significant differences among 
media systems in terms of the relationships between the media and political actors 
and between advocacy and neutral traditions of political journalism. One important 
difference is political orientations, which Blumler and Gurevitch (1975) 
conceptualise as ‘party-press parallelism’, while Hallin and Mancini (2004) theorise 
the term as political parallelism that contains several components. The latter include 
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organisational connections between media and political parties, the tendency for 
media personnel to be active in political life, the partisanship of media audiences, 
and the journalistic role orientations and practices (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 27-
29). Hallin and Mancini suggest that political parallelism is often connected to two 
concepts: internal pluralism and external pluralism (2004, pp. 29-30). The former is 
defined as pluralism achieved within each individual media outlet or organisation, 
thus ensuring a low level of political parallelism. The latter, on the contrary, is 
defined as pluralism achieved within the media system as a whole including different 
media outlets or organisations thus covering diverse voices in society. As a result, a 
media system associated with external pluralism is generally considered to have a 
high level of political parallelism. 
Professionalism is the third dimension. Three indicators have been closely 
related to the concept of professionalisation: journalistic autonomy – achieved within 
media organisations; distinct professional norms – including ethical principles and 
practical routines (such as newsworthiness); and public service orientation. In 
addition, the researchers draw a contrast between professionalism and (political) 
instrumentalisation. A general argument is that professionalisation can be in danger 
under the operation of political instrumentalisation or commercialisation, or both at 
once (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 34-37).  
The final dimension of the media system examined by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) is the state’s role. This has important implications for shaping the media 
system of any society, although with different levels and forms. The view is shared 
by many other researchers focusing on Western countries (Curran et al., 2009; 
Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Bruggemann et al., 2014). Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
discover a critical gap in funding levels not only within Europe, but also between 
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Europe and the United States. Other forms of state intervention include the 
following:  
 
(1) libel, defamation, privacy, and right-of-reply laws; (2) hate 
speech laws; (3) professional secrecy laws for journalists and conscience 
laws (protecting journalists when the political line of their paper changes); 
(4) laws regulating access to government information; (5) laws regulating 
media concentration, ownership, and competition; (6) laws regulating 
political communication, particularly during election campaign; (7) 
broadcast licensing laws and laws regulating broadcasting content, including 
those dealing with political pluralism, language, and domestic content 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 43-44). 
 
Therefore, a liberal media system is expected to have a low level of state 
intervention thus relying significantly on market forces (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 
44).  
Based on the above four dimensions, the researchers inductively propose 
three media system models covering countries from the United States and Canada to 
most of Western Europe: The Liberal Model, the Democratic Corporatist Model, and 
the Polarised Pluralist Model.  
First, the Liberal Model refers to the media systems in countries such as the 
UK, Ireland, and those in North America (or Anglo-Saxon countries), featuring a 
high level of market mechanisms and commercial media. The countries are 
characterised by an early development of press freedom and mass-circulation press, 
although the circulation rates may have changed and decreased compared to the 
Democratic Corporatist countries. This model epitomises the normative ideal of the 
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neutral independent watchdog role, thus separating the media systems from political 
systems.  
Second, the Democratic Corporatist Model is seen to be present within 
Northern continental European countries with welfare state tradition, strong public 
service broadcasters, and partisan media along identity groups. Specifically, it is 
characterised by a historical co-occurrence of commercial media (with early 
development of press freedom and high newspaper circulation) and media associated 
with social and political groups (but with a high level of professional autonomy), and 
by a state role that is legally limited but relatively active in reality. Political 
parallelism is historically high. There is also a moderate level of external pluralism 
and a tradition of commentary-driven journalism, alongside an increasingly 
developing norm and practice of neutral professional journalism. The media are 
generally seen as social institutions. That is to say, under the Democratic Corporatist 
Model, the boundaries between the practices of media and the practices of those 
existing outside the media are to some extent porous.  
Finally, the Polarised Pluralist Model – exclusive to few small countries such 
as Luxembourg – encompasses the media systems across the Mediterranean 
countries of Southern Europe. The model sketches out four features. First, a 
consolidation of the media and party politics – elite-driven press with small 
circulation. Second, a lower level of historical account of commercial media 
development – lower mass circulation newspapers. Third, a high level of political 
parallelism – strong political life, external pluralism, and advocacy journalism 
tradition. Fourth, a strong role of the state – as an owner, regulator, and funder of 
media. Hallin and Mancini (2004) consider these features as being rooted in a high 
degree of ideological diversity and conflict in the delayed development of liberal 
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institutions. Papatheodorou and Machin (2003) share a similar view. They describe 
the relationship between the media systems and political systems in South European 
societies such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece as an ‘umbilical cord’ that was never 
cut. They argue that this is the case even after a dramatic transformation of media 
systems took place in late 1980s, aiming to be in line with Western patterns. 
Likewise, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) provide four explanations for such 
‘state paternalism’ or ‘political clientelism’: a tradition of advocacy reporting; 
instrumentalisation of privately-owned media; politicisation of public broadcasting 
and broadcast regulation; and limited development of journalism as an autonomous 
profession. Therefore, this model epitomises a greater gap between the ideal of 
democratic role and reality. More precisely, the journalists have beliefs in neutrality 
and objectivity whilst they practise in an opposing direction where partisan advocacy 
has long become entrenched. Thus, the media systems under this model can be 
generally explained by the characteristics of the political systems. 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three models focusing on media systems of 
western liberal states have led to widespread discussions about how the framework 
might apply to the media systems beyond Western Europe and North America. This 
motivated the authors themselves later to expand the range of world regions in a later 
collection of studies (Hallin & Mancini, 2012a), incorporating Central and Eastern 
Europe (e.g., Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012; Vartanova, 2012), the Middle East (e.g., 
Kraidy, 2012), Asia (e.g., Zhao, 2012), Africa (e.g., Hadland, 2012), and Latin 
America (e.g., de Albuquerque, 2012). Many researchers find it particularly difficult 
to reach a consensus on the post-Soviet media sphere1, arguing that ‘media in post-
Soviet societies are a moving target, influenced by technological, geopolitical, and 
                                                          
1 Including that of emerging democracies and hybrid regimes. 
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cultural developments’ (Rollberg, 2014, p. 175). Dobek-Ostrowska (2012; 2015) and 
Vartanova (2012) adopt Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) framework proposing a 
Politicised Media model and a Statist Commercialised model to characterise the 
media systems of hybrid regimes.   
 
1.3.3 The media systems of hybrid regimes. 
Eastern European countries’ unique historical experience of political, social, 
cultural, and economic changes after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, rendered 
substantially different media models within the region and also in relation to those in 
Western European societies. Some see the models as coming in line with many of the 
Western features (e.g., Vartanova, 2012) or as similar to Hallin and Mancini’s 
Polarised Model (e.g., Jakubowicz, 2007; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012). Jakubowicz 
(2007) sees the process of media change in Eastern post-communist countries in 
general as comparable with the one in the Mediterranean countries due to the shared 
characteristics between the two (p. 304). These include ‘late democratization and 
incomplete, or (in some cases) little advanced, modernization and weak rational-legal 
authority combined in many cases with a dirigiste state’, as well as the feature of 
state paternalism or political clientelism (Jakubowicz, 2007, p. 304). The scholar also 
uses the term ‘panpoliticismo’ to describe a situation in the region when politics 
permeates social systems including the media thus having influences on them. This 
not only results in a delayed liberal democracy, but also represents ‘a political culture 
favouring a strong role of the state and control of the media by political elites’ 
(Jakubowicz, 2007, p. 304).  
This strong role of the state is especially evident in some countries of the 
region, running in parallel with a low level of journalistic professionalism and a high 
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level of marginalisation of independent journalism (Sukosd, 2012). Sukosd (2012) 
points out that the public and state media from some Eastern European countries are 
under huge pressure, not only from governments but also from the oligarchs who 
internalise and instrumentalise the media organisations for political and economic 
interests. As a consequence, there are not many independent journalists in the region, 
compared with Western Europe. Especially after the global financial crisis that hit 
the region in 2008, Stetka (2012) argues, Western global media businesses began 
their divestments thus leaving the Eastern media markets – a phenomenon referred to 
as ‘de-Westernisation’ (p. 438). This, however, opened the way for ‘the growing role 
of oligarchs in media ownership’ (Sukosd, 2012, p. 130). As Sukosd (2012) puts it, 
in order to accumulate wealth, those oligarchs used the media to financially and 
politically support political parties that they have close connections with. As a result, 
the media systems in the region in general come close and are almost identical to the 
ones of hybrid regimes (Sukosd, 2012, 2018).  
Regardless of the similarities at different levels, there are different types of 
post-communist media systems depending on the nature of their political systems 
(Sukosd, 2012) as well as their cultural background (Voltmer, 2013). Herrero et al. 
(2017) point out that media system developments in the East should not be 
categorised into any of the three Western media models developed by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004), due to the particular evolution that has taken place in these countries 
after 1991. Three factors identified by Voltmer (2012) with regard to the trajectories 
of the media transition can be used to explore the new types of media systems. First, 
the media are a unique mixture of old structures from the Soviet past, new elements 
from Western models, and particular ‘features born out of the desire to implement 
something different and better than the institutional predecessor’ (Voltmer, 2012, p. 
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235). Second, the legacy also applies to the individuals within these institutions 
(Sparks, 2008). After the regime change processes, journalists generally stayed in 
their positions, thus continuing the old rules and practices in their work. Third, the 
political elites are reluctant to accept the media as independent players. They tend to 
use the old tricks such as ‘direct pressure, threats, and editorial interference’ 
(Voltmer, 2012, pp. 235-236).  
Dobek-Ostrowska (2019) shares a similar view. In her recent study on the 
media systems of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), she argues that 
despite the fact that there are 21 countries sharing the same geographical region, 
‘each has a unique political history and experience of democracy; equally diverse is 
the condition of civil society in each jurisdiction’ (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2019, p. 260). 
More importantly, the political, economic, and social processes and factors in these 
individual countries are also very dynamic, which makes it difficult to see their 
‘direction, intensity and effects’ (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2019, p. 260). Hence, as Dobek-
Ostrowska (2019) writes, the media systems in the East ‘are not as stable as in 
Western Europe’ (p. 274). Dobek-Ostrowska (2015; 2019) suggests a ‘Politicised 
Media Model’ to describe the media systems of Poland and Hungary, and Vartanova 
(2012) proposes a ‘Statist Commercialised Model’ to refer to that of Russia. Despite 
the unique national contexts, the two models share two commonalities.  
First, a high level of state intervention (Sukosd, 2012). This indicates a 
‘dominant-power politics’ (Sipos, 2012) or ‘one-party hegemony’ (Urban et al., 
2017) where the ruling party attempts to play a strong role in terms of controlling the 
media especially in the Public Broadcasting Media and frequently intervening in the 
private media. The practice of media policy is thus determined by pro-government 
bodies including editors for the purposes of patronage and mobilisation in favour of 
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the government. Political policy on media is seen as a censorship instrument (Urban 
et al., 2017, p. 159). As Bozoki and Hegedus (2018) argue, the political power 
attempts to build an ‘executive control over the judiciary, the subordination of the 
public media to the government for propaganda purposes’ (p. 1176). In addition, 
Dobek-Ostrowska (2019) highlights the very existence of political cleavage-divided 
journalists (Glowacki, 2017). 
Second, the role of oligarchs (Sukosd, 2012). Some of the media owners are 
in a close connection with the powerful, thus ‘the oligarchic ownership model exists 
next to a strong control of the public media by political elites’ (Dobek-Ostrowska, 
2019, p. 267). As a result, the media systems of hybrid regimes are a ‘dominant-
power’ system featuring a high level of state intervention (Sipos, 2012). The deep 
politicisation (due to government’s policy) and the resulting weak media freedom, 
according to Dobek-Ostrowska (2019), exemplify that ‘media transformation [has] 
derailed’ (p. 266). Despite the normative standards of objectivity, the models in both 
liberal and hybrid regimes demonstrate that fulfilling the media’s democratic role is 
challenging.  
The ultimate challenge to the normative frameworks is often posed by war 
and conflict when the media cover foreign policy issues. Williams (1992) argues that 
‘war should not be seen as a special case of how the media works but rather as a 
magnifying glass which highlights and intensifies many of the things that happen in 
peacetime, albeit revealing them in exaggerated form’ (as cited in Carruthers, 2000, 
p. 13). The extent to which the media are actually independent from the politics in 
the context of war and conflict has remained open to debate. This is the case even in 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Liberal model that highlights the media’s detachment 
from the political power and its market-driven features. For example, in 2003, 
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questions about the situation in Iraq flourished: Where were the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)? Did Saddam Hussein – the then President of Iraq – have a 
connection to Al Qaeda? Although evidence did not support either of these 
justifications for the invasion of Iraq, beliefs that Saddam Hussein owned WMD and 
that he was related to Al Qaeda continued to exist (Stroud, 2008, pp. 341-432). Many 
American people in fact tended to embrace these beliefs especially between 2004 and 
2006, although the subsequent information noticeably disproved them (Castells, 
2009). Kull et al. (2003-4) study the case of the invasion of Iraq concluding that at 
the beginning of the invasion, those watching FOX news tended to believe the 
existence of both the weapons and the link while those watching Public Broadcasting 
Service and listening to National Public Radio did not (as cited in Stroud, 2008, p. 
342). This finding is important as it shows how diverse patterns of news coverage 
may lead to people generating varied impressions of the actual event taking place 
globally. Hence by misinforming the public, it is possible that polarised attitudes 
toward political issues would be greatly encouraged or even generated. 
Zaller and Chiu (2000) focus on the censorship and the national perspective 
of the US media when they cover the country’s military, and state that: ‘It is a truism 
that journalists find it difficult to report critically on government activity during 
foreign policy crises. They […] fear that tough reporting will undermine the 
government’s ability to deal with the crisis’ (p. 61). A number of empirical studies 
have suggested that the media’s role in democracies during conflicts in general has 
always been disputable (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 1991; Hammond, 2007a, 2007b, 
2017; Balabanova, 2007, 2015; Carruthers, 2011; Parry, 2010, 2011; Robinson, 
2002; 2017; Robinson et al., 2010; Freedman, 2017; Hammond et al., 2019; Boyd-
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Barrett, 2019). The following section looks at the theoretical debates on the role of 
media in the context of war and conflict.  
 
1.4 Media and Conflict 
The news media are a central forum where issues related to war are openly 
debated (Robinson et al., 2010, p. 1). This, aided by the developments in 
communications technology, is part of the reason for the increasingly extensive 
levels of news media’s attention to conflicts. The ever-changing globalised 
environment of 24-hour news channels, real-time reporting, and the internet have 
rendered the information and images of conflict more accessible to a majority of the 
population worldwide. As Carruthers (2011) notes, the battle over images during the 
1980s has extended to the internet – today’s increasingly significant place for the 
presentation and exchange of visual imagery. Consequently, following the 
description of the Vietnam War as the first ‘television war’, the Iraq war in 2003 was 
given the name the first ‘YouTube war’ (p. 5). 
The other contributing factor for the increasing degree of attention paid to 
conflicts by the media is the very nature of the news media and the emphasis on ‘the 
dramatic, the bloody, and the controversial’ (Balabanova, 2007, p. 2). As Galtung 
and Ruge (1965) in discussions on ‘news values’ or newsworthiness suggest, 
negative news such as wars and conflicts are more likely to be selected for coverage 
than positive news (pp. 65-71). Where there is something new, discontinuities, and 
drama; there is news. Journalists after all are interested in ‘change’ (Keen, 2000, p. 
1). In comparison with ‘good news’ that is generally considered no news (Minear et 
al., 1996, Wolfsfeld, 2011), Altheide (1995) argues that conflicts, drama, and war are 
newsworthy. This is because conflicts strongly attach to TV news owing to their 
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potential for dramatic visuals such as ‘explosions, bombs, people running, and a 
range of emotional reactions of people’ (Altheide, 1995, p. 184). This is the case 
especially if there is a high level of destruction and human loss (Balabanova, 2017). 
Balabanova (2017) argues that violent events such as genocide and extreme human 
suffering are more likely to be reported (p. 233). Wolfsfeld (2011) describes the 
media’s obsessive need for sensationalising violence as a main influence on how 
they frame violent events. To highlight how wars can bring economic benefits to 
media, he says:  
 
War’s drama is especially suited to television news where viewers 
can see and hear the horrible things that happen: explosions, hysterical 
victims and bystanders, fires, neighborhoods destroyed, dead bodies being 
dragged out of burning buildings, wounded soldiers writhing in pain, and 
coffins being lowered into the ground (Wolfsfeld, 2011, p. 83).  
 
Consequently, it is arguable that nothing is able to make audiences pay 
attention to the news like war. Several scholars suggest that war ‘sells’ (Balabanova, 
2007; Carruthers, 2000, 2011; Moeller, 1999; Lasswell, 1927; Hudson & Stanier, 
1999). This perception was famously proved by an American news channel – Cable 
News Network (CNN) covering the first Gulf War in 1991 (e.g., Carruthers, 2011; 
Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010).  
Some researchers (e.g., Shaw, 1996) believe that war coverage has the 
potential to not only shape the public’s perceptions of the situation, but also 
influence the policy-making process. The use of images of human suffering can lead 
the public, politicians, and non-governmental organisations among others to have the 
feeling that they must ‘do something’. This attention paid to the humanitarian 
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dimension was a feature of the coverage of conflict in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and 
Kosovo during the 1990s (Carruthers, 2011). For example, Carruthers (2011) 
suggests that media used pictures of starving infants as the facilitator for:  
 
Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia in 1992; pictures of Rwandan 
refugees entering Kigali were used as the motivation behind a massive relief 
effort in 1994; and the use of reporting of atrocities committed by the 
Belgrade regime against Kosovar Albanians triggered NATO’s 1999 
bombing campaign to accuse Serbian ethnic cleansing (pp. 142-143).  
 
Marx (2008) sees this attention paid by the media in the name of improving 
‘the human condition’ as stirring moral consciousness (as cited in Carruthers, 2011, 
p. 143). This is how the so called ‘CNN effect’ has emerged. The theory quickly 
prevailed in discussions of media power in the 1990s (Gilboa, 2005a). On the other 
hand, some researchers (Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Bennet, 1990; 
Entman, 1991; Mermin, 1999) have maintained that news media coverage of 
international politics often challenges the democratic ‘watchdog’ role, by being 
‘indexed’ in close concordance with national foreign policy establishments as the 
‘manufacturing consent’ thesis suggests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The two 
theories – exemplifying the extremes of the debate over media’s role in conflict and 
war – will be critically discussed in the next section, with empirical evidence 
provided to support the arguments on both sides. 
 
1.4.1 The manufacturing consent thesis. 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that in recent history the media appear 
complicit in support of government actions such as for example during the Vietnam 
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War. In addition to government influence, journalists themselves tend to both self-
censor and interpret issues through specific perspectives such as ‘the cultural and 
political prisms of their respective political and social elites’ (Robinson, 2002, p. 12). 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) suggest that media biases ‘arise from the preselection 
of right-thinking people, internalized preconceptions, and the adaptation of personnel 
to the constraints of ownership, organization, market, and political power’ (p. xxii). 
The authors put forward a propaganda model (PM) hereafter to outline five media 
‘filters’ that ‘fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of 
what is newsworthy’ (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 2). Although the PM was 
originally developed regarding the US media system, Freedman (2008, 2009) argues 
that the model is also relevant to a UK media environment as it highlights economic-
driven forces within the media industry.  
The five filters are ownership, advertisement, sources, flak, and anti-
communism (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The first – ownership – refers to media 
industries being part of conglomerates that are profit-driven and controlled by 
wealthy people. As such, mainstream media are in a kinship sharing important 
common interests with networks of other political and economic corporations, such 
as banks and government (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 14). The second filter 
highlights that these media corporations often rely on advertisements as major source 
of income. Over time, the strive to remain financially viable leads to a tendency that 
the media eventually align their coverage towards the interests of specific audiences 
or sellers, and thus marginalising the content that may not satisfy the most powerful 
advertisers. The third filter notes that news media outlets rely largely on elite sources 
for two reasons. On the one hand, they typically believe that the elites are accurate 
and ‘reliable’ sources of information; one the other hand, this way of newsgathering 
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– not requiring the otherwise necessary fact-checking – is lower-cost. The resulting 
coverage is dominated thus not only by political and economic elites, but also by 
‘experts’ and think tanks, all of which help with the cost reduction in newsgathering. 
Flak is the fourth filter. Herman and Chomsky (1988) use the term to refer to 
negative responses to programmes or news content, which results in a 
marginalisation of material that challenges mainstream sources. This is due to the 
fact that dominant organisations hold privileges and power, thus pressuring media to 
play a propagandistic role in society. For instance, after the publication by the British 
newspaper the Mirror of film-maker John Pilger’s anti-Bush position that challenged 
Bush’s war plan of bombing Afghanistan in 2001, ‘the fund manager of one of 
Trinity Mirror’s large American investors’ called the newspaper’s chief executive to 
complain about the news content (Freedman, 2009, p. 64). The final, fifth filter is 
anti-Communism understood as a control mechanism. The construction of an 
‘enemy’ is the main theme here. While anti-communism primarily fulfilled this role 
during the Cold War period, since then the enemy has been largely replaced with that 
of fundamentalist Islam (Freedman, 2017; Freedman & Obar, 2016; Hammond, 
2017).  
This propaganda model explicitly demonstrates that the conscious control 
over the public opinion is seen as an important factor in democratic societies. The 
rule of the masses by the elite can be achieved through ‘manufacturing consent’. The 
US media, as the authors conclude:  
 
Inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of 
privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state. The 
media serve this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, 
distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, 
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emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable 
premises (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 298). 
 
Many scholars have provided support for the thesis in their empirical studies 
(Bennett, 1990; Entman, 1991; Entman & Page, 1994; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Robinson, 
2002; Balabanova, 2007; 2015; Carruthers, 2011; Hammond et al., 2019; Boyd-
Barrett, 2019). They adhere to the position that the media cover war and conflict in 
line with national foreign policies. Robinson (2002) identifies an executive version 
of manufacturing consent paradigm highlighting ‘the extent to which news media 
content conforms with the agendas and reference frames of government officials 
where government officials are understood as members of the executive’ (p. 13). In 
this context, Robinson claims that the news media follow the executive policy line 
(2002, p. 13). Entman (1991) on the basis of significant empirical analysis of the US 
news coverage of the shooting down of the Korean Airline and Iran Airline planes in 
the 1980s, reaches a similar conclusion that media reporting is compliant with the 
policy interests of the respective American governments (pp. 6-27). Some studies on 
wartime media coverage combine the notion of framing and agenda-setting tradition 
showing the importance of media guidance for particular issues (Christie, 2006). For 
example, Dorman and Livingston (1994) in their empirical study with regard to the 
1991 Gulf War observe that while the news coverage was ‘rich with references to an 
alternative historical context: Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’, the media gave 
‘selective attention’ to ‘the historical root cause of the crisis’ (pp. 65-67). The 
media’s use of frames indicates that there was limited policy debate about the crisis. 
Consequently, the ‘alternative interpretations and policy implications’ were 
eliminated (Dorman & Livingston, 1994, p. 73). A further empirical evidence for this 
view can be found in a later study where Entman and Page (1994) examine 118 
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opinion pieces in The New York Times covering the period leading up to the 1991 
Gulf War. The researchers find that most of the reporting hardly criticised the foreign 
policy on US involvement in the war (Entman & Page, 1994). Criticism was rather 
‘procedural’ in terms of relying heavily on official sources and encouraging ‘the 
over-representation of administration views’ (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 96).  
This pattern is still evident in the second Gulf War in 2003 when the media in 
the UK delivered ‘subtle but clear bias towards […] pro-war assumptions’ (Lewis et 
al., 2006, p. 126). Similarly, Robinson et al. (2010) suggest that British media during 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq were overall supportive in the war effort, despite the 
opposition coverage. Robinson et al. (2010) use framing analysis to scrutinise the 
media’s war coverage and suggest two key points. First, the news agenda was set on 
daily issues such as ‘battle’ stories, while substantive issues such as the rationale for 
intervention was marginalised, with relatively low level of reporting of domestic 
dissent. Second, the British media in particular reproduced the perspective of official 
sources and actors. In other words, the government still heavily engaged in setting 
the agenda and framing the news reporting. Robinson et al. (2010) claim that this is 
mainly due to the patriotic sentiments among journalists as well as their commitment 
to humanitarian intervention. Carruthers (2011) with a focus on the 2003 Iraq war 
coverage, likewise recapitulates that the media became voluntary co-conspirator in 
wartime propaganda. Overall, the empirical studies exemplify that war coverage is 
constructed by the media as per their biased interpretation and framing. As 
Bruggemann (2014) suggests the ingredients of journalistic framing ranges from 
simply circulating officials’ interpretations of a situation to actively reproducing the 
journalist’s subjective interpretation (pp. 61-82).  
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The framework of the manufacturing consent thesis, however, has not 
received universal support in times of war. For example, some scholars (Sparks, 
2007; Freedman, 2009, 2017; Boyd-Barrett, 2010) critically point out that the PM 
underemphasises the potential of alternative frames produced by pressures among the 
elites and among progressive journalists. Hallin (1994) suggests that the PM fails to 
account for other possible media roles such as offering a place for elite debates as the 
media are described as ‘perfectly unidimensional’ within the model (p. 13). As 
Freedman (2017) argues, the thesis may not be helpful in demonstrating specifically 
‘how journalistic practices are shaped by news environments and how the 
professional ideology of journalists – including a commitment to “objectivity” and 
“truth-telling” – intersects with their wider surroundings’; although it may be precise 
in explaining the general idea that a pro-market media is pro-war driven (pp. 74-75). 
Bennett’s (1990) ‘indexing (journalists’ reliance on official sources) hypothesis’ can 
be useful in dealing with how and why journalists are ‘naturally’ official line-driven. 
He states that journalists ‘tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both 
news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream 
government debate about a single topic’ (p. 106). Thus, Bennett (1990) concludes 
that ‘mass media news is indexed […] to the dynamics of governmental debate’ (p. 
108). In other words, when there is general consensus on the objectives of foreign 
policy for instance, media are likely to be unable to be critical of this consensus and 
to stress independent voices. Moreover, news for Bennett (1994) is not only ‘elite 
driven’, but also sensitive to the impact of divisions within elites. This is the case 
particularly in times of conflict which may allow journalists to report opposition 
voices (p. 24).  
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A similar interpretation of how the media cover war and conflict is described 
by Robinson (1999, 2002) as the ‘elite version’ of the manufacturing consent thesis. 
He describes how ‘news media coverage conforms to the interests of political elites 
in general whether they are in the executive, legislative or any other politically 
powerful position in society’ (Robinson, 2002, p. 13). The elite version also 
highlights that during periods of elite dissensus critical coverage might appear 
(Robinson, 2002, p. 14). Therefore, rather than merely emphasising media reporting 
as a reinforcement of government policy in the way that the executive manufacturing 
consent suggests, there is a possibility that news media coverage might be critical of 
executive policy on war. Furthermore, there might also be a chance that the media 
may take sides, especially when there are elite debates over policy (Robinson, 2002, 
pp. 14-15). Namely, either deliberately or unintentionally, journalists might have an 
opportunity to choose which side of elites they support, or even, in the words of 
Wolfsfeld (1997), to be supportive of ‘non-elites’. From this perspective, the media 
are seen as active and powerful participants in political debate (Robinson, 2002, p. 
15). Robinson (2002) suggests that, elite manufacturing consent theory does not 
imply a passive news media with dependence on political elite sources due to the 
possibility of media’s opposition against policy.  
More evidence from Robinson (2002) highlighting the elite 
consensus/dissensus factor in relation to media power is provided via a policy-media 
interaction model, where he begins with an essential understanding of policy 
un/certainty. He defines policy uncertainty as ‘a function of the degree of consensus 
and co-ordination of the sub-systems of the executive with respect to an issue’ 
(Robinson, 2002, p. 26). Accordingly, Robinson (2002) argues that manufacturing 
consent theory only undoubtedly applies when there exists elite consensus over an 
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issue. This is in line with the executive version of the manufacturing consent thesis, 
where the media are unlikely to criticise the policy. In contrast, if there exists elite 
dissensus over an issue, the media respond to the debate thus providing critically and 
supportively framed coverage. This is what Robinson (2002) identifies as the elite 
version of the manufacturing consent thesis. Furthermore, if the elite dissensus 
combined with a high level of policy certainty within government exist at the same 
time, the media are expected to align with official policy. Finally, according to 
Robinson (2002), when elite dissensus along with policy uncertainty exist, the media, 
in addition to reflecting the debate via critically framed coverage, might be able to 
influence policy contrary the suggestions of the manufacturing consent thesis. More 
empirical evidence about the political consensus factor is to be found from other 
researchers (Hallin, 1986; Mermin, 1996, 1997, 1999; Zaller & Chui, 1996, 2000).  
In the study on media coverage during the Vietnam War, Hallin (1986) 
argues that patriotic media privileged government sources and marginalised 
oppositional ones making Americans the ‘good guys’ (Parry & Goddard, 2017), and 
later these government sources ‘became more and more divided’ (Hallin, 1986, p. 
10). This shift occurred because of the failure of the political consensus on the war. 
The divisions within the political elites and the increasing anti-war sentiment inside 
the US contributed to the media’s changing focus. Hallin (1986) details that before 
1968 the media coverage of the Vietnam War merely reflected official sources and 
elite consensus about the war effort. Critical coverage was often dependent on 
information from Congressional leaders. Nevertheless, after the Tet Offensive took 
place in January 19682, the political consensus changed, and the news coverage of 
the war started to reflect this dissensus. Thus, the media were in fact playing a rather 
                                                          
2 Several rounds of North Vietnamese attacks on South Vietnam and its U.S. ally. 
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follower role responding to the appearing divisions. Aa Hallin (1986) writes, ‘the 
media became a forum for airing political differences rather than a tool of policy’ (p. 
187). Accordingly, he develops three ideological spheres to imply different 
journalistic standards. The first sphere is that of consensus, where the media are 
unlikely to present opposition views on any given political issue. Instead, journalists 
are rather feeling responsible for advocating and protecting consensus values among 
elites. The second sphere is that of legitimate controversy where Hallin (1986) points 
out that the media feel it is their obligation to practise objectivity between opposing 
claims. This sphere is seen as the one where many of today’s progressive journalists 
fall within (Keeble, 2017, p. 13). Finally, there is a sphere of deviance. Hallin (1986) 
states: ‘[US media] play the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the 
public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus’ (p. 117). 
Within this sphere, the media tend to attack ‘those political actors and views which 
journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being 
heard’ (Hallin, 1984, p. 21). The defeat in Vietnam was a blow for the U.S. military 
and politicians, which was often blamed on the media for the graphic/negative 
coverage that was seen as turning the public opinion against the war (Elegant, 1979). 
Former President Ronald Reagan referred to this as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ (Parry 
& Goddard, 2017, p. 161). Hallin’s (1984, 1986) findings make significant points 
about the media’s rather obedient role, thus rejecting the accusation.  
Mermin’s (1999) study of news coverage during post-Vietnam US military 
interventions is a further empirical research supporting the indexing theory (Bennett, 
1990) and the elite manufacturing consent theory (Robinson, 2002). Mermin (1999) 
develops two versions of the indexing hypothesis: correlation and marginalisation. 
The former is similar to Bennett (1990) and Hallin’s (1986) arguments highlighting 
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that the change of media’s emphasis is according to the level of consensus on a 
foreign policy issue within political elites. The latter marginalisation version holds 
that if critical views are not articulated within political elites, the critical debate is 
marginalised or ignored. The news media then will do something that contradicts the 
journalistic autonomy from the government (Mermin, 1999, p. 6). 
Zaller and Chiu (1996, 2000) study news coverage of foreign policy from the 
beginning of the Cold War to the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and offer supportive 
evidence of the theory that the indexed media are passive and faithfully deliver 
politicians’ lines. They describe the news media as to ‘wax hawkish and wane dovish 
as official sources lead them to do’ (Zaller & Chiu, 1996, p. 386). However, this 
statement is found to apply only for the period between 1945 and 1991. The follow-
up study focusing on the post-Cold War period discovers no indexing pattern and 
contradicts Mermin’s (1999) findings. The researchers argue that the media were less 
in line with executive officials and in certain ways more balanced when issues did 
not contain communist enemies (Zaller & Chiu, 2000, p. 77). The difference between 
the two results from Mermin (1999) and Zaller and Chiu (2000) lies in the use of 
different methodologies in terms of coding scheme (Zaller & Chiu, 2000, pp. 80-81). 
But the change in media’s role is similarly observed by Entman who previously 
proves the media’s compliance with foreign policy interests (Entman, 1991, 1994), 
and later argues that the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s such as the 1991 
Gulf War and the Somalia crisis (1992-93) were triggered by influential news media 
coverage (Entman, 2000). The end of the Cold War is seen as the reason for the shift 
in how the media cover war and conflict. That is, the disappearance of communism 
as a direct threat to U.S. security enabled elites to be critical of policies without 
looking unpatriotic. In this case, Entman (2000) claims that demonisation that ‘was 
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the engine of interventionism’ became more difficult (p. 14). Consequently, the 
‘benefits of intervention policies’ that were embedded among journalists and the 
public during the Cold War transformed into a ‘costs schema’ in the post-Cold War 
era (Entman, 2000, p. 14). In addition, the development of technology made it 
possible to publish image of dramatic visual details of U.S. casualties. The rising 
public concern about these two factors – the costs schema and the image – became 
perceived pressure against the country’s involvements in Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. Thus, the media in the post-Cold War era became increasingly critical of 
foreign policy on war effort in many ways, ranging from selecting sources to 
constructing frames (Entman, 2000). As Entman (2003) puts it: ‘the media now 
pounce upon any signs of failure or quagmire and in doing so apply their own 
evaluative criteria as much as indexing elite opposition’ (as cited in Robinson et al., 
2009, p. 539). 
Similarly, Bennett et al.’s (2007) later updated concept of indexing 
hypothesis suggests a number of ‘notable conditions’ (such as events, technology, 
and investigative journalism) that may lead to independent journalistic practice 
including challenging official sources. One example of those ‘notable conditions’ is 
the 2003 Iraq War, where the media became more anti-war oriented after Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) were found to be absent. However, Baum and Groeling 
(2010) examining news coverage of the Iraq War between 2003 and 2007, argue that 
the notion of ‘notable’ implies ‘exceptional infrequency’ (p. 4). Speaking of the 
notable conditions such as ‘major breakthroughs by investigative journalists’, they 
argue: ‘it is difficult to precisely define and measure them, and even more difficult to 
determine ex ante which events are likely to give rise to them’ (Baum & Groeling, 
2010, p. 4). Consequently, the media’s dependence on official sources remains intact. 
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Other scholars (e.g., Chomsky, 1999; Hammond, 2007a, 2007b) agree that the media 
during the 1990s such as the 1999 Kosovo crisis were more of a tool used by 
Western political elites to justify and glorify their military actions in other countries.  
An example of this tendency is news coverage of the 1999 NATO air strikes 
against Serbia (Hammond, 2007a, 2007b). Hammond (2007b) investigates the 
relationship between news framing and power by comparing leading frames by 
British mainstream media with the official government perspective. He discerns 
some overall patterns in the media’s misrepresentation and distortion and 
summarises that in the Kosovo conflict the media morally simplified and promoted 
NATO’s air strike by framing the bombing as ‘good against evil’ (Hammond, 2007b, 
p. 219). Hammond (2007a, 2007b) suggests that the humanitarian crisis was 
successfully justified to the Western public as a humanitarian war. This position can 
also be found in the comparative study of Balabanova (2007) who scrutinises 
Western and Eastern European countries – Britain and Bulgaria’s print media 
regarding the NATO’s air war in 1999. She finds that the Western media in 1999 
were overall supportive of the war effort in terms of a clear foreign policy line on the 
NATO’s military action, with a focus on suffering people in Kosovo. Once the 
question of air strikes was set on to the agenda, the British media paid significant 
attention to the issue with three dominant topics including the air strikes against the 
FRY, the direct clashes between Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, and the peace 
talks/negotiations (Balabanova, 2010, p. 75). The British media framed the air strikes 
during the first period (February/March 1999) in a supportive way, and became 
critical of the government but with regards to the effectiveness of their strategy 
during the second period (April/May 1999). Overall, the British media were 
supportive of the war effort from February to May 1999, where the manufacturing 
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consent thesis was identified (Balabanova, 2007, pp. 148-149). Yet, this kind of 
journalistic practice of selective reporting on human suffering not only challenges the 
normative framework of media’s democratic role as ‘watchdogs’ and causes ‘a 
perception that human rights are only relevant to the reporting of distant conflict’, 
but also means that it is possible to completely miss some human rights stories 
(Balabanova, 2017, p. 233).  
In addition to the indexing hypothesis (Bennett, 1990) and the elite 
manufacturing consent theory (Robinson, 2002), Entman (2004) proposes a media 
cascade model to replace the indexing approach suggesting that ‘the White House, its 
supporters, and its critics peddle their messages to the press in hopes of gaining 
political leverage’ (p. 4). He believes that the media’s important role in politics is a 
result of its ability to frame the coverage in ways favouring one side over another. 
This is because of the very existence of differences among elites in the post-Cold 
War era. Even when the administration is initiating and promoting war, media are not 
completely passive receptacles for government propaganda (Entman, 2004, p. 428). 
At least not always. The model also clarifies deviations from the preferred frame, and 
proves how information cascade works – from the administration on the top, to other 
elites, then to news organisations, and to the texts they produce, finally reaching the 
public. 
Unlike the variables such as degrees of political consensus, Wolfsfeld (1997) 
focuses on the level of control over the political environment and argues that the 
media rather respond to and drive political agendas instead of initiating them. They 
quicken political success and failure. Wolfsfeld (1997) highlights the competition 
among opponents along two dimensions: a structural (struggle over access) and a 
cultural (struggle over meaning). The struggle over the news media is seen ‘as part of 
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a more general struggle for political control’ (Wolfsfeld & Sheafer, 2006, p. 334). 
The former dimension refers to the level of interdependence between a political 
antagonist and respective media. According to Wolfsfeld (1997), ‘the relative power 
of either side […] is determined by the value of its services divided by its need for 
those services offered by the other’ (p. 14). There is an important exchange of 
information between the two systems. Wolfsfeld (1997) stresses that competing 
parties attempt to promote their own interests on a policy/issue, whilst their 
respective media need materials (e.g., information and events) from the antagonists 
in order to produce news. The latter cultural dimension emphasises the impact of 
norms: how rules, principles, and routines have an impact on the building of media 
frames of conflict. According to Cottle (2006), this cultural dimension suggests that 
political contests ‘are also struggles over meaning in which success within the news 
media can lead to higher levels of political support’ (p. 22). Easy access to media is 
an important factor in order to promote and legitimise specific discourses and thus 
ensure hegemonic power. Wolfsfeld’s (1997) arguments together give an idea of a 
process that is neither linear nor constant, because of the dynamic nature of things. 
As he says, ‘the competition between authorities and challengers over the news 
media is as fascinating and unpredictable as politics itself’ (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 5). 
Overall, the models (the executive and elite versions of the manufacturing consent 
thesis, the indexing hypothesis) both empirically and theoretically highlight the 
importance of elite consensus that renders the media significant degree of 
dependence upon political line in the context of war/conflict (Balabanova, 2015; 
Robinson, 2011). The other theories from Wolfsfeld (1997) who emphasises the 
struggle over the news media, and Entman (2004) who highlights the media’s ability 
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to frame news coverage in ways favouring one side over another, propose how the 
media might be in line with political policy within mediated conflict. 
Technological factors are another prism through which to review the current 
media landscape. This leads scholars to rethink whether the manufacturing consent 
thesis still applies to the changing media ecology in today’s interconnected 
communications. Roger (2013) argues that the centralised manufacturing consent 
model is somewhat outdated in the current ‘deterritorialised media age’ (p. 34). 
Others such as Livingston and Van Belle (2005) and Wolfsfeld (2011) similarly 
point out that technological innovations have improved the ability of journalists to 
collect information and images and thus increased the number of ‘spontaneous’ news 
that are not scheduled by the authorities. This results in a difficulty for the 
government to maintain a monopoly over information. Yet, empirical studies suggest 
that the advances in communications technology have not brought in independent 
journalistic practice in times of war, but rather caused tougher restrictions on media 
movement in war zones (Robinson, 2004). Moreover, when there is an event such as 
a distant conflict, it is the authorities that journalists will go to in the first place, for 
authoritative information (Wolfsfeld, 2011). Wolfsfeld (2011) explains that the new 
technology indeed enables the media to get more access to news stories that might 
have not been available previously. However, most of that news is with official 
involvement (p. 36). More empirical proof on his argument is offered by Livingston 
and Bennett (2003) in their study of how the US media reported international stories 
between 1994 and 2001. The findings reveal a trend that there was an increase in 
event-driven news. However, the media still stuck to official sources and agenda. As 
Livingston and Bennett (2003) state: ‘officials seem to be as much a part of the news 
as ever. When an unpredicted, nonscripted, spontaneous event is covered in the 
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news, the one predictable component of coverage is the presence of official sources’ 
(p. 376). Thus, the seemingly spontaneous presentation of a news event is already 
mediated by reference to authority. Hence the importance of the technological 
development should not be undervalued, but it should not be exaggerated either.  
 More empirical evidence is offered by the study on the 2014 conflict 
between Israel and Palestine from Qiu and Sanders (2014) who suggest that during 
the first few weeks of the conflict, there was a systematic favouring of Israeli 
officials on CNN over Palestinian ones, and of ‘dramatic’ pictures that stereotyped 
the participants. The dramatic pictures were an important value in the news 
production. As a news editor from The Guardian acknowledges the pictures featured 
‘a disproportionate use of images of Palestinians throwing rocks’ (as cited in 
Freedman, 2017, p. 69). Freedman (2017) adds to this the journalists’ reluctance to 
challenge the powerful from Israel. He quotes a senior news editor from the BBC in 
Philo and Berry’s (2011) study: ‘following any critical report, “we wait in fear for 
the phone call from the Israelis”’ (p. 69). Regardless of the attempt to be ‘objective’ 
in covering the conflict, Freedman (2017) argues that the construction of equal 
representation of all sides is a journalistic device that should be rejected. Given the 
asymmetric nature of the assault on Gaza, he continues, objectivity is rather ‘a 
strategy to paint a picture of two equal sides battling it out for regional hegemony’ 
(Freedman, 2017, p. 69). Boyd-Barrett (2019) in his recent study on Western news 
coverage of the Syrian conflict finds that a large number of seemingly credible 
sources of information offered by the media were actually created or funded by the 
governments. This important finding speaks directly to the third filter of the 
Propaganda Model – journalistic reliance on ‘legitimate sources’ (Herman & 
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Chomsky, 1988). The reporting routine, thus, supported Western political stances 
and goals in the region (Boyd-Barrett, 2019).  
Western news media coverage (especially the UK and the U.S.) in the context 
of war and conflict is extensively researched by scholars as demonstrated above. This 
indicates a lack of non-Western media focused studies of war and conflict. Few 
scholars adopt a comparative approach to incorporating war coverage outside of the 
Western media (e.g., Balabanova, 2007). Heywood’s (2014) research on European 
television news reporting of war and conflict in the Middle East post 9/11 (including 
a peace conference, Israel-Palestinian fighting, and intra-Palestinian fighting) 
contributes to the field. Heywood (2014) examines news values and agenda-setting 
techniques by looking at three public broadcasters from three European countries – 
Britain (the BBC), Russia (Channel 1), and France (France 2), and identifies 
different roles of public (the BBC and France 2) and state-aligned (Channel 1) 
broadcasters from 2006 to 2008. She argues that the hierarchy in news values can be 
partly explained by the structure of the broadcasters. The other explanation is the 
events occurring within or in relation to the reporting country (Heywood, 2014, pp. 
280-281). For example, the BBC tends to use ‘a “futility of war” narrative, human 
interest, and compassion aspects of the conflict’, which is connected to two reasons 
(Heywood, 2014, p. 280). One is due to the Middle East editor’s important role in 
determining news agenda according to her/his subjective interpretations and views 
on war reporting. The other is linked to the fact that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
were still going on during the studied time period, thus gaining more attention by the 
media. Quite different from the BBC, France 2’ news coverage focuses mainly on 
the negative value of subjects on terrorism and the Islamic republic in the region, but 
with bare reflection on the compassion values in relation to the human aspect. 
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However, the French media noticeably prioritises the events in Lebanon in detail as 
well as France’s diplomatic role in Israel. The Russian media Channel 1 is found to 
be highly supportive in the national foreign policy as Russia played an important 
diplomatic role in the region. For instance, the media tends to offer a wider scope in 
its news coverage, incorporating even non-conflict related stories especially that of 
Israel by using the overall conflict narrative. This is regardless of the fact that the 
Middle East is ‘not purely a site of conflict’ (Heywood, 2014, p. 283). As Heywood 
(2014) explains, by doing this the Russian media is attempting to highlight the 
country’s close relationships with the Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel (p. 283). A 
recent comparative study from Nelson (2019) essentially examines how Russian 
external service RT framed international conflicts: ‘the 2011 NATO intervention in 
Libya and the 2014 Russian intervention in the Ukraine’ (p. 127). For purposes of 
comparison, the researcher includes two media outlets from the West: Voice of 
America (U.S.) and Deutche Welle (Germany). The results show a ‘persuasive power 
of certain framing devices by RT’ via synchronising its editorial perspectives in 
support of the Kremlin’s foreign policy (Nelson, 2019, p. 136). The pattern of 
editorial synchronisation is also found between Voice of America and the US 
government. This observation reflects Bennett’s (1990) indexing thesis (Nelson, 
2019, p. 137). 
 
1.4.2 The CNN effect theory. 
Against the background of an extensive literature on the relationship between 
media and conflict that has stressed the tendency for the news media to act in favour 
of government war aims (e.g. Bennett & Palets, 1994; Hallin, 1986; Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988; Robinson et al., 2010; Balabanova, 2007, 2015; Hammond, 2017, 
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2018; Hammond et al., 2019; Freedman, 2017; Keeble, 2017), a new discourse 
emerged during the 1990s through the so-called CNN effect theory. Gilboa (2005b) 
explains how global television news became a reality in the early 1980s when CNN 
expanded its broadcasting reach to countries worldwide. Due to the newly emerging 
technologies and the capabilities of satellite broadcasting and cable TV, global media 
players such as the CNN were able to become a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
‘it was not until the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, that CNN became a significant actor in 
international relations’ (Gilboa, 2005b, p. 325). And it was around this time that the 
CNN effect theory first appeared, which initially referred to the ‘adverse 
psychological, economic, and financial consequences of CNN’s war coverage’ 
(Gilboa, 2005b, p. 325). Namely, the theory examined the emerging 24-hour news 
providers worldwide and traditional broadcast media such as television news and 
newspapers, to better appreciate how real-time broadcasting shaped the making of 
news and their effects on policy making (Gowing, 1994; Minear et al., 1996; 
Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 2002; Gilboa, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Balabanova, 2007; 
Bahador, 2007). Academic research shed light on the importance of the different 
contexts in determining the power of Western media that might have (or not) caused 
US-led humanitarian interventions such as the 1991 Kurdish crisis in Northern Iraq, 
Somalia in 1991-92, Bosnia in 1994-95, and Kosovo in 1999. As Gilboa (2005a), 
Seib (2002), and Robinson (2002) critically argue the evidence to suggest the 
existence of the CNN effect theory remains contradictory. The related empirical 
studies have discovered contextual factors such as levels of policy certainty (Entman, 
2004; Minear et al., 1996; Robinson, 2002; Shaw, 1996; Strobel, 1997), national 
interests (Gowing, 1994, 2000; Jakobsen, 1996, 2000), nature of interventions 
(Livingston, 1997), and types of media system (Balabanova, 2007). More studies 
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such as that of Freedman (2000), and Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer, and Shenhav 
(2013) highlight political opponents’ ability to influence international media 
coverage to support their course. These include agenda-setting, framing, and 
facilitating diplomatic and military assistance.   
There are a number of definitions being used when discussing the notion of 
the CNN effect. Seib (2002) offers a general understanding of the theory defining it 
as ‘illustrat[ing] the dynamic tension that exists between real-time television news 
and policymaking, with the news having the upper hand in terms of influence’ (p. 
27). Schorr (1998) sees the CNN effect as ‘the way breaking news affects foreign 
policy decisions’ (as cited in Gilboa, 2005b, p. 29). Robinson (2002) puts it 
differently focusing on all media impact upon political decision-making. ‘The CNN 
effect’, he argues, ‘is in the alleged influence of the media upon decisions to 
intervene during humanitarian crises with the use, or threat of use, of force’ 
(Robinson, 2002, p. 2). Two other important interpretations are similar to Robinson’s 
definition. Livingston and Eachus (1995) highlight news sources as a way of 
deciding whether or not social actors have control over the policy process, and define 
the CNN effect as elite decision makers’ loss of policy control to news media (p. 
413). In their scrutiny of the media role during the US invasion and withdrawal from 
Somalia from 1992 to 1993, Livingston and Eachus (1995) write: ‘Shifts in policy 
come in response to media content, and policy makers, in some measures, have lost 
control of policy making to the news media’ (p. 416). Feist (2001) drives this view 
further, covering the media’s influence in terms of their assumed ability to prevail 
over certain national interests. He describes the CNN effect as: ‘compelling 
television images such as images of a humanitarian crisis, cause U.S. policymakers 
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to intervene in a situation when such an intervention might otherwise not be in the 
U.S. national interest’ (Feist, 2001, p. 713).  
Neuman (1996) provides a broader-time span of the media effects by looking 
at the coverage’s influence on the primary decision and on the following intervention 
phases including long-term deployment and exit strategies. She regards the effect as 
a ‘curve’ during a foreign crisis where the coverage floods the airwaves and 
politicians are pressured to follow the crisis. The coverage activates the public’s 
emotional outcry forcing policy-makers to ‘do something’: ‘change course or risk 
unpopularity’ (pp. 15-16). This indicates a powerful role of television driving 
political officials to initiate a military intervention in a humanitarian crisis, and to 
make them again end the intervention once there are casualties or humiliation in 
military. The ‘forcing’ function, in this sense, is key to the definition that includes 
two parts (Gilboa, 2005b, p. 29). Gilboa (2005b) describes the first part as to signify 
the media putting the issue of humanitarianism on the agenda. The second part 
represents the powerful force of television that can force politicians to change policy 
because of public opinion. Similarly, building upon Neuman’s two effects, Freedman 
(2000) studies global news coverage of conflict at different phases with a focus on 
the collective and often irrational emotional effect of strong visual images, and 
identifies three effects of television coverage on humanitarian interventions. They are 
the ‘CNN effect’ – whereby images of human suffering push governments into 
intervention; the ‘body bag effect’ – whereby images of casualties pull the military 
out; and the ‘bullying effect’ – whereby the use of excessive force risks to deactivate 
public support for intervention (p. 338). The latter two effects refer to the public 
intolerance for unexpected casualties, both among military (body bags effect) and 
among citizens of the target country (bullying effect).  
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Strobel (1997) uses interviews with policymakers, critically highlighting the 
significant factor of obvious national interests. He argues that the media are only 
seemingly influential when politicians frame and motivate coverage in the first place. 
As Strobel (1997) says ‘pictures and other news media products can help explain the 
need for intervention to the public, making officials’ task of persuasion that much 
easier’ (p. 162). This pattern is similarly recognised by Gowing (1994, 2000) and is 
partly accepted by Jakobsen (1996, 2000). Gowing (1994) also uses interviews with 
policymakers in several countries, and concludes that in spite of substantial news 
coverage of atrocities in the 1991 Bosnia, the Western and the US politicians resisted 
the media pressure to intervene. In a later study, Gowing (2000) with regards to the 
change of U.S. policy toward the 1996 catastrophe in Burundi, demonstrates that 
regardless of the absence of media coverage, the government was willing to 
intervene. The opposite examples imply the same observation that highlights national 
interests as the determining factor for interventions, thus undermining the CNN 
effect theory.  
Jakobsen (1996) explores the reasons of post-Cold War UN peace 
enforcements by looking at the operations in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Haiti. He finds two distinct patterns leading to the operations: national 
interests and humanitarian sentiment. CNN reporting played an important role 
because it set the issue on the agenda; but it was not the determining factor for the 
intervention. As Jakobsen (1996) concludes when national interests are perceived to 
be at stake, governments that want to intervene in an international situation will use 
the media to mobilise both domestic and international support and will be less 
concerned with casualties (pp. 212-213). In this case, the CNN effect does not exist 
because the intervention is desirable by policy makers. On the other hand, when 
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national interests are not seen to be at stake, the media then play a different role 
mobilising pressure on government to act. Simultaneously government’s decision of 
whether to go to war is influenced by the perceived chance of success. In this 
scenario, an intervention seems unlikely to take place unless ‘the risk of casualties 
can be kept to a minimum and the operation can be limited in time’ (Jakobsen, 1996, 
p. 213). But this is not the rule for all times. For example, in the case of the Bosnia 
conflict, Jakobsen (1996) argues that the Western powers exacerbated the situation 
and thus could not limit their involvement. They were increasingly drawn deeper into 
the conflict and in order to avoid a shameful withdrawal, the decision was made to 
use force. Jakobsen (2000) later expands this view with the emphasis on national 
interests and evaluation of casualties. He suggests that due to the fact that it is 
unlikely to conduct interventions quickly with a low risk of causalities, ‘media 
pressure on reluctant governments is most likely to result in minimalist policies 
aimed at defusing pressure for interventions on the ground’ (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 138).  
More observations of the CNN effect are made by Livingston (1997), 
Mermin (1999), Wheeler (2000), and Bahador (2007) who identify important 
differences among different CNN effects. Livingston (1997) provides three 
variations of the CNN effect: a ‘policy agenda-setting agent’ – emotional and 
persuasive news coverage of humanitarian crises is able to reorder foreign policy 
priorities; an ‘impediment’ to the achievement of desired policy goals, suggesting 
either media’s link with breaches in operational security or that the media is powerful 
enough to challenge public and political support for an operation – this is also what 
Freedman (2000) calls the ‘body-bags effect’; and finally an ‘accelerant’ to policy 
decision-making, as new communications technology shortens politicians’ ‘response 
time’, instantaneous media quickens decision-making (Livingston, 1997, p. 293). 
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Livingston’s (1997) three manifestations have been highlighted by many scholars, 
but not everyone was convinced due to the likelihood of different effects that might 
occur in one on-going conflict (Carruthers, 2011, p. 146).  
Wheeler (2000) differentiates ‘determining’ from ‘enabling’ effects of 
television coverage. The ‘determining’ effect refers to policy forcing, while the 
‘enabling’ effect suggests that coverage enables politicians to initiate humanitarian 
intervention by mobilising domestic support (p. 300). For example, in the case of 
Iraq and Somalia in the 1990s, Wheeler (2000) argues that the media coverage of the 
humanitarian crises was an important enabling condition rather than the determining 
one, in making intervention possible. A further example of the notion that media’s 
influence is conditional is offered by Bahador (2007). Bahador (2007) in his study on 
the 1999 Kosovo crisis demonstrates that the CNN effect takes place when the media 
take sides and depict one party as a victim. According to him, the media can contest 
an official policy’s credibility by being critical of and characterising the policy as 
ineffective, so that the policy-makers ‘are pressured to alter policy in order to fill the 
void’ (Bahador, 2007, p. 11).  
Since framing is seen as key in the war news coverage (Robinson, 2002; 
Bahador, 2007; Freedman, 2017), how the international media convey messages is 
important to how the conflicts are perceived and understood. However, one problem 
is that some conflicts do not attract media’s attention in the first place. For instance, 
in the 1990s, while the 1999 Kosovo crisis attracted significant attention by the 
media, humanitarian emergencies in Africa such as Congo and Sierra Leone did not 
receive any attention (Hawkins, 2004; 2008). Hawkins (2011) argues that the media 
often selectively and disproportionately cover conflicts thus omit most of the world’s 
conflicts: ‘the deadliest conflicts are among those ignored’ (Hawkins, 2011, p. 55). 
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Hawkins (2011) labels the unreported conflicts as ‘stealth conflicts’ (losers), while 
the chosen conflicts are select winners. He examines the US media in 2009 and 
argues that Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Pakistan were the winners. The 
determination to cover them is related to the US interests (e.g., belligerent, 
benefactor) rather than being random (Hawkins, 2011, p. 65). In a more recent study 
on media coverage of international terrorism (the Al-Qaeda attack of the United 
States on 9/11, the Palestinian attacks against Israel, and Islamic terror against 
British targets), Yarchi et al. (2013) discover that political value proximity leads to 
more frequent reports of terrorism attacks. If a victimised country has a closer 
political value (i.e., liberal democracy and a high standard of human rights 
protection), the media will report in detail what happened in the country and follow 
the framing of the victim government.  
In addition to these conditioning variables, Shaw (1996, 2000) focuses on 
humanitarian rationale and formulates an argument that viewing the graphical 
portrayal of human tragedy is the main reason for humanitarian interventions. In his 
empirical study of the Western response to the Kurdish refugee crisis immediately 
after the 1991 Gulf War, Shaw (1996) argues that the global flow of news and the 
visual representation of distant suffering led to ‘the unprecedented proposal for 
Kurdish safe havens’ (p. 79). However, while Shaw (1996) highlights the media’s 
role in what he defines as a global reduction of ‘emotional and psychological 
distance’ (p. 8), the view is opposed by the ‘compassion fatigue’ thesis (Moeller, 
1999). Moeller (1999) sees ‘compassion fatigue’ as responsible for the failure of 
contemporary journalism, including the nature of its global crisis coverage (p. 2). 
Specifically, she insists that compassion fatigue functions as a pre-limit in that 
‘editors and producers do not assign correspondents to possible stories; it abets 
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American self-interest; it strengthens simplistic, standard reporting; it increases the 
standards for stories to be reported; it makes journalists sensationalise; ‘and it 
encourages the media to move on’ (as cited in Cottle, 2009, p. 132). That is, the 
excess of media images of human suffering is considered to have overwhelmed 
audiences’ capacity to care (Cottle, 2009, p. 128).   
In addition to the ‘compassion fatigue’ thesis, more recent studies such as that 
of Freedman (2017) mirror Jakobsen’s (2000) argument in relation to the national 
interests factor and contend that while the governments strive to legitimise and 
sustain military action by expecting the media to supportively frame the issue, editors 
and journalists faithfully share and concretise the ideological expectations about 
national interest. Rather than direct censorship, argues Freedman (2017), the media 
are often willing to accept and reproduce what politicians and generals have offered 
such as agenda and briefings. The circulation of such fed information can ultimately 
naturalise the idea that ‘conflict is an inevitable, acceptable or necessary part of 
modern life’ (Freedman, 2017, p. 77). As Parry (2010) in her empirical study on 
British media’s photographic representation of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict 
points out, the editorialising decisions and the media owner’s preference were two 
major factors that resulted in The Times downplaying the Israeli military force used 
against the Lebanese people. During the 2003 Iraq Invasion, the high-circulation and 
pro-war media outlets (Sun, Mail, Telegraph, Times) were overall supportive of the 
glorified ‘humanitarian’ and ‘liberation’ discourses, thus legitimating the initial 
invasion that eventually caused internecine strife in Iraq (Parry, 2011, pp. 1197-
1198). Using the universal value of humanitarianism as justification for military 
interventions is essentially associated with ‘attempting to create an image of 
purposefulness’ (Hammod, 2007a, p. 59). Hammond et al. (2019) see Western 
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media’s advocacy of liberal interventionism in Syria with their ‘moral impulse’ as 
part of the efforts to implement the ‘regime-change’ agenda in the country. Robinson 
(2017) shares a similar view on the often-exaggerated humanitarian sentiment whilst 
the significance of realpolitik that is shown to shape intervention decisions is 
overlooked. He argues that in the context of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ over the 
past almost two decades, a combination of ‘humanitarian’ aid strategies and military 
operations has reflected the US and Western geo-strategic interests. For example, 
these interests have been pursued in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, yet 
presented in a sugar-coating of the humanitarian agenda ‘as a public justification for 
these wars of national/security interest’ (Robinson, 2017, pp. 191-194). Thus, the 
news framing of the humanitarian discourse reflects ‘the masking of geo-political 
strategy’ (Robinson, 2017, p. 189), resulting in conflicts being ‘simplified beyond 
recognition’ (Robinson, 2019a, p. 562).   
Another contextual factor can be found from Balabanova’s (2007) empirical 
study where she points out the importance of media system in Bulgaria that framed 
the coverage of the 1999 Kosovo crisis in a relatively neutral way. While she 
validates the manufacturing consent thesis in the British media, the CNN effect 
theory was not substantiated in any of the two countries’ media. A study by Baum 
and Groeling (2010), discussed earlier with regards to news reporting of the 2003 
Iraq War, shows that elite criticism of the US government was a vital factor that 
enabled news media to play an influential role. Nevertheless, the significance of this 
argument lies in the high frequency in reporting the elite criticisms of the 
government’s policy on a war. Robinson (2011) links this fact to the corollary that 
‘high levels of elite-consensus (policy certainty) are likely to inhibit media influence’ 
(p. 6). When there exist clear policy lines on a specific action, the media are believed 
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to be rather submissive than forcing solidarised officials to change course. This again 
resonates with Robinson’s (2002) earlier work where he emphasises the elite’s 
‘consensus’ and ‘dissensus’ factors as discussed above.  
In responding to the necessity of examining and reflecting how news media 
report war and conflict in general and in particular the CNN effect theory in the 
current world, Balabanova (2011) and Robinson (2011) call for an exploration of 
different national contexts rather than merely that of the US and the UK cases. 
Taking into consideration the national context is an essential element to better 
understand war coverage dynamics that might differ across nations. Thus, ‘how 
different global crises become communicated, contested and constituted by the 
world’s media’ communication flows might also cause a ‘re-imagining of the 
political within an increasingly interconnected, interdependent and crisis-ridden 
world’ (Cottle, 2009, p. 170). As Robinson (2017) suggests, these are uncertain and 
troubling times where there are military operations co-operating with humanitarian 
operations attempting to ‘win “hearts and minds” of the population, at the expense of 
the latter’s independent role (p. 192). The current media often endorse the 
humanitarian dimensions and fail to see the significance of geo-political play and 
realpolitik (Robinson, 2017). The US/NATO and its regional allies’ constant 
belligerent stance is seen as the real risk of catastrophic conflicts with geo-political 
enemies (Robinson, 2019a). This world encompasses spin and other newspeak that 
do not have fixed meanings, whether they are hegemonic or counter-hegemonic (Bob 
et al., 2008). Given the advantages of cross-national research (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004) and the theme of this study, the next section focuses specifically on the 
existing research on the Ukraine crisis coverage through a comparative lens thus 
identifying the key findings and the key gaps.  
64 
 
1.4.3 Media coverage of the Ukraine crisis. 
The on-going Ukraine crisis has been accompanied by an information war in 
the media domain. Few comparative studies have compared the news coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis in and outside the West. An overarching feature shared by these 
studies is an alignment between the media coverage and the national policies on 
Ukraine, thus reflecting the manufacturing consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988) and the indexing theory (Bennett, 1990). For example, Nygren et al. (2018) 
adopt quantitative content analysis and semi-structured interviews with journalists to 
scrutinise news coverage of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine from 10 July to 6 
September 2014 in four countries: Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and Sweden. They find a 
clear patriotic pattern that applied to the Ukrainian news coverage and journalists in 
support of the national struggle. Two key factors were identified in the Russian news 
coverage: journalists’ self-censorship and strong political control over mainstream 
media. The latter was seen as causing rather passive professional values. Nygren et 
al. (2018) suggest that the mediatised conflict in Eastern Ukraine was strongly 
associated with ‘the political economy of the media systems’ and the ‘professional 
journalistic cultures’ (Nygren et al., 2018, p. 1074). Therefore, activism and self-
censorship were two major factors explaining the journalistic practices in Ukraine 
and Russia. As a consequence, news reporting of the Ukraine crisis mainly followed 
political division. The Polish reporting on the crisis was even more ‘anti-Russia’ than 
the Ukrainian, focusing on ‘Russian aggression, international sanctions, and threats 
against Poland’ (Nygren et al., 2018, p. 1074). The Polish media was, therefore, 
characterised by a certain degree of journalistic professionalism with clear activist 
attitudes. The professional culture also applied to the journalism in Sweden. The 
Swedish media focused mainly on international politics and the downing of MH17. 
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Although impartiality existed, there was evidence showing a strong preference in 
covering western actors and perspectives (Nygren et al., 2018, p. 1074).  
This compliance between the media and the politics is also found in Szostok, 
Gluszek-Szafraniec, and Guzek’s (2016) cross-national content analysis on news 
coverage of the Ukraine conflict in German, Polish, and Russian leading weekly 
opinion magazines. The researchers state that the Polish media tended to ‘reproduce 
opinions expressed by society rather than the ruling elite’, such as calling for radical 
sanctions on Russia (Szostok et al., 2016, p. 165-166). This is due to the historical 
fear of Russia that continues until today in Poland (Szostok et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, according to Szostok et al. (2016), this does not mean an effort to play 
an independent role from the powerful. As the researchers point out an overt 
compliance between the political elites and the media existed in the context of the 
Ukraine conflict (Szostok et al., 2016, pp. 165-167). Szostok et al. (2016) did not 
find an apparent manufacturing of consent in the German and Russian media. 
Especially in Germany, the political magazines (Der Spriegel and Focus) tended to 
offer various perspectives on the conflict, such as being wary of sanctions on Russia, 
including Russophile coverage, and criticising the government for being incompetent 
to deal with Russia. Szostok et al. (2016) explain this balanced stance by referring to 
the close cultural and social relationship, as well as the heavy economic 
interdependence between the two countries. But over time more critical coverage 
such as that about ‘the lack of a single EU position and the lack of firm resistance 
against the Russian annexation of Crimea’ started to appear in the German media 
(Szostok et al., 2016, p. 166). The surprising results coming from the Russian 
magazines clearly acknowledged Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict 
(Szostok et al., 2016). Szostok et al. (2016) suggest that there was critical coverage 
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identified in the Russian publications. For example, the media published opposing 
voices towards Russia’s situation in the context of the Ukraine crisis, owing to the 
fact that Russia’s involvement would incur costs at the social and political levels.   
Mirroring Nygren et al.’s (2018) findings with regards to the patriotic pattern 
in Ukrainian media and the strong political control of Russian media, Roman, Wanta, 
and Buniak (2017) use framing analysis to examine television news coverage of the 
Eastern Ukraine conflict across three different countries – Russia (Channel One 
Russia), Ukraine (1+1), and the U.S. (NBC) – from April 2014 to March 2015. The 
researchers argue that the studied news media relied greatly on sources and frames in 
line with the respective governments. In addition, the Russian and the U.S. media 
were more likely to report the sufferings and the deaths than the Ukrainian media. 
Roman et al. (2017) explain the U.S. media’s reliance on official sources as a 
‘journalistic tradition’ in war coverage. Due to the feature of operating under a tight 
control by the government, the Russian TV tended to symbolically annihilate 
alternative views and use Second World War symbolism such as ‘fascists’ in 
covering the Ukrainian side. The Ukrainian channel, on the other hand, often 
glorified Ukrainian troops as ‘our guys’ and ‘heroes’ (Roman et al., 2017, pp. 15-17).  
Roman et al.’s (2017) findings regarding the compliance between the politics 
and the media in Ukraine and Russia is supported in a later study of Fengler et al. 
(2018) who examine 13 European countries’ newspapers in covering the Ukraine 
crisis in the first half of 2014: Albania (Panorama and Shqip), Czech Republic 
(Mlada Fronta Dnes and Pravo), Germany (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Suddeutsche Zeitung), Latvia (Diena and Latvijas Avize), the Netherlands (De 
Telegraaf and De Volkskrant), Poland (Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita), 
Portugal (Diario de Noticias and Publico), Romania (Adevarul and Romania Libera), 
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Serbia (Danas and Kurir), Switzerland (Neue Zurcher Zeitung and Tagesanzeiger), 
the UK (The Guardian and The Times), Ukraine (Den and Segodnya), and Russia 
(Kommersant and Rossiyskaya Gazeta). Fengler et al. (2018) first of all point out that 
newspapers from Ukraine and Russia were identified as representing the respective 
national politics on the Ukraine crisis. In addition, while there was a high visibility of 
the Russian President Vladimir Putin as a major aggressor in the crisis, the featured 
‘human suffering’ pattern (Russian and Ukrainian newspapers in particular) 
identified by Roman et al. (2017) was also evident in Fengler et al.’s (2018) study 
where the evidence revealed a general tendency ‘to “humanise” conflict coverage’ 
(p. 17).  
Lichtenstein, Esau, Pavlova, Osipov, and Argylov (2018) in their comparative 
study on talk show debates in Russian and German television similarly reflect the 
above discussed results associated especially with the Russian media. Lichtenstein et 
al. (2018) also use framing analysis and suggest that the Russian media paid more 
attention to issues such as the Maidan protests, the stability of Ukrainian politics and 
economy, the complexities within Ukraine, the political strategy of the Yanukovych 
government, and the legal situation of the new Kyiv (p. 18). In comparison, the 
German debate paid less attention to an in-depth understanding of the structural 
situation in the country, but focused extensively on external issues such as the 
responsibility of separatist movements and the new Kyiv (Lichtenstein et al., 2018, p. 
18). Regardless of the critical coverage of both Russian and Western politics from 
both countries’ media outlets, the researchers argue that their reporting on the 
Ukraine crisis was highly representative of the governments’ policies on Ukraine. 
While the Russian media emphasised the political interests, the German media often 
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showed one-sided coverage. This reflected Bennett’s (1990) indexing thesis 
(Lichtenstein et al., 2018, p. 19). 
The attention paid to the Ukraine crisis examined by Lichtenstein et al. 
(2018) is explained in detail by Fengler et al. (2018) where the researchers find that 
among the 13 studied countries, Poland, Latvia, Germany, and Switzerland paid the 
biggest attention to the conflict, which can be explained by factors such as their 
diplomatic roles in solving the crisis, economic exchanges, geographic proximity, 
and cultural proximity. Second, distant countries such as Portugal, the Netherlands, 
the Czech Republic, the UK, as well as Lativa (Diena) and Switzerland 
(Tagesanzeiger) paid limited attention to the Ukraine crisis, as they – as countries –
played a minor role in looking for solutions to the crisis. These countries’ 
newspapers thus focused on international or EU politics rather than domestic issues 
and politics (Fengler et al., 2018). Third, news coverage from South-Eastern 
European countries – Albania, Romania, and Serbia was marginal. This was due to a 
lack of ‘resources for foreign coverage in the print sector of these countries’ (Fengler 
et al., 2018, p. 16). The researchers provide two explanations. First, newsrooms 
tended to send unexperienced staff to report the Ukraine conflict. Second, weaker 
internalisation of news factors owing to ‘substantial deficits in journalism education’ 
resulted in a different method of selecting news subjects and allocating editorial 
resources to foreign coverage (Fengler et al., 2018, p. 16). 
 
1.4.3.1 Locating this research. 
The above presented arguments about the characteristics of the media 
systems of liberal and hybrid regimes, the media’s overall submissive role leaning 
towards the governmental lines in covering war and conflict, and the lack of 
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comparative studies of war coverage including those outside of the Western media 
illustrate the current trends in the research on the topic. The recent comparative 
studies on the news coverage of the Ukraine crisis discussed above all focus on 
national-language media outlets (television, newspaper, and magazine) that target 
national audiences. Given the facts that the Ukraine crisis is an international conflict 
and English-language presence is more commonly accessed by global audiences, this 
study will help to fill the gap in recent research firstly in the area of media and 
international conflict, secondly in the specific field of Russian and British war 
reporting. Existing comparative study on Russian and British media coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis between 2014 and 2015 is very limited for the time being, although the 
literature on Russian coverage is more extensive especially on RT. Nevertheless, The 
Moscow Times and Pravda.ru have generally been excluded from the analysis. 
Finally, mirroring Balabanova (2011) and Robinson’s (2011) earlier call for 
examining war coverage beyond the Western world – the UK and the U.S. in 
particular, this research expands to a country with a hybrid political regime with 
different national peculiarities ranging from politics to culture and socio-economics. 
Therefore, looking at news media coverage of war and conflict under the hybrid 
regime will add to the existing and limited empirical studies on the subject, thus 
contributing to the theoretical development in terms of the applicability of the 
theories on media coverage of war. Overall, this comparative research offers a new 
insight into the way national contexts such as regime types contribute to the currently 
scarcely-researched field of cross-national (liberal and hybrid) comparisons of war 
coverage. Drawing upon the broader context of media systems of hybrid and liberal 
regimes (Vartanova, 2012; Hallin & Mancini, 2004), the study aims to shed light on 
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the role assumed by three media outlets from different political ends in one hybrid 
and one liberal country.  
What is expected is a general consensus between the media and their host 
countries’ foreign policies on legitimating political decisions in relation to the 
conflict. This is considered an apparent pattern especially occurring in the Russian 
media, given the nature of the media system – the statist commercialised model – as 
conceptualised by Vartanova (2012). The manufacturing consent thesis is therefore 
hypothesised to be evident in the Russian media due to the high level of state’s 
involvement in the media industry. The tabloid-style right-wing media, in particular, 
could be seen as more submissive to the government lines. However, the 
manufacturing consent thesis may not be applicable to all the Russia media. As 
Vartanova (2012) proposes, there are commercially-oriented media outlets in the 
country. Due to the fact that the British media under the liberal model (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004), in the sense of journalistic professionalism and market mechanism, 
strive to be watchdogs, the subservient nature in the context of the Ukraine crisis can 
be very subtle. The focus, therefore, will be on assessing in detail how the news 
coverage of the Ukraine conflict is framed in Russia and the UK respectively. This 
will provide evidence as to whether the media tend to align themselves with the 
national policies on Ukraine, and the exact nature of this possible alignment. Thus, 
this will offer significant answers not only to the dynamic of news framing in the 
context of war and conflict, but also to the development of pertinent theories: the 
manufacturing consent thesis and the CNN effect theory. This also helps highlight 
aspects of media systems, thus answer the main research question in relation to the 
extent and the ways the news coverage of the Ukraine conflict supports or refutes 




This chapter has demonstrated the normative frameworks of media within 
liberal democracies, as well as the different models of media systems across liberal 
and hybrid regimes. The literature on the war coverage during international conflicts 
illustrates very well the ever-changing and disputable relationship between political 
power and the media. The two main theories – the CNN effect and the manufacturing 
consent – have polarised the debate on media’s role in conflict. While the former 
emphasises the power of the media stressing varied contextual factors, the latter 
delivers a strong criticism of the media system and its subservience to political elites. 
The empirical studies exemplify that objectivity in the war coverage can only be 
regarded as journalism ideology. When it comes to war, the media are seen largely to 
underline moral and humanitarian sentiments, thus legitimising military activities 
and dehumanising the enemy (Riegert, 2003).  
The chapter has also acknowledged the limitations of these findings in terms 
of the main focus on liberal contexts (especially the UK and the U.S.), and identified 
the research gap that the current study aims to address. The following chapters 
explore the extent to which the selected Russian and British media paid attention to 
the Ukraine crisis between 30 November 2013 and 28 February 2015; and the way in 
which the Russian and British media differed in framing the narrative of the Ukraine 
crisis. Finally, an analytical discussion assesses the extent and the ways the coverage 
of the Ukraine crisis supports or refutes media systems theory.  
The following chapter is going to offer a detailed discussion about the nature 
of Russian and British media. The empirical evidence offers to situate them, build a 
comparative picture, and understand the media under a hybrid regime and the media 
in the context of an established democracy.  
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Chapter 2  
British and Russian Media 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Sukosd (2012), Dobek-Ostrowska (2015, 2019), and Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) characterisations of the media systems of hybrid and liberal regimes introduce 
a broader understanding of how media systems usually operate within the different 
regions. However, this does not mean that any of the models will apply precisely to 
the media system of an individual country. This is evident in both the hybrid and 
liberal regimes. On the one hand, while Vartanova (2012) proposes a Statist 
Commercialised model – exemplified by Russia – sharing some of the Western 
features, a number of empirical studies (e.g., Becker, 2014; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 
2018; Oates, 2013) have strongly disapproved the liberal ideal of ‘watchdog’ role in 
the Russian media system. This is due largely to the country’s political, economic, 
and socio-cultural peculiarities with contradictory features, creating what Hale 
(2010) and Sukosd (2018) call a hybrid regime. On the other hand, although the UK 
is categorised within the Liberal Model, it is often exemplified as an exception by 
both theoretical and empirical studies. Most debates are focused on ‘its strong public 
broadcasting, its ideologically polarized press, and its lack of fit with the Liberal 
model’ (Humphreys, 2012; Norrris, 2009; as cited in Bruggemann et al., 2014, p. 
1043).  
This chapter looks at the nature of the Russian and British media situating 
them and building a comparative picture and understanding of the media existing in 
what have been described as ‘hybrid regimes’ (Hale, 2010; Sukosd, 2018) and in the 
context of an ‘established democracy’ (Bühlmann et al., 2012). While the British 
media has the tradition and established market mechanism (Balabanova, 2007; Hallin 
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& Mancini, 2004), strong public broadcasting (Aalberg & Curran, 2012), and 
regulation of commercial broadcasting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004); the Russian media 
has been undergoing remarkable transformations since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. These transformations have directly affected the media ecology in 
today’s Russia. Thus, the attention here is devoted primarily to the established nature 
that characterises the British media, and the historical development that has led to the 
current characteristics of the Russian media. The chapter aims to connect the nature 
of the Russian and British media with the broader structure of the media systems 
theory outlined in Chapter one. To achieve this, the chapter first looks at the British 
media. It then focuses on the Russian media transformations from 1990s to 2000s, 
highlighting the economic and political factors as key drivers of change. Empirical 
evidence is provided throughout. 
 
2.2 British Media: Liberal Model  
Despite the fact that the term ‘Anglo-America model’ is commonly used 
within the discussion of the Liberal Model, seemingly to refer to the similarity 
between the media systems in the UK and the U.S., Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
themselves point out that the two systems are different in many ways (p. 11). They 
suggest that certain variations among countries should be taken into account when 
characterising their media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). For example, under 
this model political parallelism is suggested to be low, internal pluralism prevails, 
commercial print media dominate, state’s role is seen as limited, and professionalism 
is strong. Nonetheless, the UK is particularly characterised by high level of partisan 
media, strong public broadcasting and regulation of commercial broadcasting. The 
information-oriented journalism has features such as strong commentary practice and 
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journalistic autonomy is often limited by political instrumentalisation (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004, p. 75). As Hallin and Mancini (2004) note the UK media system is 
market dominated (except for the BBC), where commercial media are characterised 
by a high level of internal pluralism. With regard to freedom of information and the 
reporting of matters deemed sensitive for national security, the UK is seen as having 
a rather strong and ‘secretive’ state (Humphreys, 2009, p. 198). Similarly, Aalberg 
and Curran (2012) in their empirical study on media’s information role in six 
countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden) demonstrate a strong British public broadcasting that has a 
powerful effect on the public’s understanding of political issues.  
For some the rapid digitisation of media sources has strengthened the British 
media’s democratising role, both by offering various accesses to information and by 
allowing the public to have their voices heard due to the interactive nature of the 
internet (Castells, 2010; Curran, 2002; Allan, 2006; Boczkowski, 2004; Humphreys, 
2009). Most of these researchers, however, carefully point out that, the digitisation is 
not entirely unproblematic. In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, newspapers in Britain 
started to put their content online. The Office of Communications (Ofcom) (2007) 
reported that the major UK media outlets such as Daily Telegraph, the BBC, and 
Daily Mail launched online national news operations in 1994, 1997, and 2004 
respectively (as cited in Fenton, 2010). The web-based operations became significant 
in the 2010s not only for newspapers, but also for all major broadcasters and news 
agencies (as cited in Fenton, 2010, p. 557). Fenton (2010) argues that the nature of 
news gathering, however, challenges the notion of journalistic objectivity and 
impartiality. She highlights the fact that ‘interested readers can check the validity of 
one news report against another and even access the news sources referred to’ 
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(Fenton, 2010, p. 560). In doing so, a particular viewpoint will be reinforced by 
following the hyperlinks online news media have offered to their audiences. This 
process is seen to be merely a network authorising ‘the news’ rather than a bringer of 
the truth (Fenton, 2010). This results in the necessity of offering views and 
perspectives on the given news, which Fenton (2010) regards as the fall of 
objectivity.  
Since the 2010s, there has been a decrease in the number of traditional media 
like print and broadcasting, and a growing number of media enterprises that are 
owned by the same few parent corporations that dominate news provision and 
storylines (Paterson & Sreberny, 2004, p. 14). This is a manifestation of the media 
ownership and concentration in the UK. A key concern expressed by researchers is 
Rupert Murdoch’s ownership of numerous media assets (Iosifidis, 2016, pp. 425-
445). This is seen as threatening media pluralism and diversity especially when the 
owner has a close interest in the political agenda of these newspapers (Douglas, 
2012). For these reasons the UK parliament has introduced media ownership rules 
initially as part of the Broadcasting Act in 1990. The rules have been amended in 
1996 and 2003. The current form of the rules is governed by the Communications 
Act (2003). The rules aim to sustain economically open competition, and social 
pluralism and diversity in terms of news source and citizens’ viewpoint. These 
include the following: 
 
1) the national cross-media ownership rule, which (broadly) 
prevents large newspaper groups from owning a Channel 3 licence; 2) the 
Channel 3 appointed news provider rule, which requires the regional 
Channel 3 licensees to appoint a single news provider; 3) the Media Public 
Interest Test, which allows the Secretary of State to intervene in media 
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mergers to determine whether the merger might result in harm to the public 
interest; and 4) the Disqualified Persons Restrictions, which prevent certain 
bodies or persons from holding broadcast licences generally, others from 
holding certain types of broadcasting licences and still others from holding 
broadcast licences unless Ofcom has determined that it is appropriate for 
them to do so.  
 
 In spite of the Internet and the digital media popularisation that enables 
diverse news sources, TV remains a vital source of news, and newspapers preserve a 
significant role in setting the news agenda (Iosifidis, 2016).  
The Communications Act (2003) and the Enterprise Act (2002) are the major 
pieces of regulation directing British media. The former mostly applies to electronic 
media and the latter applies to newspapers (Iosifidis, 2016). However, they did not 
offer any regulation of Internet content (Humphreys, 2009, p. 209). The present law 
is seen as unsuccessful in preventing concentration, and instead resulting in ‘more 
concentration and cross-ownership in the traditional industries like newspapers and 
broadcasting’ (Iosifidis, 2016, p. 425). This is because it has eliminated strict media 
and cross-media ownership rules, and has put more focus on ‘self-regulation’ instead 
(Humphreys, 2009; Iosifidis, 2016). This is especially beneficial for foreign interests 
such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation that can own British media companies. 
According to Iosifidis (2016), as these policies are expected to prevail, the 
concentration particularly in the newspapers sector is likely to continue to grow in 
the following years.  
The discussed nature of the British media is empirically supported by 
Bruggemann et al. (2014) who reviewed the classification of countries under Hallin 
and Mancini’s (2004) media systems. Bruggemann et al. (2014) are theoretically 
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sceptical about the state’s role as a one-dimensional category as suggested by Hallin 
and Mancini (2004), and propose a three-dimensional category. The sub-dimensions 
are public broadcasting – the state may introduce and sustain a strong public 
broadcasting system to complement commercial media; ownership regulation – 
policy-makers may impose ownership regulations thus restricting the free market 
forces; and press subsidies – government may support the press with subsidies 
(Bruggemann et al., 2014, p. 1058). Their empirical analysis confirms the scepticism. 
They argue that the media system of the UK is less liberal than initially theorised, as 
it displays ‘high level of state intervention with regard to ownership regulation and 
broadcasting but low levels in terms of press subsidies’ (Bruggemann et al., 2014, p. 
1058).  
These features are seen as important to distinguish the UK from the U.S., thus 
reflecting the theoretical considerations offered by many researchers (Humphreys, 
2012; Norris, 2009; Hallin & Mancini, 2012b) in terms of separating the two within 
the same model. Accordingly, for both empirical and theoretical considerations 
(Iosifidis, 2016; Fenton, 2010; Humphreys, 2012; Norris, 2009; Hallin & Mancini, 
2012b), the British media is suggested to detach from the Liberal model proposed by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
 
2.3 Russian Media: Statist Commercialised Model 
The Russian Federation has a presidential parliamentary system, which on the 
surface seems similar to the Western liberal democracy, but exhibits features that 
have led to its conceptualisation as a hybrid regime. In this context, the Russian 
media system is complex and mixed, deeply rooted in the country’s history 
(Vartanova, 2012). Lehtisaari (2015) characterises the media system of Russia as a 
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combination of ‘market forces, state ownership, power struggles between actors in 
different sectors, obstacles to media freedom and challenges within the media 
covergence3’ (p. 1). Vartanova (2012) validates and extends Hallin and Mancini’s 
framework to the media system of Russia, and proposes a ‘Statist Commercialised 
Model’. Using the four original dimensions and applying them to evaluate and 
theorise the Russian media system, Vartanova (2012) stresses the importance of a 
strong state-media relationship in terms of state control of the media and the political 
discourse, along with a growing commercialisation that ensures financial inflow from 
the prosperous advertising sector. Professionalisation, ‘in the sense of journalistic 
autonomy and professional solidarity, is “low”; while political parallelism, in the 
sense of instrumental use of media by politicians and identification of media with 
political orientations, is “high”’ (De Smaele, 2010, p. 57). The high level of political 
parallelism in the Russian media system is embedded in power struggles between the 
state actors from different business areas and political spectrums.  
The regulation of media ownership, the limitations on news content and press 
freedom distinguish the Russian media system from most Western media systems. 
Despite the high level of state’s interference, Slavtcheva-Petkova (2018) believes 
that there are still surviving independent media outlets fulfilling their ‘watchdog’ role 
(p. 35). Rather than a dichotomy between liberal or illiberal, Vartanova (2012) insists 
that when the overarching paternalism meets the increasingly growing 
commercialism of the media industry, the Russian media outlets tend to operate in a 
third way of blending the statist mentality with the liberal practice. She argues that 
the Russia’s media model shares certain commonalities with the Polarised Pluralist 
model and the Liberal model (Vartanova, 2012, p. 142).  
                                                          
3 ‘A shift towards coverging digital technologies in media content production and distribution’ 
(Doyle, as cited in Lehtisaari, 2015, p.1). 
79 
 
Nonetheless, recent empirical studies (e.g., Oates, 2013; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 
2018; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2019) strongly disagree with Vartanova’s (2012) 
theorisation where she stresses the importance of commercialism element. This is 
mainly due to the high levels of state interference and journalists’ self-censorship in 
today’s Russian media industry, thus bringing the Russian media system close to that 
of the old Soviet style. In order to obtain a full picture of Russian media, it is 
important to look at the country’s significant and constant transformations 
experienced since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.   
 
2.3.1 Major transformations in media industry from 1990s to 2000s. 
The recent history of the Russian media demonstrates how the existing media 
system was preconditioned by the country’s political and economic development. In 
the 1990s, under Boris Yeltsin’s politically ‘polycentric’ regime based on the balance 
of different power centres (Vartanova, 2012, p. 133), the Russian media went 
through important evolutions following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
reformed post-communist media system was affected by several new features such as 
‘the market economy, the end of the ideological control of the Communist Party, the 
political pluralism, and the development of new public institutions’ (Khvostunova, 
2013a). By absorbing Western media concepts alongside the global economic values 
of capitalism, writes Khvostunova (2013a), Russian media attempted to emulate 
most of the Western features: ‘freedom of speech, private ownership of the media 
outlets, similar legislation, distance from the state, public influence, and a watchdog 
role’ (The Interpreter, 6 December 2013). The development of the new Russian 
media system, however, was strongly influenced thus restrained by the inveterately 
cultural and professional backgrounds of Russian journalism (Pasti, 2007). 
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Svitch and Shiryaeva (1997) observe a reverse trend during the 1990s from a 
primary reconciliation to the West towards a return to the previous customs and 
partiality during the Soviet times (as cited in De Smaele, 2010, p. 53). The same is 
noticed by Azhgikhina (1999) who evaluates the media after a ten-year evolution (as 
cited in De Smaele, 2010, p. 53). De Smaele (2010) adds to this the fact that Yeltsin 
himself also expected the media to be loyally supportive of his reforms during the 
transition period. Yeltsin’s Russia, in fact, cultivated and enriched an oligarchic 
system operated by groups such as politicans, bankers, and media tycoons (De 
Smaele, 2010; Khvostunova, 2013a, 2013b). Pankin (1998) highlights the 
paradoxical phenomenon of media independence combined with a low level of 
freedom of speech. The Russian researcher Valery Ivanitsky argues with regard to 
the failure of media transformation in the 1990s that: 
 
The state, while liberating the economic activity in the media, was 
not ready to relax control over the content. This has produced practically 
unsolvable tension for the media themselves trying to function both as 
commercial enterprises and as institutions of the society (as cited in 
Vartanova & Grusha, 2013).  
 
The role of the state in Russian media has been and remains dominant. As 
Pankin (1998) puts it, it is ‘genuinely pluralistic unfree media’ (p. 30). In 2000 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power alongside the synchronic political transition led to a 
further transformation of the Russian media system. The political shift from 
‘polycentric’ to ‘monocentric’ in the name of enhancing stability such as reducing 
internal conflicts/power struggles, in fact brought Putin a large public support 
(Khvostunova, 2013a). In order to secure the stability of the regime Putin established 
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‘power verticals’ in a number of ways, such as removing all alternate political 
powers and seizing control over the administration, the parliament (State Duma), the 
judiciary, and the media system (Vartanova, 2012; Khvostunova, 2013a, 2013b). As 
a result, the hold of the government over the media became stronger. Media as 
‘tools’ remained focused in the hands of a closed and loyal political circle 
(Trepanier, 2015).)  
Thus, in early 2000s a number of state organisations took ‘financial or 
managerial control over 70 percent of electronic media outlets, 80 percent of the 
regional press, and 20 percent of the national press’ (Fossato, as cited in Vartanova, 
2012, p. 134). 51 percent of the most broadly watched First Channel continued to be 
owned by the state, but the rest of the ownership moved to private but government-
friendly hands (De Smaele, 2010). Private stations such as NTV are owned by 
businesses either controlled by the state or in good relationships with the government 
(e.g., Gazprom). Furthermore, to support the vertical power system, the media 
depoliticised Russian journalism by creating ‘empty’ roles of political programming 
and commercial-driven content (Vartanova, 2012). As Vartanova (2012) argues the 
process itself increased the ‘depolitization and instrumentalization of political 
communication’ and stimulated consumption (p. 134). Oates (2013) explains this 
phenomenon by underlining journalists’ conceptions about their own role: an 
inherited tradition of being a political player, and journalists’ self-censorship in terms 
of their awareness of ‘the limits of what can be said’ (pp. 12-14). Slavtcheva-Petkova 
(2018) points out one of the factors that significantly influence journalists’ role 
perception – media subsidies from the government. This is due to the economic 
unsustainability of most Russian media, wherein journalists are drawn into a 
symbiotic relationship with the power (pp. 49-50). This defining feature is seen to 
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remain in the current media system of Russia. Becker (2014) shares a similar view 
and highlights the rules on government ownership, ranging from ‘mutually beneficial 
relations with owners’ who are closely allied with the political leadership, to a 
number of ‘quasi-legal’ and tax methods against independent media (p. 195). 
Consequently, the new Russian media in early 2000s was given substitutive names 
such as ‘semi-state’ (De Smaele, 2010, p. 54), ‘semi-authoritarian’ (Toepfl, 2014, p. 
69), ‘neo-Soviet’ (Oates, 2007), and ‘neo-authoritarian’ (Becker, 2014).  
In addition, there are certain media outlets acting in line with commercial 
models: ‘selling products directly to consumers and serving as the contact between 
consumers and advertisers’ (Lehtisaari, 2015, p. 3). Such formats encompass ‘glossy 
magazines, business newspapers, and commercial radio stations’ (Lehtisaari, 2015, p. 
3). Moreover, Lehtisaari (2015) highlights that oligarchs or business tycoons also 
play an important role in the private media sector. They simultaneously may have 
other interests in areas such as politics and business. Alisher Usmanov for example, 
one of the oligarchs in Russia, owns ‘the Kommersant publishing house, part of 
Mail.ru, half of the UTV holding – such as radio stations and music and Disney TV 
channels, and part of mobile operator MegaFon’ (Forbes, as cited in Lehtisaari, 2015, 
p. 3). Yet, his business is mainly in the metal and mining industry. Usmanov is also 
seen as closely connected to the Putin’s regime. Mikhail Prokhorov is another 
business tycoon, who has oppositional political opinions and small media ownership. 
According to Lehtisaari’s (2015) description of this group of media owners, they 
obtain resources through other doings in business and politics, and instrumentally use 
their media assets, thus ‘advancing diverse interests and working to counter rivals’ 
(p. 3). Especially from the late 1990s to early 2000s, journalistic values have been 
significantly replaced by processes of standardisation and commoditisation, leading 
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to sensationalism and appealing to mass tastes as well as entertainment values 
(Vartanova, 2012, p. 138). Consequently, the desire to serve the economy became an 
important characteristic of the media system, emphasising new media structures and 
professional practices.  
In the first ten-years of the 2000s, Russia was one of the fastest increasing 
advertising markets across the globe, and the media were ever more reliant on 
advertising (Vartanova, 2012). However, this tendency stopped and retreated 
especially in the 2010s, noticeably into a government-oriented position. This is, as 
Lehtisaari (2015) argues, because of the market and politics that are seen as the two 
major factors driving for change.  
 
2.3.2 Economic and political factors. 
From a market perspective, the importance and influence of technological 
development is highlighted, such as the change from printed newspapers to digital 
publications that is broadly experienced across the globe. Russian media enterprises, 
particularly those in newspaper publishing, also have confronted the challenge of 
digitalisation and converged media production and output (Lehtisaari, 2015). As 
Vartanova (2012) notes, the dramatic decline in newspaper circulation was 
overwhelmed by the popularisation of television that consisted of two models: one 
state controlled and the other commercial. Regardless of the ownership structure, 
advertisement and sponsorship played the most important role in financing the TV 
sector (De Smaele & Vartanova, 2007; Vartanova, 2012).  
On the other hand, media industry experienced an increasing level of policy 
interferences. Regarding the commercial media’s political environment and 
government interference levels, Russia has been characterised as a closed regime 
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that, yet, seeks an open Internet policy (Toepfl, 2014). But as Oates (2013) notes the 
Russian government’s role in online sphere is as significant as in print and TV media 
(p. 8). Media regulation is seen to have become tougher in recent years (Simpson, 
Puppis, & Bulck, 2016; Vartanova, Vyrkovsky, Makeenko, & Smirnov, 2016). Some 
media policies such as restricting foreign ownerships are making ‘the Russian media 
system less globalised and integrated amongst the transnational media structures’ 
(Vartanova et al., 2016, p. 67).  
This is exemplified primarily in the tightening of control over the internet and 
the protectionist measures put in place (e.g., putting limits to foreign stakes in media 
capital) (Vartanova et al., 2016). According to Peterson (2005), while the Russian 
government promoted IT as ‘a productivity enhancer in government and an economic 
motor in business’, the government’s various operations against media freedom in 
fact illustrates a low interest in encouraging IT’s openness (p. 5). Mathews (2010) 
defines Kremlin’s policies on independent media such as Novaya Gazeta as they ‘are 
allowed to be critical, as long as they are not too widely listened to or circulated’ (as 
cited in Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018, p. 44). More recently, Dougerty (2015) writes, 
Putin’s administration rigorously curbs internal communications – predominantly 
‘TV, which is watched by at least 90 percent of the people’, as well as newspapers, 
radio stations, the Internet. Thus, most news channels are saturated with the 
government’s information, whereas independent media organisations are 
significantly marginalised (The Atlantic, 21 April 2015). The state intervention 
becomes severe in the following years, especially since Putin commenced his second 
term as president in 2012 (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018). Putin’s government then 
began to regulate media ownership, aided by seeking to ‘depoliticize media and the 
citizenry’ (Becker, 2014, p. 206). In October 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed 
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into law amendments limiting foreign investors from owning more than 20% in 
Russia’s media organisations (Luhn, 2015). In a recent study Dobek-Ostrowska 
(2019) agrees with Vartanova’s (2012) claim that the media are an ‘obedient child’ 
and thus are political tools for propaganda purposes, but labels the model an 
‘authoritarian model of the Russian media system’. This model is especially 
applicable to the media landscape after late 2014 when the Russian legislature passed 
new laws on restricting foreign ownership of the media. As Dobek-Ostrowska (2019) 
puts it: ‘the state holds a monopoly on broadcasting. […] [Private media] are 
controlled strictly by the political regime’ (p. 263). In this sense, oligarchs who 
usually are linked with ruling leaders play an important role in the media industry. 
Consequently, there is a clear political interest and political bias in the media system 
of Russia. 
Overall, from 2000 onwards, the public debate in the Russian media has been 
either replaced by imitative forms, or pushed to publications with minor market 
share, like Novaya Gazeta, or to the internet (Khvostunova, 2013a). Under the new 
circumstances of Putin’s monocentric political system, reciprocal links were 
established between the media and the state through the latter’s direct and indirect 
financial and political state control. The media also enjoyed financial inflow from the 
advertising sector (Vartanova, 2012; Vartanova et al., 2016). The increased political 
control and the restricted ownership are the two most noticeable tendencies in the TV 
sector. This is predicted to continue in the short term (Lehtisaari, 2015). In terms of 
newspapers, there has been a shrinking advertising revenue and a challenge of media 
convergence. Independently private-owned media businesses continued until 2012. A 
trend subsequently developed of a growing position of pro-governmental media. The 
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regulation of media ownership, the limitations on news content and press freedom 
distinguish the Russian media from that of the UK. 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the characteristics of the media system of a liberal 
democracy – the UK, and the essential development of the media system of a hybrid 
regime – Russia, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This allowed the 
researcher to draw a comparison between the two media systems highlighting their 
significant differences. The current media system of Russia is in large part influenced 
by its historical account of political, social, and cultural development, especially after 
President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000. Therefore, the state plays a 
significant role in the media sector, suggesting restricted journalistic autonomy, and 
the journalists themselves remain less professional in terms of role conceptions and 
self-censorship. This represents a clear contrast to the British media that is officially 
detached from the political power and is market-driven, yet the state intervention is 
seen to operate in many ways such as ownership regulation and broadcasting. The 
journalists in the UK, however, do strive to be ‘watchdogs’ holding power to 
account. Or at the very least they are mindful of not operating without integrity. But 
the level of parallelism is still high. On the contrary, the Russian media has features 
of a high level of political parallelism entrenched within oligarchy circles, with an 
overall governmental orientation.  
The next chapter – that also offers context for the subsequent analysis – 
moves on to an introduction of the case study – the Ukraine crisis, by presenting an 
overview of the crisis development from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015 




The Ukraine Crisis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There have been a growing body of research examining various aspects of the 
Ukraine crisis, especially in the fields of international relations and political 
communication (e.g., Sakwa, 2015, 2017; Van der Pijl, 2018; Malyarenko & Wolff, 
2018; Pantti, 2016, Nygren et al., 2018; Szostok et al., 2016; Roman et al., 2017; 
Fengler et al., 2018; Lichtenstein et al., 2018). These studies have addressed 
questions in relation to the roots of this controversial conflict, as well as the roles the 
media from across the globe have played during the crisis. This chapter draws key 
information from a vast literature on the subject, and dicusses the events leading up 
to and during the Ukraine crisis till February 2015, with a focus on Russian and UK 
national foreign policies on Ukraine. It functions to provide the context for the 
analysis of news coverage of the Ukraine crisis in the subsequent chapters. 
 
3.2 The Ukraine Crisis 
Since the former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych suspended the 
preparations for the country’s EU Association Agreement on 21 November 2013, a 
prolonged conflict broke out in Europe’s borderland. Opposed to Ukraine’s 
economic ties with Russia, the EU deal would have opened borders for products and 
enabled free movement of people. However, Yanukovych argued that Ukraine could 
not abandon Russia entirely for the EU, since the sacrifice would directly worsen the 
country’s already struggling economy (Traynor, 2013). Many believed that Russia 
strongly opposed the EU deal and pressured Yanukovych into suspending the deal 
(Svyatets, 2016). Yanukovych’s subsequent rejections of EU/IMF loan packages 
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immediately divided Ukraine along the lines of future relations with Russia 
(Svyatets, 2016). About 10,000 pro-European protesters mainly from Western 
Ukraine, took to the streets in Kyiv to reject the decision. This is what the media 
around the world referred to as Euromaidan protests, as the demonstrations took 
place on the Maidan Square to begin with. Simultaneously around 4,000 
demonstrators mostly from Yanukovych’s power base in the pro-Russian East of 
Ukraine gathered in Kyiv to support his continuation of closer economic ties with 
Russia. An arguably peaceful demonstration of pro-Europe course exploded. This 
quickly developed into a violent clash separating families, communities, and – as a 
result – the whole Ukrainian nation (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2015, p. 2).  
In January 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament approved restrictive anti-protest 
laws as clashes turned deadly. This was followed by Prime Minister Mykola 
Azarov’s resignation and parliament’s cancellation of the anti-protest law. The 
country soon headed towards civil war, with 28 people including ten policemen 
reported killed on 18 February (Van der Pijl, 2018). Two days later, Kyiv saw its 
worst day of violence for almost 70 years. According to Schreiber and Kosienkowski 
(2015), violence broke out when a shootout occurred between protesters and police 
in Maidan Square, leaving 88 people dead within 48 hours. Protesters insisted that 
Yanukovych’s government shooters opened fire on them, while the government 
blamed opposition leaders for provoking the violence. As clashes intensified, 
different groups joined, uniting liberals, moderates, technocrats, pro-Europeans, and 
far-right nationalists. According to Yuhas (2014), over 100 people were reportedly 
killed in the protests (The Guardian, 13 April 2014). 
With violent fighting escalating in Ukraine, senior officials from Germany, 
Poland, and France met in Kyiv to broker an agreement with Yanukovych. A deal 
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aimed at offering a peaceful and constitutional way out of the crisis was agreed and 
signed by Yanukovych and the leaders of opposing parties (Yatsenyuk, Klitschko, 
and Tyagnybok) at 4 p.m. on 21 February (Sakwa, 2015). The moment was also 
witnessed by the three European officials as well as Russia’s special representative 
(Sakwa, 2015, p. 88).  However, the deal was extravagantly rejected by the Maidan 
protesters who insisted on Yanukovych stepping down. The violence temporally 
ended up with Yanukovych’s fleeing to Russia, and a coalition government formed 
out of the opposition, agreeing to hold new elections on 25 May (Yuhas, 2014). The 
interim government was seen by Russia as an illegal one. With the new leaders rising 
to power, many controversies surfaced in the Crimea peninsula – an autonomous 
region of Southern Ukraine but with strong Russian ties, and in Eastern Ukraine such 
as the Donbas area. Parliament voted to prohibit Russian as the second official 
language in the country, which caused a wave of anger in Russian-speaking regions 
(De La Pedraja, 2019). The vote was later overthrown.  
As the month of February drew to a close, Russia quickly responded to its 
perceived political coup in Kyiv – the collapse of the Yanukovych regime, by 
sending in military and taking control of the Crimean Peninsula (Kofman et al., 
2017; Hierman, 2018). The Kremlin officially denied the soldiers in Crimea were 
Russian and the intention of annexing the peninsula; but maintained that the residents 
were legally to hold a referendum determining the region’s status and MPs had 
authorised President Putin to use military force as Yanukovych pleaded for help. 
Two weeks later the referendum took place in the city of Sevastopol (site of Russia’s 
Black Sea Fleet) on 16 March, with a majority voting for unification with Russia. 
Despite Ukraine and many political leaders condemning the vote as illegal, Russia 
recognised its result and created an official treaty on annexing the Crimea into Russia 
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(Toal, 2017), or in the words of President Putin: ‘welcome back’ Crimea that ‘has 
always been an inseparable part of Russia’ (Walker, 2014). In fact, the close tie 
between Russia and Crimea had long existed. Historically, Crimea had been part of 
Russia since the 1700s until 19 February 1954 when Nikita Khrushchev – the then 
general secretary of the Soviet Union – formally handed it over to Ukraine as a gift 
to celebrate the 300th anniversary of Ukraine’s union with Russia (Rutland, 2015). 
The change in territory did not include Sevastopol, which however was retained by 
Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Budapest 
Memorandum (1994) was designed as a modus vivendi for Russia and Ukraine, it 
enabled Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – in 
response to which Kyiv in 1997 launched agreement to let Russia’s fleet remain in 
Sevastopol (Rutland, 2015). During the speech about ‘Crimea and Sevastopol 
returning home’ on Red Square, Putin denounced the West and listed a series of what 
he called false pretences of a humanitarian intervention. This referred to NATO’s 
expansion towards Russia by intervening in Kosovo in 1999, and by toppling Col. 
Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya in 2011 (Myers & Barry, 2014; Van der Pijl, 2018).  
Russia, on one hand, and the United Kingdom and the EU, on the other, were 
allies of opposite sides of the belligerent camps in Ukraine. Since the beginning of 
the Ukraine crisis followed by Russia’s annexation of the Crimea the UK has been 
supportive of Ukraine. A series of high-level political dialogues following the 
collapse of the Yanukovych government took place in 2014. Importantly, the UK 
played a leading role in designing sanctions packages imposed on Russia for its 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as well as its actions in Eastern Ukraine 
(Perraudin, 2015). The sanctions targeting certain individuals, companies, and 
sectors were agreed and applied by most EU Member States (Foreign Affairs 
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Committee, 2 March 2017). The Western bloc also suspended Russia’s participation 
in the Group of Eight and European Council, although European Union leaders were 
divided over punishing Russia for seizing Crimea. According to Waterfield and 
Freeman (2014), Britain, Sweden, France, and East European countries went along 
with the sanctions and pushed for arm sales to Russia to be halted, while Germany 
and Italy disagreed on how strongly to respond to Russia at an EU summit as they 
were heavily economically dependent on Russian gas and oil imports (The 
Telegraph, 20 March 2014). As a quick consequence of the economic sanctions, 
Russian markets trembled, and the country’s economy faced a fall into recession. 
The EU and the US supportively guaranteed Ukraine a 16-billion-dollar loan as part 
of an effort to rescue its economy. Although several meetings between top diplomats 
from Russia, the US, and EU took place in Europe, the talks finished with no results. 
Each state was committed to their country’s official line (Yuhas, 2014).  
As the conflict continued, on 15 April, the new Kyiv’s (interim) government 
started its first official military action – Anti-Terrorism Operations against 
federalisation forces (pro-Russian) across Eastern Ukraine (Black & Plekhanov, 
2016; Maltseva, 2016). Putin warned that Ukraine was on the ‘brink of civil war’ 
(Thompson, 2017). Less than a month later, clashes in the Black Sea city of Odessa 
left 42 people dead. Most of them were pro-Russian activists. Shortly after, the rebels 
in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk announced independence in the 
context of escalating fighting between the new Kyiv and pro-Russian forces 
(Maltseva, 2016). The Russian military were seen to have not only centred on 
Ukraine’s Eastern border but also entered the Eastern region of Ukraine – the 
Donbas. The region was one of the major battle grounds between the new Kyiv 
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government and separatist forces, with constant revelations that Russia transferred 
weaponry to the separatists (Jackson, 2014).  
Petro Poroshenko, one of the richest men in the country was elected 
Ukraine’s President in May, and soon signed the landmark EU Association 
Agreement – that Yanukovych previously refused to sign and triggered the clashes in 
Kyiv. It seemed like a termination of the conflict, when Russian parliament annulled 
a parliamentary resolution that authorised the use of Russian forces in Ukraine. But 
the crisis reached another peak on 17 July. 298 people lost their lives when Malaysia 
Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam was shot down in Eastern Ukraine, allegedly 
by pro-Russian rebels, with Russia quickly denying any involvement (Davidson & 
Yuhas, 2014). What followed in the end of July was the EU’s launch of further 
economic sanctions on Russia, limiting access of Russian banks and oil companies to 
long-term Western financing.  
Several dialogues about ceasefire followed between Ukraine, separatist 
forces, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE 
– an independent body providing a mediating rule during the Ukraine crisis). A peace 
deal was eventually signed in Minsk, Belarus in early September. The Minsk 
Protocol aimed to end the violence and ‘committed the government to extensive 
decentralisation of the Donbass’ (Svyatets, 2016, p. 170). Nevertheless, domestically 
conflict remained between Western and Eastern Ukraine. Outside of the country, 
NATO reported that Russian military equipment and troops were witnessed entering 
Ukraine. The peace talks lasted a few months until they collapsed in the beginning of 
2015. The conflict continued. In early February 2015 the Chancellor of Germany 
Angela Merkel and the then French President Francois Hollande initiated and formed 
a ceasefire deal with Ukraine and Russia after the US declared it was considering 
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providing Ukraine with lethal assistance. Some European leaders disagreed with 
arming the new Kyiv's government forces, as they feared it could further the conflict, 
while Philip Hammond – then Defence Secretary suggested that Britain did not rule 
out offering ‘lethal force’ to assist Ukraine in its ground battle against pro- Russian 
forces in Eastern Ukraine (Dominiczak, 2015).   
 After the ceasefire went into effect, violations quickly followed. After few 
days without casualties had raised hopes that the peace might hold, Ukraine's 
National Defence and Security Council reported 300 violations of the ceasefire by 20 
February. Then the EU extended sanctions on Russia. The then British defence 
minister Michael Fallon in a speech confirmed that the UK service personnel would 
provide Ukraine with medical, logistical, infantry, and intelligence training for 
government forces from mid-March. He added, ‘Russia must abide by its 
commitments at Minsk […] stopping continued separatist attacks, and allowing 
effective monitoring to take place’ (BBC, 25 February 2015). Meanwhile, Mr Putin 
described the conflict in Ukraine as an ‘apocalyptic scenario’. Speaking on Russian 
television, he denied that Russian military forces were involved in the conflict but he 
expressed his support for the recent Minsk ceasefire deal as the best way to stabilise 
Eastern Ukraine (BBC, 24 February 2015). Ukrainian and pro-Russian rebels said 
they were withdrawing their heavy weapons from the front line in Eastern Ukraine 
under the terms of the ceasefire agreed in Minsk (Taylor, 2015).  
According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), since the opening of the 
conflict, over 500,000 people have left their homes seeking a safe land elsewhere in 
the country, and hundreds of thousands have escaped from Ukraine, mostly to 
Russia. By February 2015, over 5000 have died, and over 10,000 were severely 
wounded in the battle in Eastern Ukraine (as cited in Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2015, p. 
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2). United Nations estimated 6,000 victims died by March 2015 (The Telegraph, 5 
March 2015). The scale of the human catastrophe has been significant and is 
continuing to increase. By the time of writing, the Ukraine crisis has become the 
largest humanitarian tragedy in Europe since the conflicts in the Balkans in the 
1990s. According to the European Commission (2016), there were over 9,000 deaths 
and 20,000 injured, over 1.6 million people displaced domestically and 
internationally, and five million in need of humanitarian aid. 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the Ukraine crisis development 
from November 2013 to February 2015. It has also outlined the foreign policies of 
Russia and the UK in relation to the conflict. This offers an important context for the 
subsequent analysis. The thesis now moves on to discuss the adopted research 
methodology.   
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There are several methods that can be used in studying media and 
war/conflict. For example, Critical Discourse Analysis is often adopted by 
researchers (e.g., Amer, 2017; Atawneh, 2009) to examine influencing factors 
(ideological, economic, or political) in war coverage. Other approaches such as 
visual analysis are also of increasing importance and popularity in the field of the 
study of war reporting (e.g., Fahmy, 2010; Parry, 2010, 2011; Parry & Thumim, 
2016; Corner & Parry, 2017; Ojala et al., 2017; Makhortykh & Sydorova, 2017). 
However, the aim of this study, as delineated in the introduction, is to assess how the 
Ukraine crisis was covered by the selected Russian and British media from a 
comparative perspective, as well as measure the extent the media characteristics suit 
the media systems theory. Critical Discourse Analysis and visual analysis are not 
adequate methodologies in offering large scale empirical research on the focus of this 
study, depite the in-depth information they may provide. Framing analysis is 
therefore adopted, allowing for a thorough examination of changing patterns, 
commonality, and difference across large media samples. A number of existing 
studies have used the approach to scrutinise the relationship between media and 
conflict (e.g., Entman, 1991; Hammond, 2007b; Kent, 2006; Melki, 2014; Alitavoli, 
2019; Al Nahed, 2018; Lichtenstein et al., 2018). 
This chapter discusses the adopted research methods. In developing the 
methodology, it was of significance to establish a range of methods enabling a 
reliable, valid, systematic, and quantitatively and qualitatively-rich analysis of news 
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media coverage. Thus this study follows a mixed-methods approach consisting of 
methods commonly used in traditional quantitative content analysis (such as 
frequency and word counts that determine the trend or pattern of the representation 
over the chosen timeframe), through to quantitative assessments of reporting frames, 
and in-depth qualitative analysis of news media reports in measuring the attention 
paid and the actual frames used by the British and the Russian media in their 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis.  
The chapter is comprised of four sections, starting with a theoretical 
discussion of methods and the specific ways the adopted approach helps to identify 
news frames. The second section sketches out how the theoretical explanations are 
applied to the case study – the Ukraine crisis. This is followed by the third section – 
a description of the sample. The final section discusses the actual implementation of 
framing analysis in the case of Ukraine. The data will be analysed in three steps – 
first, the level of media agenda – quantity and length of media reporting of events –
will be measured that gives general answers to the second research question: To what 
extent the selected British and Russian media have paid attention to the Ukraine 
conflict between 30 November 2013 and 28 February 2015. The second step is a 
framing analysis that answers the third research question. Based on the results from 
the first step, the framing analysis is used to explore what news frames are adopted in 
the mediated Ukraine conflict coverage. The third step is an integrated approach that 
aims to use the results from the framing analysis to qualitatively identify and analyse 
observations in terms of qualitative differences between the selected Russian and 
British media outlets. This step will give answers to the fourth research question: 
What are the differences between the Russian and British media that characterise the 
narrative of the Ukraine crisis. Drawing upon the identified differences (if any), the 
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subsequent analytical discussion will tease out the key findings surrounding the 
characteristics of the Russian media and the British media in the context of the 
Ukraine crisis. This will offer a direct answer to the first and main research question 
in relation to the media systems theory and its applicability in this case.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Backgrounds 
Traditional quantitative content analysis has been centred on counting words, 
reporting quantity, and measurement of column inches or other such 
straightforwardly quantifiable matters. The quantity and length of media reporting of 
events in a particular way is significant, allowing researchers to measure the level of 
media agenda (van Dijk, 2009). While the method is able to generate authentic and 
replicable results, the critics argue that it is incapable of exploring the nuances and 
meanings of the text (Anthonsen, 2003; Gerbner, 1958; Wilkinson & Birmingham, 
2003). Namely, the method alone does not allow researchers to scrutinise the internal 
meanings and relationships within and between texts. It often functions as the 
quantitative investigation of message characteristic vindicating the sample and thus 
selecting data for further in-depth analysis to add weight to the quantitative findings, 
such as framing and qualitative analysis. As outlined later in the chapter, the study 
combines a systematic measurement of quantifiable manifest content with 
interpretations of numerous pre-defined frames in the news coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis, which is adopted as part of the efforts to ensure reliability and validity. It is 
followed by an in-depth qualitative analysis – an extension of the framing analysis 
which adds context – aiming to systematically reduce the large volume of data to 
greatly organised and concise categories of crucial results, and to go beyond 
manifestation to include latent analysis of the contextual meaning of texts. 
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4.2.1 Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative analysis has been advanced by scholars, all of which draw 
attention to a combined observation of text and its specific context. Patton (2002) 
focuses on data reduction and sense-making stating that the method attempts to 
‘identify core consistencies and meaning’ (p. 453). Neuendorf (2002) suggests that 
qualitative analysis is more about the analyses of rhetoric, narrative, discourse, 
interpretation, or critical view (pp. 5-7). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) offer an 
elaborated explanation describing qualitative analysis as helping to identify what the 
media say about society and discovering the ‘truth’ about a society. This is what they 
term ‘the media’s symbolic environment’ (pp. 31-32). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
define it as ‘a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text 
data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns’ (p. 1278). Morse and Field (1995) describe the method as to mainly 
explore fundamental meanings of the content. Likewise, Zhang and Wildemuth 
(2017) write that qualitative analysis addresses a specific theme demonstrating rather 
‘the meanings of the phenomenon than the statistical significance of the occurrence 
of particular texts or concepts’ (p. 319). Therefore, the method requires researchers 
to conduct heavily interpretive readings of media texts, which is time-consuming 
hence often involves small samples. Regardless of this, qualitative analysis is 
expected to produce explanations or typologies from subjects. Hence the method is 
an essential path to understanding the deeper meanings, the perspectives and 
intentions of the media, and the ‘likely interpretations by audiences – surely the 
ultimate goal of analysing media content’ (Macnamara, 2005, p. 5). 
For researchers, a balance between description and interpretation when 
conducting qualitative analysis is required. Patton (2002) sates that qualitative 
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research is about interpretation that represents researchers’ individual and theoretical 
understanding of the subject. Description, on the other hand offers contextual 
background that should be rich and thick (Denzin, 1989). What researchers are 
recommended to do is to combine the two by offering ‘sufficient description to allow 
the reader to understand the basis for an interpretation, and sufficient interpretation to 
allow the reader to understand the description’ (Patton, 2002, pp. 503-504). In doing 
so, researchers can monitor the ‘cultural temperature’ of society (Hansen et al., 1998, 
p. 92), reflect society and culture (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), and discover and 
understand ‘social reality in a subjective but scientific manner’ (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2017, p. 318), However, scholars are often concerned about the 
disputable concept of objectivity when it comes to the interpretation and perception 
of ‘reality’ in qualitative analysis. It thus is important here to point out that 
objectivity is widely seen as impossible (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Hansen et al., 
1998). Nevertheless, to minimise this weakness, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) 
suggest to compare media reality with social reality by qualitatively looking at actual 
media content that reveals important differences.  
There are a variety of approaches to qualitative analysis. For this study, given 
the manifest quantification that attempts to discover the frames used in the first 
place, an extension of the framing analysis is used, with the purposes of 
understanding the contextual use of content (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283) and 
the phenomena being observed across event and countries (Power & Vera-Zambrano, 
2018). As Macnamara (2005) puts it, while quantitative research method generates 
empirical data that is highly likely generalizable and representative and thus reducing 
research findings to the moderate position on major research questions, in-depth 
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qualitative analysis has the advantage of exploring discourse at different points 
within the range (p. 18).  
 
4.2.2 Framing analysis. 
4.2.2.1 Definitions and objectives. 
In spite of journalists’ best intentions, news as a socially constructed product 
is not objectively generated, nor is it politically, economically, or ideologically 
neutral (Cozma & Kozman, 2017, p. 2). Framing attempts to explain how realities 
and meanings are constructed via communications (Entman, 1993; Reese, 2001; 
Myers, Klak, & Koehl, 1996; McQuail, 2000). The concept has been one of the most 
fertile research areas in linguistics and discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1977), 
sociology (Goffman, 1974), journalism, communication, and media studies 
(Scheufele, 1999), political communication, political science, and policy studies 
(Entman, 1993). Therefore, there is a broad range of definitions, frame types and 
methods discussed in the literature (Matthes, 2009). Goffman (1974) with the aim of 
explaining ‘what is happening’ and determining what is salient, notes that frames 
help classify, enabling individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ everyday 
occurrence (p. 21). Gitlin (1980) shares and expands this definition in his seminal 
research on the relationships between the news media and the Student New Left 
movement, conceptualising framing as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, 
interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion’ (p. 7). He 
continues that media frames as journalistic routines quicken the procedures of 
identifying and classifying information that are to be efficiently packaged to the 
audience.  
Tankard et al. (1991) reviewing the literature on framing, offer a 
methodologically oriented concept describing media framing as ‘a central organizing 
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idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through 
the use of selection, emphasis, and elaboration’ (p. 6). Iyengar (1991) adds to this by 
observing that framing is a process that may refer to only subtle alterations in the 
statement or presentation of problems (p. 11). He uses and defines episodic frames as 
to apply specific cases or particular individuals’ experiences to illustrate the issue; 
while thematic frames are conceptualised as emphasising wider trends placing 
‘political issues and events in some general context’ (p. 2). Poverty, for example, 
may be thematically framed in a way that suggests social, economic, or political 
forces are to blame; while episodic framing brings the public to believe that the 
poor’s own plight causes poverty. Iyengar (1991) observes that the majority of the 
news coverage of poverty is predominantly episodic over thematic, thus likely 
influencing audiences to believe that the poor themselves (rather than the society) are 
responsible when they are experiencing poverty. As such, the responsibility is 
successfully shifted from society to the poor themselves.  
Creed et al. (2002) from a cultural studies perspective shed light on the main 
goal of framing knowledge underlining that actors from different social contexts rely 
on their own acquainted cultural accounts so as to generate political change at the 
societal or organisational level. With regards to the framing research, they contend: 
‘Because of its underlying attention to context, standing, and power, frame analysis 
provides us with a linked theory and methodology that gets us farther in our projects 
than other methodologies’ (Creed et al., 2002, pp. 34-55). A frame then is frequently 
viewed by scholars as the fundamental notion allowing to characterise everyday 
events within individual structures, and to promote particular aspects of issues. That 
is to say, media frames are like organisations that subliminally but importantly 
structure the social world, hold privileges to deliver a particular interpretation. In the 
102 
 
words of Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2008), frames construct a conceptual 
context that ‘facilitates the apprehension, classification, and understanding of 
messages in accordance with individuals’ ideas previously associated with the frames 
adopted’ (p. 54).  
The social and political origins of framing provide a wide research ground 
that is not limited to textual analysis. For example, D’Angelo (2002), in responding 
to Entman’s (1993) call for the establishment of a paradigm of news framing 
research, argues that there is not, nor should there be, a single ‘mended’ paradigm of 
framing research. Given the news orientation of this study, Entman’s definition is 
adopted, and is by far the most cited – although some critics (Scheufele & Iyengar, 
2012) have expressed concern about its theoretical vagueness. Entman (1993) 
suggests that selection and salience constitute essential part of the framing process. 
Thus, a perceived reality is selected and made more salient in order to ‘promote a 
particular problem definition, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation, and/ or 
treatment recommendation’ from the daily events (p. 52). According to Entman’s 
(1993) definition, reporters can enhance salience to the recipients who think about 
the given issue with ‘noticeable, meaningful or memorable’ elements (p. 53). This 
can be achieved by way of using specific keywords, phrases, quotations, reiteration, 
pictures, and/or associations with culturally familiar symbols (Entman, 1993). 
Entman labels the methods such as ‘repetition’ or reiteration as quantitative salience 
(1993, p. 53), which requires measuring the frequency of frame occurrences, making 
information more visible, meaningful, or memorable. A message, by contrast, is 
more qualitatively salient if represented by a figure who enjoys public trust, if it 




De Vreese (2005) and D’Haenens (2005) resonate with Entman’s definition 
believing that the media may shape the public opinion by framing issues in a 
particular way, thus shaping the public agenda. Such research stems from the 
assumption that the way people receive information from the news can affect their 
interpretation and perception of the issue as a whole, thus may change their 
judgments on that issue. The notion of framing hence, as Entman (1993) puts it, 
implies a widespread ‘effect on large portions of the receiving audiences, though it is 
not likely to have a universal effect on all’ (p. 54). Therefore, the mass media are 
‘stunningly successful in telling [their] readers what to think about’ (Cohen, 1963, p. 
13). Reese (2001) validates the notion in the context of political and mass 
communication, and contends that frames influence how people perceive, evaluate, 
and react to an issue. In this sense, in the case of conflict, how the conflicts are 
framed can have a powerful impact on public perceptions about the roots of a 
conflict, its victory or failure, and which individual/group of people/country is 
responsible for it. For instance, Entman (1991) points to the role of government in 
influencing news frames. His study of two airline incidents uncovers very different 
frames adopted by the US media, depending on whether the perpetrator was ‘us’ or 
the ‘enemy’. The U.S. downing an Iranian plane was framed as a technical accident, 
while the Soviet downing of a Korean plane was represented as a moral crime. 
Entman (1991) methodologically looks at how the news media applied sources, 
keywords, metaphors, and agency (the individual identified as causing or solving the 
issue; the causal force that generated the newsworthy act), arguing that the media 
generated the strikingly different frames through its de-emphasis of the agency and 
the victims, and through its choice of graphics and adjectives.  
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Hence framing analysis is pertinent to exploring how media bias patterns are 
included in news coverage. This allows us to see how the event is interpreted and 
what sense is made out of it by the selected media outlets. Framing is inevitable. One 
cannot not frame, the same as one cannot not communicate in a social interaction. If 
a frame makes a set of events ‘comprehensible’ (Fowler, 1991, p. 17), it is 
fundamental to effective communication. However, a frame represents one 
interpretation of ‘reality’ and must necessarily marginalise others, thus the choice of 
frame is an ideological act. ‘Anything that is said or written about the world is 
articulated from a particular ideological position: language is not a clear window but 
a refracting, structuring medium’ (Fowler, 1991, p.10). Proficient journalists in the 
news narrating process may apply a frame(s) easily to the production, deliberately or 
not, to inform and attract the recipients’ attention. Based on Entman’s definition of 
framing, Dimaggio (2008) from a political economy perspective examines American 
media reporting of gobal war on terrorism – focusing on 9/11, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
He uses the concept of framing when he refers to a systematic bias in coverage in 
favour of one perspective or another (p. 23). This may account for some of the main 
characteristics of mass media coverage. These include: pro-war framing of the news, 
the consistent omission and censorship of serious anti-war views and other dissident 
perspectives; media aligning with official statements and government propaganda in 
the coverage of international events (Dimaggio, 2008, p. 41). Dimaggio (2008) 
concludes that American corporate media failed to carry stories that held anti-war 
views, whilst reinforcing the official views and propaganda in support of military 
confrontations. Accordingly, for this study in order to explore the extent to which 




4.2.2.2 Operationalisation of media frames. 
 Due to the wide scope of the concept and nature of framing, over the decades 
researchers have been adding to an extensive list of frame mechanisms used for 
identifying news frames. In addition to the methods used by Entman (1991) 
mentioned above, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) used metaphors, exemplars, catch-
phrases, depictions, and visual images. Tankard (2001) developed a list of eleven 
framing mechanisms: headline, subheads, photos, photo captions, leads, source 
selection, quote selection, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts, and concluding 
statements and paragraphs. Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) divided news articles in 
their research to two sections consisting of ‘frames’ and ‘facts’ respectively. The 
division has been used in the operationalisation of news frames in a number of 
studies of framing effects (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991; Price et al., 
1997; De Vreese, 2004). In order to know how news influences audiences’ 
interpretation of facts, the scholars have used various methods to analyse the way the 
facts are covered in the first place. For the purpose of this study, a combination of 
deductive and inductive approach that involves predefined generic news frames 
consisting of six frames, diagnostic and prognostic news frames is applied to 
scrutinise the news frames used. This approach was chosen for several reasons. First, 
this approach could be easily replicated. Second, it could cope with large samples. 
Third, it could thus easily identify differences in framing between media (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000). Fourth, it offers an opportunity to examine whether the so 
defined generic frames apply to different global subjects, thus answering the question 
of ‘how generic the generic frames’ indeed are (Godefroidt et al., 2016, p. 781). 
Fifth, while a deductive approach – frames derived from literature – allows the 
researcher to apply a set of frames to other subjects, there is a risk that unanticipated 
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frames may be overlooked (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Inductive approach – frames 
inductively discovered from a small sample – mitigates the weakness of deductive 
approach (Dan, 2018). Thus, the combination of deductive and inductive approach 
ensures reliability and validity. Finally, the method can help detect patterns that 
characterise news coverage of the Ukraine crisis by the Russian and British media 
outlets and connect these with the media systems theory that is central for the current 
study. All of this make it an ideal approach to examining the attention paid and the 
actual frames used by the seclected Russian and British media; thus answering the 
main research question about the extent to which the uncovered charateristics of the 
Russian and British media support or refute the media systems theory. 
 
4.2.2.3 Generic news frames. 
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) differentiate issue-specific from generic 
frames. While issue-specific frames represent the more concrete interpretations of 
specific issues, generic frames denote general and structural features of news and can 
be used across a range of different news subjects, times, and cultural contexts. De 
Vreese, Perter, and Semetko (2001) believe that although generic frames do not 
provide the framing of an occurrence in detail, they ‘allow comparisons between 
frames, topics, and possibly framing practices in different countries’ (pp. 108-109). 
Considering the nature of this study, the generic frames are deemed more valuable 
for this study in terms of comparability (d’Haenens, 2005).  
Examples of generic frames include episodic and thematic frames (Iyenger, 
1991), strategic frames (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), and human impact, 
powerlessness, economics, moral values, and conflict frames (Neuman et al., 1992, 
pp. 74-75). Among these frames, Neuman et al.’s (1992) suggestions are the most 
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common generic frames applied by both the media and the audience in a series of 
current issues (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Cappella and Jamieson (1997) have identified 
the dominance of ‘strategically’ framed news, especially in the case of election news 
coverage. The strategic frame is generally conceptualised as news that focuses on the 
game characteristics of politics and underlines winning and losing. The researchers 
argued that the strategic frame in the U.S. news coverage of politics dominates over 
the issue frame that places interests in policy problems and proposed solutions, as 
well as the implications for the public. Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) offered a 
comprehensive discussion about a variety of frames dominantly used in the U.S. 
news coverage: human impact, powerlessness, economics, moral values, and 
conflict. Their study highlights that news about politics and the economy is usually 
framed in terms of conflict or in terms of the economic consequences of occurrences, 
disputes, and policies. De Vreese (2005) believed that generic frames ‘transcend 
thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even 
over time and in different cultural contexts’ (p. 54). Other researchers (Gans, 1979; 
Tuchman, 1980) recognised these patterns that draw deeply from journalists’ norms 
and routines in practice. In this context, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) empirically 
scrutinised five Dutch national newspapers and television news stories during the 
Amsterdam meeting of the European heads of state in 1997, and developed five news 
frames in order of prevalence: attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic, 
human interest, and morality. The conflict and economic consequences frames were 
proved to be among the most common frames used in the political coverage.  
However, the generic nature of these frames was not tested in a cross-national 
comparative setting to build the generality of the frames beyond national boundaries. 
De Vreese, Peter, and Semetko (2001) in their work expanded the research on 
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generic news frames to a cross-nationally comparative setting. The researchers used 
the conflict and economic consequences frames in television news in the UK, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands. The investigation showed that conflict was more 
noticeable than economic consequences in overall political/economic news stories in 
all three countries. More recently, Van Cauwenberge, Gelders, and Joris (2009) in 
their cross-national study also tested and then validated the conflict and economic 
consequences frames, which appeared more frequently in the quality papers in 
France, the Netherlands, and Belgium that they examined in relation to the coverage 
of the European Union. In addition to these two frames, the authors added a 
nationalisation frame to scrutinise the news coverage. This is because previous 
empirical studies discovered that the nationalisation of EU-related news tended to 
decline (Gleissner & De Vreesee, 2005). The results confirmed the tendency. 
Drawing from this past research, the current study uses six clearly pre-defined 
generic frames suggested by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and by Van 
Cauwenberge et al. (2009): the conflict, human interest, economic impact, morality, 
responsibility, and nationalisation frames. The combination of these frames has also 
been applied by Godefroidt, Berbers, and d’Haenens (2016) to scrutinise four 
countries’ (the U.S., the UK, France, and Russia) news coverage of the Syrian 
conflict in a comparative content analysis. The following is an outline of each of 
these frames.  
The conflict frame emphasises conflict between individuals, groups, 
institutions, or countries (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The scholars have found 
that conflict can attract public attention (Hoge, 1994; Galtung & Ruge, 1965), as it 
remains a basic and valuable ingredient of news, especially in foreign news coverage 
(De Vreese, 2005; Neuman et al., 1992). Cappella and Jamieson (1997), however, 
109 
 
point out that the news media’s focus on conflict has resulted in public mistrust of 
politicians.  
The human-interest frame is frequently applied by tabloids aiming to attract 
public attention (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009). This refers to an individual’s story 
that could sensationally generate emotional responses, which adds to the narrative 
quality of the news capturing audience interest in a competitive-market context 
(Bennett, 1995). In other words, the human-interest frame ‘brings a human face or an 
emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem’ (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). 
The economic impact frame represents an issue or facts in terms of the 
economic consequences it will have on individuals, groups, organisations, or 
countries. Previous empirical findings have showed an important news value of the 
frame that is used quite frequently (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). 
The morality frame locates the issue or facts in the context of morals, social 
prescriptions, and religious tenets (Godefroidt et al., 2016). Scholars observe that 
because of the journalistic norm of objectivity, reporters usually use this frame 
indirectly through citations, reasoning, or implications (Neuman et al., 1992; 
Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). 
The responsibility frame is defined as ‘a way of attributing responsibility for 
a cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group’ (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96). It shapes public understanding by conveying credit and 
blame mostly in serious media coverage. For instance, Iyengar’s (1987) research on 
news coverage of poverty in the US suggests that the poor’s own plight is 
responsible for such social problem.  
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Finally, the nationalisation frame describes the fact that journalists tend to 
report international news from a purely domestic angle (Gleissner & De Vreese, 
2005; Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009). This frame underlines ‘a connection between 
the topic and the country or ideas of national politicians, parties, and/or persons’ 
(Godefroidt et al., 2016, p. 782). Godefroidt et al. (2016) suggest that this frame can 
be considered as related to ‘ethnocentrism – judging other countries by the extent to 
which they live up to one’s own national practices and values – [which] has always 
been a crucial value determining the coverage of foreign news’ (p. 782). 
 
4.2.2.4 Diagnostic and prognostic frames. 
Journalists often inform the audience about the larger social, economic, or 
political context surrounding an issue. Without such context, the public will only see 
alienated subjects and lack an understanding of the bigger picture (Godefroidt, et al., 
2016). This is what Benford and Snow (2000) refer to as the diagnostic frames, 
whereas Iyengar calls this thematic framing (1991), highlighting the wider 
background of the issue. When journalists frame an issue thematically, they highlight 
the wider tendencies, the social context, and the background of the issue. Namely 
they provide the public with diagnostic frames: ‘a diagnosis of some event or aspect 
of life as troublesome and in need of change’ (Snow et al., 2007, p. 3). Diagnostic 
framing consists of guilt or causality (the origin of the issue) thus adding background 
to a story. Previous studies suggest that attribution of the roots of a problem is 
frequently present in news coverage (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Ojala & Pantti, 2017). 
For example, in reporting on a U.S. citizen who was captured in Afghanistan 
together with the Taliban soldiers, The New York Times made a number of different 
causal attributions trying to explain why the American young man had turned into a 
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Taliban fighter (Zhang & Winfield, 2002). These included the young man’s different 
personality, his broken family, the figures he worshiped – Malcolm X and John 
Lennon, and the place where he grew up.  
Along with diagnoses, journalists may also suggest solutions for the problems 
to people. Snow and Benford (2000) characterise such solutions and strategies as the 
prognostic framing. In order to find out prognoses, they specify the solution 
consisting of ‘at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan’ 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Prognostic framing refers to how the issues 
identified in the diagnostic frames are to be solved, aiming to offer desirable 
solutions to the issue. Hence, the diagnosis and prognosis are major constructs of the 
consensus mobilisation (Klandermans, 1984), potentially intending to produce 
support amongst individuals in news coverage. For the audiences, the representations 
of prognoses and diagnoses allow them to link the topic to particular roots and 
solutions. Taken together, the combination of the six generic, diagnostic and 
prognostic frames as a whole, reflects Entman’s (1993) framing theory highlighting 
problem definition, causality, morality, and solution (p. 52). To offset any 
misperception that may occur through framing, Godefroidt et al. (2016) bring 
attention to the subtle difference between the responsibility frame and the 
diagnostic/prognostic frames. They accentuate that while the former highlights 
general responsibilities and recommends a potential solution, the latter give 




4.2.2.5 Approach for identifying news frames. 
Generic frames 
The analysis of the six generic frames contains a series of twenty-one yes /no 
questions stemming from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and Van Cauwenberge et 
al. (2009). Some of the questions are not applied for this study as changes have been 
made to account for the specific subject of analysis (Table 4.1). This modification 
follows Godefroidt et al.’s (2016) approach that was used for identifying generic 
news frames in the reporting of the Syria war.  
The conflict frame will be identified through four questions about the 
contentious situation. In light of the subject the second question from Semetko and 
Valkenburg (2000) (i.e. does one party-individual-group-country reproach another?) 
is altered: instead of ‘reproach’, ‘fights, riots, and confrontation’ (Godefroidt et al., 
2016) will be used. The human-interest frame is scrutinised through four questions 
on the extent to which the story is personalised. Again, Semetko and Valkenburg’s 
last question (i.e., presence of visual information in the story?) is not going to be 
applied, as visual analysis is not part of this study as the archives used do not always 
contain visual information. In addition, three items on financial impact will be used 
to assess the economic impact frame; and three items on moral information will be 
used to assess the morality frame. The responsibility frame is examined through five 
items interpreting which party is to be blamed for the issue. Finally, the 
nationalisation frame is investigated through two questions about the connection 





Table 4. 1: The twenty-one framing items (adopted from Semetko &Valkenburg, 2000) 
Generic Frames 
Conflict frame 
Does the story revolve around disagreement between parties, individuals, groups, 
countries? 
Does the story refer to fights, riots, and confrontation between two or more parties, 
individuals, groups, countries? 
Does the story refer to two sides or more than two sides of the problem? 
Does the story refer to winners and losers? 
Human interest frame 
Does the story provide a human example or 'human face' on the issue? 
Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings? 
Does the story emphasise how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problems? 
Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors? 
Economic consequences frame 
Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future? 
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved? 
Is there a reference to economic consequences of (not) pursuing a course of action? 
Morality frame 
Does the story contain any moral message? 
Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets? 
Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave? 
Responsibility frame 
Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the 
issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest some level of the government (including President Yanukovych) is 
responsible for the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest that an individual or group of people in society (including any 
coalition of the rebels) is responsible for the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest solutions to the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action? 
Nationalisation frame 
Does the article mention a connection between Ukraine and the individual country? 
Does the article articulate or quote the ideas of national politicians or persons that are 




Diagnostic and prognostic framing  
All articles were also scrutinised for proposed causes of and solutions to the 
Ukraine crisis. Based upon Godefroidt et al.’s (2016) approach to evaluating 
diagnostic and prognostic frames, six questions were developed to measure potential 
diagnoses and eight questions were raised to scrutinise the potential prognoses (Table 
4.2). Rather than all-encompassing ‘diagnostic/prognostic framing’, specific causes 
and solutions were chosen to be looked at, because this allowed us to draw parallels 
with the policies carried out by the countries involved (Godefroidt et al., 2016, pp. 
786-787). This researcher worked out the possible diagnoses pointing towards 
political, socio-economic, religious factors, human rights abuse, geopolitical factors, 
specific triggers (and/or other causes). These six elements were determined with 
guidance from Godefroidt et al. (2016), a close reading of the articles, and in light of 
recent studies about the roots of the Ukraine crisis (e.g., Ojala & Pantti, 2017; 
Ishchenko, 2014; Sakwa, 2015). The ‘rest’ category was aimed to offer an 
opportunity to suggest a new category once more coding had been done (Godefroidt 
et al., 2016). The prognostic solutions used were: military action, change in 
government, diplomacy, financial intervention, internal reforms, and removal of the 
military weapons arsenal (and/or other solutions) (Godefroidt et al., 2016). Again, 
the ‘other’ category was aimed to offer an opportunity to suggest a new category 
once more coding had been done. As a result, the external assistance was added as a 
separate option. By this means, this researcher was able to generate a substantial list 
of diagnoses and prognoses. In order to confidently determine which diagnostic and 
prognostic frame was present, it was important for the researcher to rigorously follow 
the rules suggested by Godefroidt et al. (2016): identifying ‘specific elements that 




Table 4. 2: Diagnostic and prognostic framing (adopted from Godefroidt et al., 2016) 
Diagnoses 
Political causes 
Does the article mention corruption, a lack of political freedom, power struggle between 
competing oligarchs, and/or unfair elections as a (possible) cause of the Ukraine crisis? 
Socio-economic causes 
Does the article mention inflation, rising unemployment, poverty or a lack of prosperity, 
limited educational opportunities, social insecurity, and/or generation gap between young 
and old Ukrainians as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Human rights violations 
Does the article mention infringement or lack of freedom of speech, opinion, religion, 
equal rights or human rights in general, and/or war crimes against civilisation or the 
violation of international law as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Religious prescriptions 
Does the article mention Ukrainian Catholics or Christians, disagreement between diverse 
religious groups, and/or the character or culture of religious groups as a (possible) cause 
of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Global dimensions 
Does the article mention disputes between Western powers and Russia, Russian ties, new 
cold war, and/or regional ambitions with limited resources as a (possible) cause of the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Particular triggers 
Does the article mention the shooting of the people, the many (innocent, civilian) victims 
and/or a violent attack as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Others  









     Intervention 
     Does the article mention suppressing the fighting with action by their military and/or a 
no-fly zone as a (possible) solution of the Ukraine crisis? 
     Assistance 
     Does the article only mention military assistance as a (possible) solution of the 
continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
     Rejection 
     Does the article mention that any military action is rejected or will only deteriorate the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Change in government 
Does the article mention the dismissal of President Victor Yanukovych or his entire 
regime and/or the appointment of a new government as a (possible) solution of the 
continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Financial intervention 
Does the article mention economic cooperation with other countries from the international 
community to provide financial support and/or economic measures against one or more 
parties involved as a (possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Internal reforms 
Does the article mention internal reforms in terms of political issues, socio-economic 
issues, religious issues, and/or the improvement of human rights as a (possible) solution of 
the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Dismantling military weapons 
Does the article mention the removal of the Russian stockpile of military weapons as a 
(possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
External assistance 
Does the article mention external co-operation or negotiations in terms of political issues, 
socio-economic issues, religious issues, and/or the improvement of human rights as a 
(possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Others 






4.3 The Case Study – The Ukraine Crisis  
Having discussed the research methods adopted in this study, the following 
section aims to introduce the specific case – the Ukraine crisis elaborating on how 
the theoretical models outlined above will apply and work here. 
Following the logic of Godefroidt et al.’s (2016) case study applying the 
generic frames to the Syrian conflict, journalists in the case of the Ukraine crisis 
could choose to not only emphasise the violence, confrontation, or disagreements 
between regimes, groups (including rebels), or international participants, they could 
equally focus on human circumstances and ‘suffering – victims of the crisis; its 
economic impact – impact on energy, financial contributions/sanctions, cost of 
intervention’ (p. 782); the morality of the violence – shooting individuals including 
elders and children; ‘point fingers towards those responsible for the crisis or its 
resolution – what can the international community or the countries involved do?; or 
they can stress an association with their own country’ (Godefroidt et al., 2016, p. 
782) – such as Vladimir Putin’s leading role. Overall, whether the journalistic use of 
a generic frame is to expedite deliberation or for other purposes, this may well have 
constructive or disadvantageous effects. For this study, following the frames 
discussed above, the differences between the selected news media in terms of applied 
frames can be easily identified.  
Moreover, the protest in Kyiv against Yanukovych’s political decision to 
suspend the country’s EU Association Agreement marked the beginning of the 
Ukraine crisis. That means the protesters initially attempted to spotlight a 
problematic situation in the hope of changing the policy. This represented the 
possibility for the media to go beyond straightforward reporting and ‘add context by 
presenting reasonable causes, responsibilities, and solutions’ (Godefroidt, et al., 
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2016, p. 783). Godefroidt et al. (2016) explain that the significance of such 
diagnostic and prognostic ways of framing on-going conflicts rests with the fact that 
they may cause various consequences. On the one hand, media can divert the 
attention from the actual purpose of protest activities to the one of treating the protest 
as a media ‘spectacle’, eclipsing information about the protesters’ voices (Hallin, 
1986; Iyengar, 1991; Luther & Miller, 2005). On the other hand, the way reporters 
interpret and articulate the development of the Ukraine crisis in general and, for 
example, the Crimean secession in particular, may encourage different or even 
polarised attitudes within the public including foreign policymakers. Therefore, the 
combination of the set of frames – generic, diagnostic and prognostic – as used by 
Godefriodt et al. (2016), can be applied to this study to scrutinise and compare news 
framing of the Ukraine crisis in liberal and hybrid regimes.  
 
4.4 The Sample 
Representativeness is considered as the first and most crucial criteria when 
selecting the sample. Accordingly, time periods, media sources, the keywords, and 
the rationale for their selection are outlined below.  
 
4.4.1 The choice of periods.  
An important aspect of this mixed-methods methodology is to identify 
specific periods of time that allow media reporting to be analysed over time. Crucial 
points which may be used to divide distinct time periods (timeline divisions used by 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies) include the ousting of Victor 
Yanukovych from power (22 February 2014), the annexation of Crimea (18 March 
2014), the declaration of the Donetsk Republic (07 April 2014), the shooting down of 
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the Malaysian airliner MH17 (17 July 2014), the Russian ‘invasion’/delivery of 
humanitarian aid in Ukraine (12 August 2014), and the imposition of each 
subsequent round of Western sanctions against Russia (March, April, July, 
September 2014). These, following Gamson (1992), provide ‘critical discourse 
moments’ that media reporters usually use as ‘pegs’. These pegs offer us ‘a way of 
identifying those time periods in which efforts at framing issues are especially likely 
to appear’ (p. 26). Table 4.3 sets out the length of each time-period. 
 
Table 4. 3: Number of days for each time-period 
Time-period             Number of days 
1st period 89 
2nd period 22 
3rd period 119 
4th period 225 
   Total                             455 
 
 
As the table above shows, the periods have very different lengths. Their 
demarcation is driven by the nature of events and developments taking place on the 
ground and they are used here as a way to break down the story of the Ukraine crisis. 
The main interest of the study is in comparing how the Russian and UK media 
framed the Ukraine conflict over the whole duration of the crisis. The timeline 




1st period - Crisis in Kyiv: 30 November 2013 – 26 February 2014. 
This period marks the beginning of the ‘Euromaidan’ anti-government 
protests in Kyiv against President Viktor Yanukovych due to his refusal to sign the 
country’s EU Association Agreement. Several critical events are included here: on 
20 February the worst 48 hours of political violence in Europe since the World War 
II were recorded with 88 people reported to have been killed; the ‘coup’ / 
‘revolution’ occurred in the following days starting on 22 February; President 
Yanukovych fled Ukraine while protesters and politicians agreed to form a new 
government; and protesters took over Presidential administration buildings including 
Mr Yanukovych’s residence.  
 
2nd period - Crimean secession / annexation: 27 February – 20 March 
2014. 
The critical events within this period are: the formation of a new government 
in Ukraine; the seizing of government building in Crimea by pro-Russian rebels; 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea; and the first round of sanctions on Russia imposed 
by NATO countries. 
 
3rd period - Battles in Eastern Ukraine: 21 March – 17 July 2014. 
During this time period pro-Russian rebels seized government buildings in 
the Eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv, whereas the Ukraine 
authorities escalated the military activities attempting to regain control; regular 
Ukrainian army and loyal mercenaries funded and supported politically by the U.S. 
and the EU, on one side, opposed separatists and militias from Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions supported by Russia, on the other, which was followed by the introduction of 
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a second round of sanctions on Russia; the third round of sanctions was initiated 
following the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Eastern 
Ukraine. This drove things forward – including NATO’s hardened positions against 
Russia, although each side blamed the other for the tragedy. 
 
4th period - Stalemate: 18 July 2014 – 22 February 2015. 
The final period of analysis covers the period from Russia’s entry into 
Eastern Ukraine, through to the reported conflicts between the two that were 
followed by further sanctions, and the international ceasefire agreement signed in 
Minsk on 22 February 2015.  
Scholars (e.g., Chouliaraki, 2008; Parry, 2010) suggest that violence, deaths, 
and suffering are often extensively mediatised, particularly in the public framing of a 
conflict because they have potential to ‘cause strong emotions, highlight questions of 
guilt and responsibility, and assert the sense that there is a moral obligation for 
people and governments to act’ (as cited in Ojala & Pantti, 2017, p. 4). Accordingly, 
the four periods that include the critical events are chosen as representative of 
different stages of discussions connected to the development of the Ukraine conflict. 
During this time the various political actors involved in the crisis attempted to use 
powerful arguments to convince their audiences of the correctness of their positions. 
The media reported these discussions. In this sense, the selected periods could be 
considered key in illustrating the dominant framing of the conflict adopted by the 
different media. Thus, with this timeline, changes in the way the media reported on 




4.4.2 The choice of media sources. 
This study focuses on the English-language reporting of the Ukraine crisis by 
the British and Russian news media. It is important to look at the English language 
presence of the Russian media outlets because these are the ones that are outward 
facing and attract intense global public attention. The British media coverage is 
collected from three publications that are selected based on their quality, circulation 
rates, and political positions – the BBC, The Guardian, and Mail Online. The 
Guardian and Mail Online are on either side of the political spectrum while the BBC 
is claiming to be independent. As counterparts, the selection of the Russian media 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis is based on three media sources – RT, The Moscow 
Times, and Pravda.ru. They are either entirely English-language media or have 
English editions in print or online. As already pointed out, this study is not interested 
in the Russian media that targets a domestic audience. For these purposes it would be 
pertinent to study domestic local media in Russian language. Rather, this study 
scrutinises the media either specifically targeting or easily available to an 
international audience. Taken together, this cross-section of the British and Russian 
news media constitutes an important component of the public sphere, serving as key 
information sources for the public, and enabling us to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the media reporting in a time of war. In choosing these media every 
attempt was made to ensure comparability between the British and the Russian 
outlets.  
As such, the selection of the BBC and the RT is based on the fact that they 
both are prominent representatives of what might be called the Western and the 
Eastern European voices in global media. First, both media claim to be independent. 
However, despite the fact that RT officially declares on its website that it is an 
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Autonomous Non-Profit Organization, independent journalists both from Russia and 
from abroad have repeatedly indicated that the Russian government supports RT with 
annual subsidies of around 11 billion rubles (Grincheva & Lu, 2016). According to 
the RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, in 2015 the funding coming from the 
Federal Budget of the Russian Federation was increased by as much as 41 per cent 
and constituted more than 15 billion rubles (Grincheva & Lu, 2016). For its part, the 
BBC is publicly funded through a licence fee. In 2017, as shown in the Financial 
statements of the BBC Annual Report and Account 2016/17, the licence fee income 
amounted to GBP 3,787.2 million (p. 125). Second, both channels broadcast in 
English and have a global reach in a number of countries and regions. The BBC 
(2015) claims to have a weekly global audience of 308 million people, and RT (2016) 
states that its services are available to over 700 million people in 100+ countries. RT 
(2016) broadcasts in English, Spanish, and Arabic, and targets first of all 
international audiences. It positions itself as a channel addressing the most important 
international issues by providing ‘an alternative perspective on major global events’ 
from the ‘Russian viewpoint’ (RT, 2016).  
The Guardian and The Moscow Times both are quality print media with 
online editions. The Guardian is a British centre-left national daily newspaper 
(Veneti, Karadimitriou, & Poulakidakos, 2016; Atanasova & Koteyko, 2017), known 
for its extensive presentation and analysis of international news coverage (Jaber, 
2016, p. 74). The paper’s war coverage has been analysed in a number of studies 
(e.g., Parry, 2010; Tumber & Palmer, 2004; Ravi, 2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; 
Dardis, 2006; Guzek, 2019). Furthermore, The Guardian reaches a wide range of 
global audiences (Jaber, 2016, p. 74). The international appeal of the paper is also 
evidenced by the facts that its online edition was the third most widely read in the 
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world as of June 2012 (Stripp, 2012), and its ‘global domain’ has over ‘120 million 
monthly unique browsers’ accessing theguardian.com – up ‘almost 35% year-on-
year’ (Murrell, 2016, p. 7). In Russia, The Moscow Times is the leading English-
language daily newspaper that was firstly published in 1992. The paper originally 
catered to foreigners living in Moscow, and gradually has attracted a number of local 
readers since it first appeared. Its news coverage ranges from politics to business and 
cultural dimensions from within the former Soviet Union. In 2005, the newspaper’s 
ownership was transferred first to a Moscow-registered publishing house – 
Independent Media, then to a Dutch-Finnish publishing group Sanoma (Zhang & 
Fahmy, 2009, p. 523). In October 2014 President Vladimir Putin signed into law 
amendments limiting foreign investors from owning more than 20% in Russia’s 
media organisations (Luhn, 2015). Subsequently, the paper’s ownership was once 
again transferred to Demyan Kudryavstsev who had been doing business with the 
late oligarch Boris Berezovsky (Luhn, 2015). The paper regularly publishes articles 
by prominent Russian journalists, many of whom take critical positions towards the 
current Russian government. As the European Stability Initiative (2009) research 
points out, the newspaper is often regarded as a source of high-quality journalism. It 
is frequently cited by foreign media as a source for Russian political and economic 
news. It has a good English website where the print articles are published (ESI, 2009, 
P. 26). Although The Moscow Times enjoys less popularity than The Guardian, 
Zhang and Fahmy (2009) state that the newspaper is ‘observed to be a major 
publication in Russia that takes critical stances toward the government on issues 
ranging from the war in Chechnya to censorship in the media’ (p. 523). As such, it 
can be argued that The Moscow Times enjoys a journalistic excellence that makes it a 
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comparable analogue to The Guardian in terms of their independent journalistic 
practices. 
In the UK, The Daily Mail is one of the country’s most polarising 
sensationalist/tabloid-style, right-of-centre newspaper (Atanasova & Koteyko, 2017, 
p. 455). Mail Online is the name of the paper’s online version. Critics argue that it is 
sensationalist in the way it demonises feminists, foreigners, and the poor (Lawless, 
2013). In addition, the latest figures from National Readership Survey (NRS) suggest 
the Daily Mail is still by far the most read national newspaper brand in the UK in 
print and online (Ponsford, 2017). In Russia, in 1999 a group of journalists who 
previously worked for the earlier famous Soviet Pravda launched Pravda.ru. The 
web-based, tabloid-style newspaper often takes a sensationalist approach to news 
reporting (Saunders & Strukov, 2010, p. 464). Pravda.ru is one of the first and most 
popular online resources in Russia. According to the Rambler Top 100, from mid-
October to mid-November 2009 Pravda.ru was the 14th most visited website in 
Russia in the news media category, attracting an audience of over 62,000 unique 
visitors daily (ESI, 2009). Bennett (2012) states that: It is ‘the largest news and 
analytical internet-holding in Russia, attracts 4 million “unique users” and “50 
million” page views; and is the first Russian online newspaper to launch an English 
version’ (p. 374). It is important to note that Pravda.ru is unaffiliated with the earlier 
Russian Pravda or with other newspapers using the name Pravda. The chairman of 
Pravda.ru says his site is ‘the absolute leader among Russian English-language 
media, with the exception of Russia Today’ (as cited in Kopan, 2013). Therefore, the 
choice of Pravda.ru and Mail Online is based on their common characteristics in 




4.4.3 The choice of keywords.  
For each period, the combinations of key words for selecting articles are 
slightly different due to the different nature of the four periods. When carrying out 
the search the method is not simply to account for all the articles that use the specific 
keywords. This would lead to unnecessary contamination of the results by containing 
the texts that focus on different subjects and mention the Ukraine crisis only in 
passing or not at all. Rather, the method employed is to use some of the keywords 
with an additional option, such as ‘Ukraine’ and ‘protest’ so as to narrow the search. 
In addition, any formulation of the keywords e.g. ‘Ukraine’, ‘Ukrainian’; ‘Russia’, 
‘Russian’; ‘Crimea’, ‘Crimean’; ‘fight’, ‘fought’, ‘fighting’ are taken into account 
when searching for articles. Bearing these in mind, the following are the four sets of 
keywords.  
For the first period, articles containing the following words are selected: 
protest, crisis, fight, war, civil war, Ukraine, Ukrainian, Russia, and Yanukovych. 
For the second period, the keywords are: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, Crimea, Crimean 
annexation. The keywords selected for the third period are: Donetsk, Luhansk, 
Kharkiv, Ukraine, Russia, NATO, referendum, MH17. Finally, in order to identify 
relevant articles during the last period, the following keywords are selected: Russia, 
Russian aid, humanitarian, NATO, ceasefire, Debaltseve. This ensures all articles 
relating to the Ukraine crisis were found. All articles were also read manually to 




4.5 The Implementation in the Case of Ukraine  
Step 1: Producing a coding scheme. 
To conduct a systematic framing analysis, this researcher took the first step to 
conduct the scientific, systematic, and objective form of appraisal by producing a 
coding scheme. The coding scheme was designed to provide a detailed account of 
how the British and the Russian media have framed the Ukraine crisis; with 
comparisons being made between different media sources from each country. The 
formulation of this coding scheme followed a preliminary review of part of the 
sample conducted in September 2017. The pilot work focused on 3 months’ worth of 
news framing of the Ukraine crisis in Russia and the UK, comparing The Moscow 
Times and The Guardian. This exercise was helpful in identifying important factors 
that could be developed into coding categories for the measurement of the news 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis. As a result, prior to proceeding to the coding of the 
entire sample, the codebook was modified by adding the ‘external assistance’ to 
prognostic frames. The final coding scheme consists of variables in the following 
order (also see Appendix A – Codebook): 
 
A1 – ID Number (ddmmyy) 
A2 – Media number (1-6) 
A3 – Number of words 
B1 – Generic frames (a-f) 
B2 – Diagnostic frames (a-f) 




Step 2: Collecting data. 
The researcher took the second step to collect data after the coding scheme 
had been set up. This was conducted by using Lexis-Nexis for The Guardian sample. 
News articles from the BBC, RT, The Moscow Times, Mail Online, and Pravda.ru 
were collected from their online archives. The Lexis-Nexis database had been 
critiqued for its intrinsic flaws such as ‘false positives’ when a terminology has more 
than one meaning and the results list would contain spurious ones as well as ‘false 
negatives’ referring to the possibility of omission when the keyword is extremely 
precise (Deacon, 2007). To account for these criticisms, the researcher ensured that 
the well-defined keywords directly referred to the issues. Particular studies have been 
productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted 
to the problem and the content’ (p. 147). Given the timespan of the research and 
extensive amount of data to be considered, it would not have been pragmatic to 
collect and look at physical copies of The Guardian without a drop in the number of 
the samples.  
Therefore, with all the aspects discussed within the sample above– media 
sources, keywords, and timelines, articles from The Guardian were searched and 
retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database. For example, for stories linking Ukraine 
with the protest in Kyiv, the keywords: ‘Ukraine’ and ‘protest’ or ‘Yanukovych’ or 
‘Putin’ or ‘Russia’ are input into the search engine and, in order to eliminate 
irrelevant and duplicated materials, the option of ‘major mentions’ and ‘high 
similarity’ were selected. This process was repeated for each set of keywords listed 
earlier. The material that was retrieved for the 15-month period of the study was then 
processed using computer to determine the number of articles and word-count for 
each article. The Moscow Times articles were collected from its official website 
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where the print version of archives was available. The researcher downloaded all the 
issues within each period, and looked through every issue to determine and retrieve 
the applicable article to ensure credibility without omission. However, coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis on last day of the final period (22 February 2015) was not 
available in the newspaper, as it was a Sunday. Therefore, a decision was made by 
the researcher to extend the final period to the last day of the month – 28 February 
2015. The extension was then applied to all the selected media outlets in order to be 
consistent and comparable. In the same way as the data collection of The Moscow 
Times, the articles from Mail Online and Pravda.ru were collected from their official 
websites respectively where archives were accessible.  
Finally, for the articles from the BBC and RT, the researcher used each of the 
keywords for all periods to search for relevant texts from their online websites. It is 
important to note here that by the time of empirically conducting this study, four 
years had passed since the Ukraine crisis broke out. And this presented difficulties 
beyond the researcher’s control namely that there was a possibility that some news 
articles could have been edited or deleted. This difficulty was encountered especially 
in relation to the BBC and RT online websites during the third and fourth periods in 
particular as these time periods included more events covering longer period. At this 
point archives were not available for data collection and cross check purposes. As a 
result, the researcher added several keywords to the existing ones in order to 
maximise the search results. For each period, the researcher used each keyword to 
retrieve relevant articles. The new keywords added to the third period are as follows: 
Donbass, Sloviansk, Odessa, Poroshenko, G7, and Sanction. The keywords added to 
the fourth period are: shelling, separatists, Minsk talk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, 
Mariupol, and Russian convoy. 
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Overall, a sample of 5,532 news articles were selected for the final analysis 
(how the researcher determined the relevance is explained in the following section). 
The retrieved data was stored in Microsoft Word documents. Coding was conducted 
using a Microsoft Access database that offered the researcher flexibility in sorting 
and interrogating data, as well as ‘the facility for the export of data to Microsoft 
Word or Excel for the production of tables and spreadsheets’ (Robinson et al., 2010, 
p. 188). Next a description is provided of how these frames were identified. 
 
Step 3: Analysing data. 
Once the tables of questions (measuring the generic, diagnostic and 
prognostic frames) were set up, every collected news item was analysed and coded 
carefully by answering the questions laid out in the Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (pp. 113-116). 
The researcher used the hard copy of the data in order to read thoroughly, analyse, 
and make notes due to the process of identifying generic, diagnosis and prognosis 
frames for each piece of news article. In order to identify the appropriate generic 
frame the researcher employed a combination of approaches consisting of 
interpretive analysis and systematic test. First of all, each news article was read 
thoroughly to both check for relevance and determine the overall message of reports. 
In spite of existing critiques of this stage of framing analysis as unsystematic and 
interpretative, it is of significance to scrutinise the overall sense of message 
conveyed by journalists as structural syntax of news stories makes it difficult for 
readers ‘to differentiate among statements of fact, analysis, and opinion’ (Neuman et 
al., 1992, p. 55). For example, research has found that although newspapers generally 
frame issue early in news stories where facts appear earlier than opinion, journalists 
also tend to combine several of the ‘fact’, ‘analysis’, and ‘opinion’ into one sentence 
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or expression (Neuman et al., 1992, p. 55). This thus makes it important to avoid 
determining the generic frames by the number of the ‘Yes’ answers but to evaluate 
texts on story level in the first place. As Robinson (2002) argues this aspect of 
framing analysis ‘does possess a high degree of validity, requiring the researcher to 
read complete news texts and develop a sense of the overall tone and emphasis of 
media reports’ (p. 137).  
The second step followed a more systematic and reliable approach aiming to 
test the given frame as per the questions listed. For instance, if an overall sense of 
‘responsibility’ was given after the first step of reading the article thoroughly, the 
researcher then answered the established corresponding questions to robustly test the 
validity of frame inferences. While answering these questions, the researcher 
simultaneously conducted two important tasks. The first was to manually categorise 
the issue reported. For example, with regards to the responsibility frame, some of the 
journalists’ targets may be Russia, while some may lay the blame on the EU, 
America, Britain, or Ukraine. Therefore, the effort to quantify the characteristics of 
the analysed content also had qualitative elements. The second was to identify 
whether and which diagnostic and prognostic frame was/were used.  
 
Screening / deleting data.  
Some irrelevant material that included information on the Ukraine crisis was 
left out of the analysis. This material included updates, timetables, and news in brief.  
 
Step 4: Analysing the results.  
From the resulting data, analytical tables were set up in Microsoft Word to 
compare the results of the different media sources, and those were featured in the 
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results section. For generating frequency tables, the results were presented in, for 
example: ‘quantity of coverage by the media’, ‘mean length of coverage by the 
media’, ‘distribution of generic frames by the media’, ‘distribution of diagnostic 
frames by the media’, and ‘distribution of prognostic frames by the media’. This was 
used in the framing analysis part of the research for general measures of tendency 
and the comparison between the selected media, in order to answer the research 
questions about attention paid and frames used by different media in the coverage of 
the selected key events.  
Following conclusions being drawn on the framing analysis results, a 
subsequent evaluation brings the results together by differentiating and comparing 
the frames into a coherent discussion on how the Ukraine crisis was covered by the 
two countries’ media respectively. An analytically qualitative analysis – an extension 
of the framing analysis – as a reflective process was adopted, since knowing the 
quantity of a particular frame (e.g., responsibility frame) does not articulate whether 
the coverage reflects fairness or prejudice (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The main 
goal behind this analysis was to select and comparatively analyse certain featured 
frames, and thus identify the extent to which the news coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
from Russia and the UK supports or refutes the media system models under hybrid 
and liberal regimes as developed by Vatarnova (2012) and Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). As explained in the Step 3, the researcher manually categorised the issue 
reported. This ensured that the researcher later went through all the notes taken 






This chapter outlined the approach adopted by this study for collecting and 
analysing data in order to answer the study’s key research questions. The framing 
analysis was key method to produce nuanced data (quantitative and qualitative) on 
the characteristics of the news coverage of the Ukraine crisis. The method helped 
determine the range of subject selection and critical messages of the press coverage 
of the Ukraine crisis and the national Ukraine policy. The analysed content contains 
six media outlets from Russia and the UK from different ends of the political 
spectrum. Fifteen month-long period was chosen for analysis divided into four sub-
periods reflecting critical phases of the crisis between November 2013 and February 
2015. A codebook was built on a pilot analysis of a small part of the sample. The aim 
was to take into account subtle ways of criticism in the media coverage while also 
capturing the actual substance of the political messages on the conflict. 
The empirical contribution of the study shows not only how the Ukraine 
crisis was covered by the media outlets from liberal and hybrid regimes, but also how 
the coverage differed across countries and outlets. The thesis now moves on to the 
findings of the two countries’ media. The results and data of the Russian media will 





Findings – Russian Media 
 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the framing theorists (e.g., Entman, 1993) as discussed in 
Chapter four, the public’s perception of the ever-changing Ukraine crisis is 
dependent on how the media select and organise the information. By highlighting 
certain elements while downplaying others, framing functions to bring specific ideas 
to news audiences (Iyengar, 1991). It is expected that there will be a difference 
between the media outlets from countries with liberal and hybrid political regimes in 
the ways in which they frame the conflict. Thus, it is important to ask what the 
different narratives of the Ukraine crisis are and in what ways they contribute to the 
daily productions of news.  
Accordingly, this chapter presents the data from the analysis of the Russian 
media coverage of the Ukraine crisis between 30 November 2013 and 28 February 
2015. The overall 15-months’ worth of news coverage has been divided into four 
periods: 30 November 2013 – 26 February 2014, 27 February – 20 March 2014, 21 
March – 17 July 2014, and 18 July – 28 February 2015 as explained in Chapter four. 
At the core of this assessment are both the quantitative and the qualitative features of 
the examined media outlets’ reports as part of a mixed methods approach. The 
frames and their supporting evidence in each period are presented chronologically. 
The sequence of the analysis is identical to that used for the British media in the next 
chapter. First, to answer the second research question – to what extent have the 
selected Russian media paid attention to the Ukraine crisis between 2014 and 2015 – 
the fundamental elements of the news samples such as reporting quantity and mean 
length of coverage are measured to explore the general descriptive statistics and 
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measure overall press attention. The decision to start with this assessment by 
scrutinising numerical quantities in the news coverage stems from two arguments. 
First, systematically measured numeric values reveal ‘neutral and factual’ features 
(Richardson, 2007). Second, reporting quantity and length of media reporting of 
events are media indicators of attention, and allow us to scrutinise the media agenda 
power in terms of how they shape attention about events (van Dijk, 2009). The 
chapter then proceeds to uncover the featured news frames of the Ukraine crisis 
during the defined periods thus demonstrating the characteristics of the Russian 
media coverage and directly addressing the third research question (What news 
frames are adopted in the mediated Ukraine crisis coverage?).  
 
5.2 Press Attention 
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014.  
In order to answer the second research question (To what extent have the 
selected Russian media paid attention to the Ukraine conflict during the period?), the 
overall quantities and mean length of media coverage were measured. First, in purely 
quantitative terms, the Ukraine crisis enjoyed considerable media attention between 
30 November 2013 and 26 February 2014, with a total number of 312 articles (Table 
5.1). Second, press attention was also measured through a focus on article length, 
with an average of 673 words per article. The differences ranged from 84 words 
(Pravda.ru, 5 December 2013) briefly quoting the U.S. Assistant Secretary Victoria 
Nuland’s stance towards the chaotic developments in Kyiv, to 1,479 words (The 
Moscow Times, 3 December 2013) representing diverse voices from Ukraine and 
Russia regarding the ongoing protests in the capital. Among the three media outlets, 
RT offered the most extensive coverage with 128 articles and an average of 741 
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words. This coverage primarily distanced Russia from the Ukraine conflict and 
insisted that the conflict is a domestic issue, as will be demonstrated and discussed in 
detail later on in this chapter. The Moscow Times paid slightly less attention to the 
Ukraine crisis – without the difference being significant – with 117 articles and an 
average of 702 words. The newspaper is however identified as the one that tended to 
provide the audience with various perspectives on the subject, as will be illustrated 
below. The tabloid-style media – Pravda.ru – during this period paid considerably 
less attention to the conflict, with 67 articles – nearly half of the number from RT. 
Pravda.ru’s lesser attention was also manifested in its mean length of merely 491 
words.  
 
Table 5. 1: Press attention by the Russian media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014  
 Quantity                          Mean Length 
RT  128 (41%)                                741 
The Moscow Time  117 (38%)                                702 
Pravda.ru    67 (21%)                                 491 
Total   312                                              
 
 
2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014.  
The overall press attention during the second period increased noticeably to 
401 pieces of news devoted to the escalating conflict. These intensive 22 days had 
approximately 20 reports per day on the topic by the three media outlets, and focused 
mainly on the turmoil following Yanukovych’s fleeing of Ukraine, Russia’s action in 
Crimea, as well as the imposed sanctions on Russia. The intensified coverage reflects 
the privileged position of the issue on the news agenda and Russia’s geopolitical 
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interests as the country’s involvement became crystallised compared to the previous 
period when Russia resisted to put itself in the midst of the crisis. As shown in Table 
5.2, The Moscow Times devoted the most attention to the crisis with 155 articles 
representing 39% of the whole sample of 401 articles. This is followed by RT who 
published marginally fewer but longer articles, 146 and a mean length of 747 words, 
in comparison to The Moscow Times’s 685 words mean length. Pravda.ru again 
came at the bottom of the table giving least attention to the issue, in terms of quantity 
and mean length. The media offered 92-word coverage denying the statement of the 
representative of the State Border Service of Ukraine that Russian troops have started 
military actions in Crimea (Pravda.ru, 4 March 2014). On the other hand, RT’s 
longest news item came on 19 March 2014 with 5,259 words citing President Putin’s 
speech on Crimea’s reunification. It is worth signposting here that the case of 
Crimea’s renunciation from Ukraine and its reintegration into Russia has been 
predominantly connected by the RT to the well-known Kosovo precedent – Kosovo’s 
unilateral separation from Serbia in 1999.  
 
 
Table 5. 2: Press attention by the Russian media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 
 Quantity                          Mean Length 
The Moscow Times  155 (39%)                                  685 
RT  146 (36%)                                  747 
Pravda.ru  100 (25%)                                  572 





3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014.  
The third period covered a longer timespan between 21 March and 17 July 
2014, with a total of 1,405 articles on the Ukraine crisis published by the three 
Russian media. The ranking regarding the reporting frequency remains identical to 
the second period with The Moscow Times on top, followed by RT and Pravda.ru 
(Table 5.3). The difference lies in the mean length with The Moscow Times on 
average publishing longer articles than the other two media outlets. Overall, The 
Moscow Times paid the most extensive attention to the Ukraine conflict, critically 
dealing with the tit-for-tat sanctions between Russia and the West, the new 
government forming in Kyiv, the anti-Maidan protest/unrest/ referendum in Eastern 
Ukraine, and the following offensive military action in the region initiated by new 
Kyiv. RT attempted to distance Russia from the deteriorated violence in Eastern 
Ukraine, whilst reporting that Russia resettled the refugees from severely hit area in 
Eastern Ukraine due to new Kyiv’s launch of Anti-Terrorism Operations. This will 
be demonstrated further later on in the framing analysis. During this time period the 
longest news item for a second time was provided by the RT’s quoting of President 
Putin’s statements from an interview on 5 June 2014. Pravda.ru’s less interest in the 
Ukraine conflict was evident in its apparently lower number of articles (302) with 
shorter length compared with The Moscow Time and RT (536 words on average). 
Manifestly Pravda.ru offered the shortest piece during the third period – only 86 
words long announcing that Slavyansk’s self-defence forces within the Donetsk 







Table 5. 3: Press attention by the Russian media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
 Quantity                          Mean Length 
The Moscow Times  560 (40%)                                  652 
RT  543 (39%)                                  588 
Pravda.ru  302 (21%)                                  536 
Total 1,405                                          
 
 
4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015.  
The overall attention paid to the Ukraine conflict during the final time period 
covering seven months’ worth of news slightly dropped. This is regardless of the fact 
that the attention radically intensified when the chaos reached a peak as Malaysian 
Flight MH17 was shot down on 17 July 2014 whilst constant shelling and fighting in 
Eastern Ukraine took place. The turmoil continued with many civilians reported 
killed in the ongoing conflict until the end of the period when international parties 
signed a peace deal. Similar to the first period, RT came on top with 583 pieces of 
news occupying 39% of the whole sample of 1,504 articles. The considerable 
attention given by RT to the Ukraine crisis is marked by a consistent tone in terms of 
Russia staying on the side-lines in the internal issues of Ukraine such as the downing 
of MH17, and the inhuman battling on the ground between new Kyiv and pro-Russia 
forces. The Moscow Times, nevertheless, strikingly reduced its interest in the Ukraine 
crisis compared to that in the previous three periods, with 493 out of 1,504 articles 
dealing with it. The newspaper still offered more perspectives regarding the issue. 
The mean length stayed stable at 677 words. Pravda.ru in contrast increased 
attention to the crisis not only by its reporting quantity of 428 articles, but also by its 
increased mean length of 561 words. During this final time period, the most 
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extensive and shortest coverage were provided by the RT offering 4,560-word item 
on Russia’s discontent over the aggressive Western bodies by quoting from an 
interview with the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (28 September 2014) and by 
Pravda.ru (13 October 2014), briefing about the Governor of People’s Republic of 
Donetsk being severely attacked on the territory controlled by the People’s Republic 
of Donetsk.  
 
Table 5. 4: Press attention by the Russian media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
 Quantity                        Mean Length 
RT  583 (39%)                            614       
The Moscow Times  493 (33%)                            677     
Pravda.ru  428 (19%)                            561 
Total 1,504                                          
 
 
5.3 Framing of the Ukraine Crisis 
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014.  
Generic news frames. 
The third research question focused on the frames used by the Russian news 
media during the Ukraine crisis. First, the coverage in all three outlets during the first 
period revealed a high level of interest in the conflict frame. Overall, the media 
outlets framed 41% of their coverage using the conflict frame, 7% of the coverage 
used the morality frame while the human-interest frame was visible in 6.4% of the 
articles (Table 5.5). In comparison, the amount of coverage framed using the 
economic consequences frame, the responsibility frame, and the nationalisation 
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frame, was 15%, 24%, and 5% respectively. Thus, the responsibility frame came 
second behind the conflict one with the majority of the coverage focusing on the 
protests, radical groups, the opposition party in Ukraine plotting a coup with support 
from the US, and the West’s interference in the country. This was followed by the 
economic consequences frame with an overall of 15% of the coverage mainly 
highlighting the pros and cons of the offers from the EU and Russia. The morality 
frame (23 articles) was used less than half as often as the economic consequences 
one among the whole of 312 articles (7%). RT contributed more than half of that 
quantity. Similarly, the human-interest frame was generally the fifth favoured frame 
with 20 articles in total, The Moscow Times using it half of these times. All three 
media outlets published a similar number of articles using the nationalisation frame 
amounting to a total of 17, thus making it the least applied generic frame.  
 
Table 5. 5: Distribution of Generic frames by the Russian media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 
(1st period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Conflict 42 (33%) 55 (47%) 32 (48%) 129 (41%) 
Responsibility 39 (30%) 24 (21%) 12 (18%)   75 (24%) 
Economic consequences 20 (16%) 21 (18%)   7 (10%)   48 (15%) 
Morality 15 (12%) 1 (1%)   7 (10%) 23 (7%) 
Human interest 6 (5%) 11 (9%)  3 (5%) 20 (6%) 
Nationalisation 6 (5%)   5 (4%)  6 (9%) 17 (5%) 
Total  128           117        67 312 
 
 
Looking at the individual media in more detail, it is notable that The Moscow 
Times used the conflict frame the most – in 55 out of 117 articles (47%) – offering 
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various perspectives and voices regarding the early stage of the Ukraine conflict. 
Notably The Moscow Times ran counter to the overall framing tendency of using the 
generic frames (the morality, human-interest, and nationalisation frames). The 
newspaper, nevertheless, used a similar quantity of the economic consequences 
frame as RT, focusing on the positive and negative aspects of the deals from the EU 
and Russia. For example, The Moscow Times claimed that ‘there is no guarantee his 
[Yanukovych’s] country of 46 million will now follow Putin’s declared will in 
joining a Moscow-led Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan – a precursor of 
the Eurasian Union which Putin envisages’ (The Moscow Times, 2 December 2013). 
On the same day, RT showed a more unequivocal position. In a news article titled 
‘Ukrainian opposition wouldn’t sign “suicidal” EU agreement’, the media quoted 
Mateusz Piskorski, Director of the European Centre of Geopolitical Analysis: 
 
I think for the moment being any kind of association and signing a 
deeper and more comprehensive fair trade agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine would be a kind of economic suicide for Ukrainian side […] [T]he 
EU is not capable of compensating all the financial losses that Ukraine 
would encounter in case of closer cooperation with the EU. […] This pro-
European rhetoric aims at causing internal crisis and early elections, perhaps 
next year (RT, 2 December 2013). 
 
As Table 5.5 shows, The Moscow Times used more human-interest frames 
with 11 articles, whereas the morality frame was the least used one occupying only 
1% of the whole sample. The morality frame, however, received higher prominence 
in both RT and Pravda.ru, being the 4th and the 3rd used frame respectively. RT in 
particular, offered 15 articles – 12% of the overall coverage expressing 
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dissatisfaction with the moral weakness of the European bodies in terms of their 
double-standard policy towards Russia, their immorally direct meddling in other 
country’s internal issues, as well as the aggressive propaganda in the Western 
mainstream media. The human interest and nationalisation frames shared the same 
quantity of 6 articles each provided by the RT, representing 5% of 128 articles. 
Although the nationalisation frame was rarely used by The Moscow Times and RT, 
Pravda.ru tended to utilise the frame in 9% of its articles, a similar quantity to the 
morality frame. What Pravda.ru used the least was the human-interest frame with 
merely 3 articles, briefly narrating how the protestors were injured.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
Next, the study explored the prevalence of each diagnosis and prognosis 
among the selected set of Russian media. On the whole, the vast majority of the 
articles (71%) offered to their readers explanations of the cause of the Ukraine crisis, 
but only a small number of articles (11%) offered solutions. Table 5.6 shows that, 
overall, the global dimensions came on top with a total of 62% of the coverage 
explaining the root of the Ukraine crisis and the current situation between the West 
and the East. RT and Pravda.ru, in particular, used the global dimensions frame to 
label the West as offensive and interfering in the Ukraine crisis. One example is a 
leaked phone call (between Assistant Secretary of State for Europe – Victoria Nuland 
and US ambassador to Ukraine – Geoffrey Pyatt) before the collapse of Yanukovych, 
in which Nuland vocally nominated Arseniy Yatsenyuk to be the future leader in 
Kyiv. And Yatsenyuk became the new Prime Minister. As RT quoted the 




“I don’t think that Klitschko should go into the government. […] I 
don’t think it is a good idea,” Nuland said. “[J]ust let him stay out and do 
his political homework,” a male voice - believed to be Pyatt - replied. “In 
terms of the process moving ahead, we want to keep the moderate democrats 
together,” he said. […] Nuland added that she has also been told that UN 
chief Ban Ki-moon is about to appoint the former Dutch ambassador to 
Kyiv, Robert Serry, as his representative to Ukraine. "That would be great I 
think to help glue this thing and have the UN glue it and you know, f**k the 
EU," she said in apparent reference to their differences over policies. "We've 
got to do something to make it stick together, because you can be pretty sure 
that if it does start to gain altitude the Russians will be working behind the 
scenes to try to torpedo it," Pyatt replied. The leaked chat fuels earlier 
allegations that Washington is heavily meddling in the Ukrainian political 
crisis by manipulating the pro-EU opposition and helping it in its efforts to 
oust President Viktor Yanukovich (RT, 6 February 2014).  
 
Table 5. 6: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the Russian media: 30.11.2013 – 
26.02.2014 (1st period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Global dimensions 46 (52%) 49 (42%) 15 (5%) 137 (62%) 
Particular triggers   26 (30%) 13 (11%)   1 (3%)  40 (18%) 
Political causes   9 (10%) 25 (21%)   6 (20%)  40 (18%) 
Human rights violations   7 (8%) 9 (8%)   7 (23%)  23 (10%) 
Socio-economic   0 8 (7%)    1 (3%)  9 (4%) 
Religious    0            0    0      0 
Total 88 (69%) 104 (89%)  30 (45%) 222 (71%)4 
                                                          
4 The overall distribution of the diagnostic frames: 222 out of 312 articles (71%). 
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Political causes and particular triggers were mentioned significantly less both 
at 18%. The human rights violations were less frequently cited with 10%, while 
socio-economic causes were discussed in 4% of the coverage. The articles did not 
mention the religious factor at all. The same tendency with regard to religious 
considerations is found in the subsequent periods as well. This could be explained by 
the fact that although Ukraine can be seen as a religious diverse society, there is a 
majority shared religion across the whole of Ukraine. It is predominantly Orthodox 
Christian (Bremer, 2016). Thus, religion would not be a dividing factor in relation to 
the Ukraine crisis.  
As Table 5.6 shows, The Moscow Times offered the highest number of 
diagnostic frames in 89% of its sample, whereas RT provided somewhat less – in 
69% of cases. This was followed by Pravda.ru with 45%. The reason for The 
Moscow Times’s higher interest in diagnosis can be connected to its tendency to 
report on more dimensions and perspectives regarding the Ukraine conflict. For 
example, the socio-economic causes frame was suggested by the newspaper in eight 
articles, while Pravda.ru published only one, with non mentioning this in the RT. For 
instance, The Moscow Times talked about the differences between Russia and 
Ukraine: The former had oil to benefit its people, the latter did not. Thus, the people 
in Kyiv were less likely reliant on their government:  
 
Ukraine has no oil. The 3 million residents of Kyiv must survive 
by other means. As a result, they do not feel indebted to their leaders 
and cannot be confined to a petrodollar pecking order. For them, […] 
Yanukovych is not an alpha male like Putin, bequeathing pensions and food 
packages from on high. He is just one of the reasons that the average 
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resident of Kyiv slugs it out at low-paying jobs, struggling to pay bills 
and put bread on the table (The Moscow Times, 4 December 2013). 
 
Another example came from Pravda.ru that used the socio-economic causes 
frame highlighting the harsh conditions for joining the EU: 
 
[T]here is a threat that the country would split into three parts. But 
neither the West nor Russia are interested in the split of Ukraine. Eastern 
Ukraine and south-east feed all the other regions of Ukraine. But for the 
West (the EU), this scenario is disadvantageous because then they would 
have to feed western Ukraine. The [EU] is already feeding the Baltic states 
whose economy they've destroyed. Western conditions […] are harsh and do 
not suit [Yanukovych’s] clan, he refuses it, knowing that it would kill the 
entire Ukrainian industry (Pravda.ru, 12 December 2013). 
 
The Moscow Times again bucked the trend in terms of favouring political 
causes (21%) over particular triggers (11%), followed by human rights violations (9 
articles) representing 8%, which was close to the socio-economic causes frame at 
7%. Contrary to The Moscow Times that suggested the Yanukovych government’s 
crackdowns as the main reasons for the escalation the Ukraine crisis, RT preferred 
the particular triggers frame implying protesters, radical groups, and the new 
government’s attacks were the roots of the crisis and were responsible for escalating 
the chaos in Kyiv. RT employed the political causes frame in 10% of their coverage 
highlighting the internal protest and power struggles between parties in Kyiv that led 
to the intensified conflict. The Moscow Times, on the other hand, largely suggested in 
its 21% articles that Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the country’s EU Association 
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Agreement directly triggered the turmoil. Pravda.ru’s reporting preference was 
running in parallel with that of RT in terms of using the political causes frame to 
highlight the role the opposition parties in Kyiv played in the Ukraine conflict. The 
particular triggers frame was only used once by the media. Beyond these two frames, 
Pravda.ru employed more human rights violations frames especially in the middle of 
January 2014. The media tended to be critical of Yanukovych’s new law of 
criminalising protests which escalated riots in Kyiv: 
 
“The increasing tension in Ukraine is a direct consequence of the 
government failing to acknowledge the legitimate grievances of its 
people. Instead, it has moved to weaken the foundations of Ukraine’s 
democracy by criminalizing peaceful protest and stripping civil society and 
political opponents of key democratic protections under the law” […] NSC 
spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said (Pravda.ru, 20 January 2014). 
 
The vast majority of the Russian media (90%) did not provide prognostic 
solutions (Table 5.7). Among the 32 articles that offered prognosis, the external co-
operation was the most frequently-offered solution with 18 articles in total by all 
three media outlets. The solutions included EU assistance or talks, cooperation either 
between Russian and the opposition party in Ukraine, or between Russia and the EU, 
and tripartite negotiations. The Moscow Times contributed most of these articles. The 
second solution the media tended to refer to were internal reforms, followed by 
change in government and financial intervention. The three media did not suggest 
military action and dismantling military weapons as possible solutions at all, due to 
the nature of the events during this period. Overall, the infrequent offer of prognosis 
especially by RT and Pravda.ru was consistent with their uses of the political causes 
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frame (diagnosis) emphasising the conflict as an internal struggle, and with the 
responsibility and morality frames (generic) blaming the West’s direct and immoral 
interferences in Ukraine’s domestic affairs.  
 






2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014.  
Generic news frames. 
A similar analysis was carried out with reference to the second time period 
studied here – 27 February 2014 – 20 March 2014. With the total number of 401 
articles of coverage attention, the three media outlets framed the Ukraine crisis using 
the conflict frame in 40% of the whole sample (Table 5.8). As Figure 5.8.1 shows, 
the overall ranking of generic frames did not change, with minimal shifts among the 
media outlets. The responsibility frame came second at 21%. The third, fourth, fifth, 
and sixth commonly used frames were economic consequences, morality, human-
interest, and nationalisation frames, respectively. Among these four frames, the 
                                                          
5 The overall distribution of the prognostic frames: 32 out of 312 articles (10%). 
        RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
External co-operation       3 (50%)         13 (68%) 2 (29%) 18 (56%) 
Internal reforms         1 (17%)           3 (16%) 3 (43%)   7 (22%) 
Change in government       1 (17%)           2 (11%) 2 (29%)   5 (16%) 
Financial intervention       1 (17%)            1 (5%)   0  2 (6%) 
Total       6 (19%)          19 (59%)  7 (22%)  32 (10%)5 
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media used 3% more morality and human-interest frames. On the one hand, 
Pravda.ru contributed extensively to the proliferation of morality frame, from 7% to 
17% of the overall coverage attention. The frame moved to second most prominent 
(17%) during this period from third (10%) in the previous period in Pravda.ru. There 
was a minor difference in the use of the responsibility frame (15%). The media’s 
position became clearer in relation to the Crimean issue and the constant accusations 
from the West. For example, 59% of the 17 morality frames were critical of western 
irresponsibility. This included their propaganda in the mainstream media that 
circulated biased coverage, and their politicians being supportive of the newly self-
proclaimed Kyiv government that Russia considered illegitimate. 41% of the 
morality frames criticised the radical protesters in Kyiv as fascist, and condemned 
the media disinformation coming from Kyiv.  
 
Table 5. 8: Distribution of Generic frames by the Russian media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd 
period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Conflict 62 (42%) 62 (40%) 38 (38%) 162 (40%) 
Responsibility 45 (31%) 25 (16%) 15 (15%)  85 (21%) 
Economic consequences 6 (4%) 42 (27%)   7 (10%)  55 (14%) 
Morality 17 (12%) 6 (4%) 17 (17%)  40 (10%) 
Human interest 9 (6%) 20 (13%)   6 (6%) 35 (9%) 
Nationalisation 7 (5%)           0 12 (12%) 19 (5%) 
Total 146 (36%)       155 (39%)  100 (25%) 401 
 
 
On the other hand, The Moscow Times tended to employ 4% more human-
interest frames compared to the previous period offering assessments from involved 
individuals from multiple angles. For example, the media published 20% of the 
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human-interest framed articles giving details on Yanukovych’s wealth and 
corruption, and the asset freezing of his political and personal circles; 10% of the 
items revealed the fact that many people willingly rushed to Russia from Ukraine due 
to the on-going violence in the country. 10% concentrated on the issue of radical 
Ukrainians who had been actively participating in the conflict. The media also 
presented the Moscow-based Ukrainians’ voice that were critical of Russia’s role in 
the conflict, and the Russian journalists who were harassed in Ukraine. Another 
observable difference from The Moscow Times is the employment of the economic 
consequences frame, where the media committed nearly half of the 42 articles to 
demonstrate the ailing economy in Russia because of the country’s involvement in 
the conflict and the Western sanctions. The economic consequences frame, however, 
was the least used one by the RT in only 6 out of 146 articles, 3 of which were 
optimistic that the economic sanctions from the West would not affect Russia. For 
example, RT on 13 March 2014 published an article titled: ‘Western sanctions will 
only strengthen Russian industry – Rogozin’:  
 
Earlier this week, veteran Russian parliamentarian and head of the 
Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky told reporters that the 
sanctions would not have any negatively [sic] impact on the Russian 
economy directly. “The USA is ready to support anyone if this would help 
them spite Russia, this is still the remnants of the Cold War,” the politician 
noted (RT, 13 March 2014).  
 
In another report, RT informed: ‘The Ukrainian parliament has adopted an 
anti-crisis bill proposed by the IMF to secure an international financial aid package. 
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Ordinary Ukrainians will have to tighten their belts to help the coup-installed 
government keep the collapsing economy afloat’ (28 March 2014).  
 
 
Figure 5. 8. 1 
 
In addition to the decrease in the use of this frame, RT increased by 10 
percentage points the use of the conflict frame stressing the confrontations between 
groups within Ukraine and the disagreement among western politicians, thus 
implying that there was no war between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, but only 
conflict with the West. This point was further evident in the media’s use of the 
responsibility frame (45 articles) in 31% of its whole sample of 146 articles, 
rendering a large portion (16 articles) of these to a discussion of Russia’s role as 
peace keeper. A similar quantity of 17 articles were focused on accusing the West of 
ushering in the pro-longed mess.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
Unlike the first time period with vast majority of the news offering diagnosis, 
the second period saw only 39% diagnostic framing. RT provided the most diagnostic 
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frames with 43% of its articles using these frames, while The Moscow Times offered 
slightly lesser diagnosis at 39%. Pravda.ru remained identical to the previous period 
being the media outlet that least used diagnostic framing. In spite of the overall 
decrease in diagnosis, the global dimensions frame stayed on top of the list (Table 
5.9), with an increase in the use of the frame by Pravda.ru which interpreted the 
conflict as the result of power struggle between the West and the East. Likewise, RT 
clarified the issue with a stronger line that NATO’s expansion eastward was the main 
root of the current situation in Ukraine (Figure 5.9.1).  
 
Table 5. 9: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the Russian media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd 
period) 
    RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Global dimensions 24 (38%)       49 (82%) 19 (58%)   92 (59%) 
Human rights violations 30 (48%)         7 (12%)   5 (15%)   42 (27%) 
Particular triggers     8 (13%)         1 (1%)   2 (6%)   11 (7%) 
Political causes   1 (2%)         3 (5%)   6 (18%)   10 (6%) 
Socio-economic    0         0    1 (3%)     1 (0.6%) 
Religious     0         0    0     0 
Total 63 (43%)        60 (39%) 33 (33%)  156 (39%) 
 
 
For example, the media reviewed NATO’s role in the case of Kosovo crisis 
and accused NATO of artificially creating the conflict between Yugoslav forces and 
Kosovan Liberation Army fighters backed by the West. The created crisis was a 




The KLA’s job was to carry out attacks on Yugoslav forces, 
provoke a violent response from Belgrade, which could then be used as a 
pretext for NATO intervention to destroy an independent, socialist country 
which had resisted globalization. A “crisis” had to be created in order to 
justify the NATO military action. Four years later, we had the Iraq WMD 
“crisis.” Something had to be done about Saddam's deadly weapons which 
threatened us all, western leaders told us. We couldn't wait for the team of 




Figure 5. 9. 1 
 
Quite a different interpretation was given by The Moscow Times which 
dedicated 82% of its diagnostic frames to elucidating that the worsened Ukraine 
conflict including the Crimean annexation was the result of Russia’s regional 
ambition. For example, the newspaper published 1,196-word coverage to discuss 
President Putin’s imperial ambitions in the context of the Crimean Referendum: 
 
As soon as Putin starts devouring a chunk of Ukraine and really 
savoring it, the more Ukrainian territory he will want. As a harbinger to this 
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expansion, pro-Kremlin Sergei Aksyonov, who seized power on Feb. 27 
and declared himself Crimea's new prime minister, went on television 
Sunday to address residents in Ukraine's southern and eastern regions, which 
have Russian-speaking majorities. […] The imperial euphoria over annexing 
Crimea will probably last for a month or two (The Moscow Times, 14 March 
2014). 
 
Following the global dimensions frame that remained the most used diagnosis 
frame, Figure 5.9.1 illustrates a significant shift in the human rights violations frame 
with an increased use from 10% to 27%, which RT (30 articles) contributed most to. 
Out of these articles, there were 25 suggesting that the new Ukrainian government 
revoking the Russian language law violated peoples’ rights and this was the main 
reason for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. The point has been manifested in 
Pravda.ru that went further suggesting that the safety of Russian speakers in Ukraine 
should be taken into consideration. This was also evident in the use of next favoured 
diagnosis – particular triggers, as both RT and Pravda.ru attributed the persistent 
havoc to Ukrainian nationalists’ violence seizing local buildings and threatening the 
lives of people. What Pravda.ru endorsed more with regards to the conflict is the 
political coup in Kyiv conducted by the opposition parties, which forced 
Yanukovych to flee the country. For instance, Pravda.ru talked about how unknown 
individuals seized and raised Russian flags over the buildings of the Crimean 
Parliament, and explained the reason for the ongoing turmoil: ‘The power in Ukraine 
was changed on February 22nd, when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dismissed 
President Viktor Yanukovych from power. The coup caused a wave of protests 




Table 5. 10: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the Russian media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 
(2nd period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Military action 15 (79%)           0 3 (60%) 18 (58%) 
External co-operation 2 (11%) 2 (29%)      0  4 (13%) 
Internal reforms       1 (5%) 2 (29%) 1 (20%)  4 (13%) 
Financial intervention   2 (11%) 2 (29%)      0  4 (13%) 
Change in government     0 1 (14%)  1 (20%) 2 (6%) 
Total    19 (13%)           7 (5%) 5 (5%)  31 (8%) 
 
 
The preference of the prognostic frames significantly changed among the 
Russian media over the second time period, although the total percentage of 
prognosis remained nearly the same (Table 5.10). First of all, as an absent element 
during the first period, the military action was put onto the news agenda between 27 
February and 20 March 2014 (Figure 5.10.1). RT in particular made the most 
outstanding increase, followed by Pravda.ru. The Moscow Times did not take note of 
this solution. There were 15 articles suggesting military action to resolve the Ukraine 
conflict by RT, among which 12 invariably followed the rhetoric that Russia could 
send troops to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea to protect ethnic Russians. Second, the 
previously often suggested solution of change in government decreased dramatically 
dropping to the very bottom of the list with only two occurrences. The Moscow 
Times and Pravda.ru promoted the solution only once each. Both put a focus on 
requiring new leaders from different parties to be in power in Kyiv. Third, the 
external co-operation, internal reforms, and financial intervention frames were used 
156 
 
an equal number of times, with The Moscow Times and RT employing these frames 
the most.  
 
 
Figure 5. 10. 1 
 
 
3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014. 
Generic news frames. 
The subsequent third period encompassed a longer time frame – from 21 
March to 17 July 2014 – with a total number of 1,405 pieces of news on the subject. 
The overall journalistic practice in the generic frames remained identical to that of 
the previous period, although the use of the human-interest frame noticeably 
increased from 9% to 15% and became the third most frequently used generic frame 
(Table 5.11). These frames are outlined in order of significance: the conflict frame 
(54%), the responsibility frame (20%), the human-interest frame (15%), the 
economic consequences frame (7%), the morality frame (3%), and the nationalisation 
frame (1%). 
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Table 5. 11: Distribution of Generic frames by the Russian media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Conflict 284 (52%) 299 (53%) 169 (56%) 752 (54%) 
Responsibility 100 (18%) 111 (20%)   69 (23%) 280 (20%) 
Human interest   99 (18%)   74 (13%)   37 (12%) 210 (15%) 
Economic 
consequences 
27 (5%)   55 (10%) 11 (4%) 93 (7%) 
Morality 23 (4%)  19 (3%)   7 (2%) 49 (3%) 
Nationalisation 10 (2%)       2 (0.3%)   9 (3%) 21 (1%) 





Figure 5. 11. 1 
 
It is also worth noting that while the Russian media increased the use of the 
conflict frame by 14 percentage points, there was a major drop in the uses of the 
economic consequence, morality, and nationalisation frames, by an average of 6 
percentage points. With regards to change in focus, first of all, The Moscow Times 
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tended to divert attention from the implications of the fall of the Russian economy, to 
multiple-dimensioned analyses including the cost of Crimean integration, the 
anabatic economic downturn in Ukraine, and the financial aid from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Second, RT and Pravda.ru in particular, showed less interest 
in the use of the morality frame, although the general message in the media remained 
critical of the new Kyiv’s behaviour and the West’s involvement. Third, the media 
that most applied the nationalisation frame during the last two periods, Pravda.ru 
significantly reduced its use in this period, by 9 percentage points. Last but not least, 
RT used the human-interest frame three times more, whilst Pravda.ru doubled its 
usage, and The Moscow Times remained unchanged at 13% of the coverage attention.  
 
Table 5. 11. 1: The use of the responsibility frame by The Moscow Times: 21.03. – 
17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
Blames on Percentage (out of 111 items) 
Russia 54% 
The West 7% 
The Ukrainian political elites 3% 
Yanukovych 3% 
Pro-Russian gunmen 3% 
Fascists in Ukraine 1% 





The focus moves to looking at the three media individually in terms of the 
generic frames. To begin with, The Moscow Times as a media that offered the most 
coverage remained critical of the issues regarding the Ukraine crisis. For example, as 
shown in Table 5.11.1 above, out of the 111 articles that used the responsibility 
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frame, 60 (54%) put the blame on Russia as responsible for the ongoing conflict. The 
rest of the articles placed blame on the West in 8 pieces (7%), the Ukrainian political 
elites in 3 articles (3%), Yanukovych in 3 articles (3%), pro-Russian gunmen in 3 
articles (3%), and the fascists in Ukraine in 1 piece of news (1%). The media 
continued to provide various perspectives in its uses of the human interest, economic 
consequences, and morality frames. The nationalisation frame was used in only 2 of 
its total sample of 560 articles.  
 
Table 5. 11. 2: The use of the responsibility frame by Pravda.ru: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
Blames on Percentage (out of 69 items) 
Kyiv 26% 
The West 23% 
The western media 10% 
The U.S. 10% 
Suggestions of solutions and requiring actions 30% 
 
 
Pravda.ru tended to use most the responsibility frame (Table 5.11.2), with 18 
out of 69 articles (26%) blaming the Junta in new Kyiv for the political coup and the 
constant attacks on their own people. 16 articles (23%) accused the West (NATO, 
US, EU) of irresponsibly supporting what had been happening in Ukraine and the 
extremist party Red Sector. Seven articles (10%) were critical of Western media in 
terms of their irresponsible and what the media considered to be ‘unreal’ reporting. 
In another 7 articles (10%) the media expressed strong discontent particularly with 
the United States. 
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In addition, the media doubled the use of the human-interest frame in 
comparison with the last period. Pravda.ru highlighted the coverage of mistreated 
Russian journalists and victims in Eastern Ukraine due to the ‘Kyiv junta’ ordering 
an Anti-Terrorism Operation (2 July 2014). In a report regarding 7,000 Ukrainian 
refugees that had been settled and transported across cities in Russia, following the 
new Kyiv’s punitive operation in Donbass, Pravda.ru contended: ‘The flow of 
refugees from the South-East of Ukraine to Russia has increased dramatically since 
June against the backdrop of combat clashes in Donbass’ (Prvda.ru, 7 July 2014). 
Later, the media referring to the new Kyiv’s shelling in Donetsk where people had 
been forced to take refuge, wrote: ‘Constant attacks on checkpoints on the border 
with Russia seriously complicate the condition of refugees. Checkpoints do not work 
during attacks, and many refugees have to wait, while staying in the zone of fire’ 
(Pravda.ru, 10 July 2014). 
Despite the lesser use of the economic consequences frame by the media, the 
articles remained positive regarding the Western sanctions caliming that the Russian 
economy would improve in the long run. On the other hand, the media described the 
‘rescue packages’ from the IMF in a negative light in 3 articles: 
 
Ukraine will never see one dollar of the IMF money. What the IMF 
is going to do is to substitute Ukrainian indebtedness to the IMF for 
Ukrainian indebtedness to Western banks. The IMF will hand over the 
money to the Western banks, and the Western banks will reduce Ukraine's 
indebtedness by the amount of IMF money. Instead of being indebted to the 





Pravda.ru also implied that the conditional financial aid from the IMF would 
not benefit Ukraine: 
 
The IMF conditions that will be imposed on the struggling Ukraine 
population will consist of severe reductions in old-age pensions, in 
government services, in government employment, and in subsidies for basic 
consumer purchases such as natural gas. Already low living standards will 
plummet. In addition, Ukrainian public assets and Ukrainian owned private 
industries will have to be sold off to Western purchasers (Pravda.ru, 31 
March 2014). 
 
With regard to the morality frame, Pravda.ru described the West and new 
Kyiv as immoral evils while worshiping Russia for protecting its people. 
What was the most noteworthy change in RT’s use of the generic frames, was 
the tripling of the human-interest frame from 6% to 18% in the coverage (Table 
5.11.3): with 99 articles using the frame, 31 articles (31%) giving details about how 
foreign journalists especially Russian ones were severely victimised and killed in 
Ukraine; 29 articles (29%) concentrating on the viciously affected sufferers and 
refugees in Eastern Ukraine due to the brutality carried out by the new Kyiv 
authority including the far-right wing. Another 25 pieces (25%) focused on different 
stories but all placed Ukraine in a negative light. For example, allegations of 
massacre/genocide by the new Kyiv forces were significantly underlined by the RT, 
painting a picture of what was a volatile and intricate actuality on the ground. In 




Many of the people gathering in central Slavyansk told Phillips 
[RT’s stringer] that they are frightened for their lives and do not want any 
Ukrainian military sent by the “Kyiv junta” in their city. One woman 
interviewed by Phillips appealed to Russia and personally to President 
Vladimir Putin for help, saying the people are getting desperate. The others 
had a message for US President Barack Obama, whom they blame for the 
chaotic developments in Ukraine (RT, 2 May 2014). 
 
Table 5. 11. 3: The use of the human-interest frame by RT: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
 Percentage (out of 99 items) 
Foreign journalists  31% 
Eastern sufferers and refugees 29% 
Negative descriptions of Ukraine 25% 
Other individuals 14% 
 
 
The message remained critical of the West and Ukraine and was 
demonstrated in the RT’s responsibility frame (100) where the media blamed 
Ukraine’s new authority (illegitimate) in 22 articles (22%):  
 
Following months of deadly protests, Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovich was ousted and replaced by a self-appointed government on 
February 22. Russia slammed the coup-appointed government as illegitimate 
and said it had violated the Ukrainian constitution by setting elections for 




As Table 5.11.4 below shows, RT also suggested that the West should take 
the responsibility for the devastation in 21 articles (21%). Quite like Pravda.ru, RT 
published 13 articles (13%) to specifically blame the US. The blame was also 
attributed to the nationalists in Kyiv in 7 articles (7%), and in 1 article (1%) 
discontentment was expressed over Poland for following the West and stirring the 
Ukraine conflict.  
 
Table 5. 11. 4: The use of the responsibility frame by RT: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
Blames on Percentage (out of 100 items) 
New Kyiv 22% 
The West 21% 
The U.S. 13% 
Nationalists in Ukraine  7% 
Poland 1% 





Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
Compared to the second period, the diagnostic framing offered by the 
Russian media slightly increased from 39% to 49% (683 out of 1,405 articles). Table 
5.12 clearly shows that the particular triggers frame came first occupying 50% of the 
coverage, with RT contributing the most to it, while The Moscow Times devoted the 
least attention with 55 out of 339 articles. The second most used diagnosis was the 
global dimensions frame with 222 articles and The Moscow Times contained half of 
them (Figure 5.12.1). The third most common diagnostic frame was the human rights 
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violations one, followed by the political causes, socio-economic causes, and religious 
prescriptions frames.  
 
Table 5. 12: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the Russian media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
(3rd period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru    Total 
Particular triggers   196 (63%)          55 (31%) 88 (45%) 339 (50%) 
Global dimensions   53 (17%) 113 (63%) 56 (29%) 222 (33%) 
Human rights violations   42 (14%)  6 (3%) 32 (16%)   80 (12%) 
Political causes 18 (6%)  6 (3%) 29 (15%)   53 (8%) 
Socio-economic 15 (5%)            0   11 (6%)   26 (4%) 
Religious      0            0     2 (1%)     2 (0.3%) 






Figure 5. 12. 1 
 
Among the three media outlets, Pravda.ru dedicated more of its space (64%) 
to suggesting diagnosis compared to RT and The Moscow Times, with a rise in the 







Dynamics of the Diagnostic frames
3rd period 2nd period 1st period
165 
 
use of particular triggers to explain the Ukraine conflict. The Moscow Times came 
last offering least diagnosis frames, preferring the global dimensions frame over the 
particular triggers. 57% of the RT sample offered diagnosis to explain the cause of 
the Ukraine conflict, 2/3 of which contained particular triggers. In line with the 
responsibility frame, both RT and Pravda.ru pointed fingers primarily towards the 
new Kyiv regime for ordering an Anti-Terrorism Operation, the Ultranationalists for 
fascist violence, and the Nazi Kyiv junta for the escalation of the Ukraine crisis. 
Conversely, The Moscow Times used the frame to suggest that pro-Russia separatists 
and eastern anti-Maidan protesters who shaped the unrest and violence, were the 
main reason for the chaotic developments in Ukraine. 
The second diagnostic frame – global dimensions – was mainly favoured by 
The Moscow Times which used it in 62 out of 113 cases (55%) implying that 
Russia’s regional ambitions were the roots of the Ukraine crisis. These included 
annexing the Crimean Peninsula, expanding the border via military threat to the 
region, and keeping its influence over ‘next doors’ which would this way stay in the 
Russian orbit. 43 articles (38%) spoke to the tug-of-war between the West and the 
East (e.g., the tit-for-tat sanctions between the EU and Russia) because of their own 
geo-political interests. RT and Pravda.ru used the frame to suggest that the Western 
expansionism was the main goal with regard to the Ukraine crisis. For example, 
alongside criticisms of Putin’s attempt to rebuild influence over the region, RT also 
voiced strong condemnation of NATO and the EU: 
 
[A]gainst promises that were given during the time of German 
reunification, the further expansion of NATO towards the east took place so 
that Russia slowly would become encircled. Then there were missiles 
stationed in Poland and Czech Republic...the Russian side has said that it 
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reduces its security, but the Western side was not interested in hearing that 
(RT, 25 March 2014).  
 
Another example comes from Pravda.ru: ‘NATO enlargement, particularly to 
Ukraine, remains “an emotional and neuralgic” issue for Russia, but strategic policy 
considerations also underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and 
Georgia’ (13 May 2014). 
RT and The Moscow Times decreased the use of the human rights violations 
frame, although the overall tone remained the same. RT clearly focused on actions by 
the Ukrainian government, in terms of revoking Russian language, banning Russian 
TV and Russian journalists’ entrance to Ukraine, and conducting criminal Anti-
Terrorism Operations in Eastern Ukraine. Pravda.ru kept in line with RT, but with 
harsher language calling the Western bodies and Kyiv ‘war criminals’ (Pravda.ru, 30 
May 2014) due to their wrongdoings such as Anti-Terrorism Operations and the 
revoking of the Russian language. The Moscow Times, on the other hand, was critical 
of the country arguing that Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, thus 
breaking international law (The Moscow Times, 26 March 2014).  
The political causes used by Pravda.ru underlined the political coup by the 
‘coup-appointed junta in Kiev, designed, engineered and controlled from 
Washington’ (Pravda.ru, 3 May 2014) that triggered the long-lasting conflict in 
Ukraine. RT explained the political coup the same way, and further pointed out the 
fear that the riot could spread to Crimea. The two media also presented the socio-
economic element to explain the conflict. For instance, RT made clear in 9 out of its 
15 cases that due to Ukraine’s unpaid gas bill to Russia, the on-going battling (gas 
price negotiation) between the two countries continued. This directly affected the 
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overall situation of the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, people’s safety and poverty in 
the region were another issue identified as causing the unrests in 7 articles.  
 
Table 5. 13: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the Russian media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
(3rd period) 
     RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Internal reforms    20 (45%)      6 (23%) 9 (43%) 35 (38%) 
Military action  16 (36%)      3 (12%) 11 (53%) 30 (33%) 
External co-operation    3 (7%)      8 (31%) 3 (14%) 14 (15%) 
Financial intervention    1 (2%)      9 (35%)   0 10 (11%) 
Dismantling weapons    8 (18%)      0   1 (5%)   9 (10%) 
Change in government    6 (14%)      0   0 6 (7%) 
Total  44 (8%)    26 (5%) 21 (7%)   91 (6%) 
 
 
Table 5.13 above shows the use of the prognostic frames by the Russian 
media during the third time period: 21 March – 17 July 2014. Two key observations 
are stressed here: a rise in the use of the internal reforms frame and the first time use 
of the dismantling of weapons frame (Figure 5.13.1). Firstly, the internal reforms 
came on top appearing in 35 out of 91 articles (38%). RT and Pravda.ru in particular 
encouraged constitutional reform/federalisation, which would take into consideration 
the interests of all Ukrainian regions. Secondly, the dismantling weapons frame 
during this period was largely used by the RT. The media called all sides to disarm, 
with specific emphasis on Ukrainian nationalists who had been active in the battles 





Figure 5. 13. 1 
 
The second most suggested prognosis was military action. Again, RT and 
Pravda.ru contributed a large part to it. While Pravda.ru generally resisted any 
potential military action as a solution to the conflict in its 7 out of 11 cases (64%), 
RT simplified the solution encouraging the new Kyiv government to annul the army 
Anti-Terrorism Operations in Eastern Ukraine, in its 12 out of 16 articles (75%). The 
other prognostic frames that the Russian media tended to use were the external co-
operation and the financial intervention ones, which featured predominantly in The 
Moscow Times. Lastly, change in government came occurred only 6 times, all of 
which nevertheless were offered by the RT, identified at its fourth most desired 
solution. For instance, having supported the referenda in Lugansk and Donetsk 
regions which took place on 11 May 2014, the media wrote: ‘Kyiv Nazi authorities 
are the only obstacle to peace in Ukraine […] which must be removed from power’ 
(RT, 18 May 2014).  
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4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015. 
Generic news frames. 
The final time period covered seven months’ worth of news coverage of the 
Ukraine conflict from 18 July 2014 to 28 February 2015, with a total number of 
1,540 articles. The general trend in the use of the generic frames slightly differed 
from the third period (Figure 5.14.1). First and foremost, the morality frame 
surpassed the economic consequences frame, occupying third and fourth place 
respectively in the ranking (Table 5.14). While the ratio remained unchanged in The 
Moscow Times that condemned the Kremlin’s lack of moral stance, RT and 
Pravda.ru used the morality frame 5% more often compared to the previous period. 
The spearhead of the attacks from the latter two media were aimed directly at the US 
for covering up the truth with regards to Ukraine’s wrongdoings including chemical 
attacks in the South-Eastern region. An example of this frame is the following piece 
by RT titled ‘Lavrov: US must stop acting like global prosecutor, judge and 
executioner’:  
 
Washington relies on unconfirmed reports or spins facts on purpose. 
Once they claimed the footage showed a helicopter downed in Ukraine 
while in reality it happened in Syria. There were multiple cases when false 
data was used to back up a public statement or a call for action. […] Some 
use lies on purpose, some make statements based on unconfirmed online 





Table 5. 14: Distribution of Generic frames by the Russian media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
(4th period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Conflict  191 (33%) 242 (49%) 167 (39%) 600 (40%) 
Responsibility   211 (36%) 128 (26%) 143 (33%) 482 (32%) 
Human interest  94 (16%) 56 (11%)   53 (12%) 203 (13%) 
Morality     55 (9%)          14 (3%)   31 (7%)  100 (7%) 
Economic consequences     17 (3%)          45 (9%)   15 (4%)  77 (5%) 
Nationalisation     15 (3%) 8 (2%)   19 (4%)  42 (3%) 





Figure 5. 14. 1 
 
Moreover, although the position of the conflict and responsibility frames 
persisted, there was an intensification of the responsibility frame from 20% of the 
coverage attention in the previous period to 32% now, whereas the use of the conflict 
frame plunged to 40% from 54%. This is mainly due to the fact that RT doubled the 
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use of the responsibility frame in the blame game against Ukraine, followed by 
Pravda.ru that used the frame to lay accusations on the Western bodies and Ukraine. 
Days after the downing of MH17, RT claimed that the Ukraine crisis was a civil war 
with death toll of 1,100 and over 3,500 wounded. This was due to Poroshenko’s 
administration continued bloody campaign including chemical threat: ‘Human Rights 
Watch alleged that Kyiv is using indiscriminate Grad missiles to attack densely 
populated areas in Donetsk, which violates international humanitarian law, and also 
blames the militia for taking cover in the same areas’ (RT, 28 July 2014). The 
Moscow Times continued to be critical of the crisis and offered various perspectives 
on the topic. The overall uses of the human interest, economic consequences, and 
nationalisation frames remained identical to the previous period, but with minor 
changes in individual media.  
In addition to RT’s upsurge in the use of the morality frame during the fourth 
period, there was another change in the use of a generic frame: the responsibility 
frame overtook the conflict frame with 211 articles (36%) making it the most 
prominent frame. RT (Table 5.14.1) continued the trend set in the previous period – 
being resentful towards Ukraine’s misconducts – 65 out of the 211 cases (31%), the 
West’s interference in Ukraine and their double-standard policy against Russia – 51 
articles (24%). The media drew attention to calling for an end to the conflict in 53 
articles (25%) with focus on peace proposals and cease fire talks. Another practice 
that remained identical to the previous period was the blaming of the US, in 





Table 5. 14. 1: The use of the responsibility frame by RT: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th 
period) 
Blames on Percentage (out of 211 items) 
New Kyiv 31% 
The West 24% 
Require an end to the war 25% 
The U.S. 4% 
Suggestions of solutions  16% 
  
 
The next most frequently used generic frame by RT was the human-interest 
frame in 94 articles (16%). The items gave extensive coverage to the victims in 
South-Eastern Ukraine where the new Kyiv had been carrying out military shelling. 
A smaller portion of items focused on badly mistreated Russian journalists. In the 
case of the less frequently used economic consequences frame, 7 out of 17 articles 
(41%) stressed that EU sanctions would backfire and potentially cause a new 
economic crisis. In relation to the situation of the Russian economy, RT continued to 
be positive, with only 2 articles describing the negative effect on the markets. The 
nationalisation frame came last with only 3% of articles in the sample using it. 
Pravda.ru still contributed the most to it.  
Similar to RT, Pravda.ru increased the number of times the responsibility and 
the morality frames were used (Table 5.14.2). Firstly, Pravda.ru largely placed the 
blame on both the Western establishments and the new Kyiv in 34 out of its 143 
pieces (40%). This included their policies against Russia and the bias of the Western 
mainstream media against Russia. Secondly, Pravda.ru articulated strong messages 
particularly towards the new Kyiv for the shelling in the South-East and the shooting 
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down of the MH17 in 25 cases (17%), and towards the U.S. in 16 cases (11%). 
Finally, the accusations against particular groups such as the West and NATO were 
respectively documented in 15 (11%) and 7 items (5%).  
 
Table 5. 14. 2: The use of the responsibility frame by Pravda.ru: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
(4th period) 
Blames on Percentage (out of 143 items) 
New Kyiv and the West 24% 
New Kyiv 17% 
The U.S. 11% 
The West 11% 
NATO 5% 
Suggestions of solutions  32% 
 
 
In the use of the morality frame, Pravda.ru directed attention to what it 
referred to as the Washington’s propaganda and Ukraine’s fascist behaviour in 31 out 
of 428 articles (7%). The economic consequences frame came last following the 
nationalisation frame. Two ideas were highlighted by the media: Western sanctions 
could backfire; and Russia has a promising future in the long run as it has several 
other stronger economic ties such as those with the BRICS countries – Brazil, India, 
China, and South Africa.  
The economic consequences frame was relatively favoured by The Moscow 
Times over the morality and nationalisation frames. The focus was first of all on 
Russia’s economic loss – 33 out of 45 articles (73%). Seven items (16%) 
demonstrated that Western sanctions had minimal impact on Russian economy and 
could backfire. Although The Moscow Times followed the overall trend of using 
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more the responsibility frame in the final period, the media was critical of Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict with Ukraine. Only 13 articles from the media spoke 
directly to the West’s responsibility and ability to stop the new Kyiv from being 
aggressive to its own people. The media’s critical message was reflected in the uses 
of the human interest and morality frames, where The Moscow Times offered diverse 
understandings in relation to the Ukraine conflict.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
In contrast to the third period, the Russian media during the final period 
generally offered fewer diagnostic frames with only 602 out of the 1,504 articles 
between 18 July 2014 and 28 February 2015. This was despite the longer timespan of 
this period (Table 5.15). This is largely due to the visible reduction of diagnosis from 
RT and Pravda.ru, whilst The Moscow Times marginally increased the use of them. 
One observable change lies in the political causes frame, which the three media used 
more than during the last period (Figure 5.15.1).  
 
Table 5. 15: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the Russian media: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru  Total 
Particular triggers    139 (59%) 72 (39%) 98 (54%) 309 (51%) 
Global dimensions     57 (24%) 82 (45%) 76 (42%) 215 (36%) 
Human rights violations     29 (12%) 14 (8%)   30 (16%)   73 (12%) 
Political causes     19 (8%) 10 (5%)    37 (20%)   66 (11%) 
Socio-economic             11 (5%)   9 (5%)      10 (5%) 30 (5%) 





Figure 5. 15. 1 
 
Pravda.ru used this frame the most, with 30 out of the 37 occurrences 
mentioning that the coup backed by the West was the main reason of the continuing 
conflict in Ukraine. For instance, Pravda.ru stated that ‘The United States and the 
EU actively support the new, coup-installed Ukrainian government, accusing Russia 
of interfering in internal affairs of the neighboring country. The support is primarily 
expressed in wiring huge funds to Kiev’ (Pravda.ru, 1 October 2014). The view was 
also shared by RT in 11 out of 19 articles (58%). In 8 articles (42%) the media talked 
about the help from the Western countries especially the US. In contrast, The 
Moscow Times used the political causes frame to imply the referenda that took place 
in the South-Eastern region were reasons for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.  
The most used diagnosis overall was the particular triggers frame with a total 
of 309 articles. RT was behind 139 items (45%), among which 87 articles (63%) 
explained that new Kyiv’s shelling escalated the Ukraine conflict, 50 articles (36%) 
suggested that the fighting between the new Kyiv and the local militia was the main 
reason for the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. Similar to RT, Pravda.ru also 







Dynamics of the Diagnostic frames
4th period 3rd period 2nd period 1st period
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suggested that the new Kyiv’s shelling triggered the continuation of the Ukraine 
conflict, in 56 out of its 98 articles (57%). As Table 5.15.1 below shows, this was 
followed by what Pravda.ru believed to be the reason for escalating the Ukraine 
crisis in its 14 articles (14%): fighting in the region between new Kyiv and militias. 
To explain the conflict, another 14 articles (14%) were focused on the downing of 
MH17, while 14 articles (14%) talked about the violence by the new Kyiv and the 
far-right groups in November 2013 and February 2014. 
 
Table 5. 15. 1: The use of the particular triggers frame by Pravda.ru: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
Particular triggers Percentage (out of 98 items) 
Kyiv’s shelling 57% 
Fighting between Kyiv and militias 14% 
Downing of MH17 14% 
Violence by Kyiv and far-right groups 14% 
  
 
The Moscow Times (Table 5.15.2) used all the explanations that occurred in 
the other two media, however it privileged the account of fighting in Eastern Ukraine 
between the new Kyiv and the pro-Russian separatists, in 49 out of the 72 articles 
(68%). Only 5 articles (7%) referenced the shelling as a cause of the crisis, while 10 
articles (14%) put an emphasis on the rebels who started the fighting. The downing 
of MH17 was suggested as a reason for the continuing Ukraine conflict in another 5 
articles (7%).  
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Table 5. 15. 2: The use of the particular triggers frame by The Moscow Times: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
Particular Triggers     Percentage (out of 72 items) 
Fighting between Kyiv and separatists 68% 
Rebels               14% 
Kyiv’s shelling                 7% 
Downing of MH17                 7% 
  
 
The second preferred diagnosis was the global dimensions frame which was 
predominantly endorsed by The Moscow Times in 82 pieces of its news. The 
newspaper (Table 5.15.3) offered 38 items (46%) criticising Russia’s expansionism 
as the root of the Ukraine conflict. 35 articles (43%) were published by the media to 
suggest that the specific geo-political interests from the West and the East were the 
reason for the long-lasting conflict in Ukraine. In 9 articles (11%) The Moscow 
Times used the frame to highlight NATO’s expansionism to explain the conflict.  
 
Table 5. 15. 3: The use of the global dimensions frame by The Moscow Times: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
Global Dimensions Percentage (out of 82 items) 
Russia’s expansionist  46% 
The West vs. The East 43% 




Opposite interpretations were offered by RT and Pravda.ru who believed that 
the reason behind the conflict was the US and NATO’s interests to expand their 
controllable borders.  
The human rights violations frame was mainly utilised by Pravda.ru which 
strongly explained the conflict by highlighting the new Kyiv’s use of chemical 
weapons to conduct ethnic cleansing/genocide, in 32 articles. RT offered the same 
diagnosis frame as Pravda.ru, along with stressing the importance of several specific 
issues in 29 out of its 236 articles (12%). As Table 5.15.4 below shows, these are 
Ukraine’s use of chemical weapons (19 articles) at 66%, curbing of Russian language 
(2 articles) at 7%, banning of Russian journalists and Russian media (2 articles) at 
7%, West’s illegal sanctions on Russia (1 article) at 4%, and their financial and 
military support to Ukraine (3 articles) at 10%. RT regarded the EU and Ukraine as 
those who conducted war crimes in 2 articles. The Moscow Times, on the other hand, 
provided nearly half of the frame by referring to the Russia’s crime of shooting down 
MH17, in 6 out of its 14 items.   
 
Table 5. 15. 4: The use of the human rights violations frame by RT: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
(4th period) 
Human rights violations Percentage (out of 29 items) 
Using of Chemical weapons 66% 
Supporting of finance and military 10% 
Curbing of Russian language 7% 
Banning of Russian journalists and media 7% 




The socio-economic causes frame was mentioned by all three media with 
similar quantities. RT and Pravda.ru again aligned together in their use of the frame 
by pointing out the Ukraine’s economic blockade to Eastern cities, the energy cut in 
Crimea, as well as the country’s gas debt to Russia, which were exacerbating the 
situation in Ukraine. Although The Moscow Times used the frame the least, the 
newspaper was in line with the other two media outlets (RT and Pravda.ru) with the 
same facts being highlighted.  
The table below (Table 5.16) presents the general breakdown of the 
prognostic frames used by the Russian media during the final period with 90 articles 
available for analysis. The use of the dismantling weapons frame was identified as 
the third most recommended solution to the crisis; compared with the previous 
period when the frame was the fifth with a contribution solely from RT’s coverage 
(Figure 5.16.1). In the final period, RT maintained its major contribution to the frame 
with 11 out of a total of 15 occurrences. The Moscow Times offered 3 items 
suggesting this prognosis, while Pravda.ru used it once. There was a minor 
difference evident among the three media in terms of the prognosis frames. RT and 
Pravda.ru suggested that both sides should withdraw the heavy weapons, whereas 
The Moscow Times clearly resisted the inflow of military supplies from Russia. With 
the most used internal reforms frame, RT and Pravda.ru repeatedly suggested 
decentralisation/autonomy/federalisation as the ideal solution to the Ukraine conflict, 
giving special status to the South-Eastern region of Donbass for example, thus 
catering to all Ukrainians’ interests. The Moscow Times rarely recommended the 
terms of decentralisation, autonomy, or federalisation, rather it underlined the ideas 




Table 5. 16: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the Russian media: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
 RT The Moscow Times Pravda.ru Total 
Internal reforms       16 (43%) 11 (34%)  9 (43%) 36 (40%) 
Military action 9 (24%) 10 (31%) 11 (53%) 30 (33%) 
Dismantling weapons     11 (30%) 3 (9%) 1 (5%) 15 (17%) 
External co-operation 4 (11%)  6 (19%)   3 (14%) 13 (14%) 
Financial intervention  2 (5%)  6 (19%)     0 8 (9%) 
Change in government  1 (3%)  4 (13%)     0 5 (6%) 




Figure 5. 16. 1 
 
The military action frame was uniformly promoted by all the three media 
resisting any inflow of weaponry and soldiers to Ukraine, or intervention from 
outsiders. The external co-operation came up as the fifth preferred solution especially 







Dynamics of the Prognostic frames
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by the RT and The Moscow Times. The two suggested a collaboration between 
Russia and the West including the US. Pravda.ru offered a detailed solution to the 
crisis, in terms of global monitoring group residing in the conflict zone (Pravda.ru, 8 
September 2014) and humanitarian cargos delivering to victimised area from 
international community (Pravda.ru, 3 September 2014).  
RT and The Moscow Times also suggested the financial intervention 
prognosis with 8 occurrences. While the former provided 2 of them suggesting 
Ukraine should restore its economic bond with the attacked South-Eastern region; the 
latter called for financial assistance to Ukraine from the West (2 out of its 6 articles) 
at 33%. The Moscow Times (Table 5.16.1) also recommended economic sanctions on 
Russia to refrain the country from supporting pro-Russian separatists (3 out of 6) at 
50%. One (17%) focused on the settling of the gas price between Ukraine and 
Russia.  
 
Table 5. 16. 1: The use of the financial intervention frame by The Moscow Times: 
18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th period) 
Financial intervention Percentage (out of 6 items) 
Financial assistance to Ukraine 33% 
Economic sanction on Russia 50% 
Settling of the gas price 17% 
 
 
Lastly, the change in government was relatively favoured by The Moscow 
Times with 4 articles, which used the frame to describe decentralisation and 
autonomy. This is what RT and Pravda.ru regarded as internal reforms as illustrated 
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above. The different interpretation perhaps can be best explained by what President 
Putin stated and was cited by RT:  
 
It’s extremely important that the authorities in Kyiv have agreed to 
carry out a deep constitutional reform, to satisfy a desire for self-rule in 
certain regions – whether that reform is called decentralization, 
autonomization or federalization. This is the deeper meaning of the Minsk 




This chapter has examined the coverage of the Ukraine crisis during the 15-
month period from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015 by the selected Russian 
news media outlets. The first part answered the second research question about the 
press attention to the Ukraine conflict and provided evidence of the clear increase in 
press attention during the second (27 February – 20 March 2014) and the third (21 
March – 17 July 2014) time periods. These were the times when Russia appeared in 
headlines globally, as Western powers condemned Putin for annexing Crimea and for 
militarily and financially supporting the rebels in Eastern Ukraine. The following 
section answered the third research question looking at the actual frames used in the 
mediation of the Ukraine crisis. Clear patterns were identified. The Russian media 
used extensively the economic consequences, morality, and human-interest frames. 
Overall, The Moscow Times and the RT seemed to be the ones that used the 
economic impact (generic), global dimensions and political causes (diagnoses), and 
external co-operation (prognosis) frames the most, especially during the first period. 
RT alongside Pravda.ru tended to use more morality frames especially from the end 
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of the first to the second time periods when human rights violations diagnostic frame 
and military actions prognostic frame received higher attention. All the three media 
favoured human-interest generic frame during the last two periods although with 
different perspectives. This can be explained by their uses of the diagnosis and 
prognosis frames. On the one hand, RT and Pravda.ru suggested that particular 
triggers (new Kyiv’s Anti-Terrorism Operations) and human rights violations were 
the factors escalating the Ukraine crisis and strongly recommended to stick to the 
Minsk accords (by using the internal reforms prognosis frame) in terms of 
decentralisation, autonomisation, or federalisation. On the other hand, The Moscow 
Times explained the root of the Ukraine crisis by pointing out Putin’s global 
ambitions and his involvement leading to the deepening of the crisis. Consequently, 
the newspaper often suggested preventing the inflow of weapons from Russia and 
conducting internal reforms. A particularly important finding in terms of the 
theoretical development of the generic frames is the fact that the study did not find 
frequent use of the religious frame (diagnosis). As explained earlier, religion was not 
the dividing factor. The Ukraine crisis was a fundamentally political one. Having 
presented and answered the research questions 2 and 3 regarding the Russian media, 
now the focus moves onto the British media.   
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Chapter 6  
Findings – British Media 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the selected British media coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015. Following the structure of 
analysis of the Russian media from Chapter five, the findings from the framing 
analysis of the British media are outlined. The four periods as outlined and explained 
in Chapter four are: 30 November 2013 – 26 February 2014, 27 February – 20 March 
2014, 21 March – 17 July 2014, and 18 July – 28 February 2015.  
The chapter begins with a quantitative assessment of the media coverage 
exploring quantity and mean length of coverage in order to answer the second 
research question about the attention paid to the Ukraine crisis by the selected British 
media. This is followed by a second evaluation – to answer the third research 
question about the adopted frames – uncovering the actual frames used by the British 
media during the Ukraine crisis. Through both a quantitative and a qualitative 
evaluation of the frames, the key characteristics of the coverage will be revealed.  
 
6.2 Press Attention 
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. 
The second research question that aims to explore the attention paid to the 
Ukraine crisis was addressed through a look at the overall quantities and average 
length of coverage by the examined media outlets. The generated resulting 
descriptive statistics – quantitative differences – are shown in Table 6.1. First, the 
British media reported the Ukraine crisis between 30 November 2013 and 26 
February 2014, with a number of 243 articles and a mean length of 729 words. Mail 
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Online tended to publish longer articles than the other two media outlets – the BBC 
and The Guardian. The differences in length ranged from 157 words (BBC, 30 
January 2014) discussing how the Ukrainian riot police mistakenly attacked a group 
of bloodied government supporters due to their bus registration number suggesting 
being from Western Ukraine; to 3,008 words (Mail Online, 19 February 2014) noting 
the escalated violence in Kyiv between protesters and the Yanukovych 
administration, and the role of Russia who was seen by the media as the winner for 
the time being in the battle for influence in Ukraine. The media quoted Robert 
Brinkley – the UK’s ambassador to Ukraine – laying accusations against 
Yanukovych and Russia explaining the roots of the upheaval in Kyiv: 
 
This has roots which go back further than the last three months. 
Every Ukrainian government since independence in 1991 has accepted the 
importance of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU […] [W]hen 
[Yanukovych’s] government suddenly [suspended] talks with the EU it 
came as a huge shock to a great many people in Ukraine […] [EU’s] single 
market [is] eight times bigger than the Russian market […] They were 
offering Ukraine a route to modernisation of its economy – bigger markets 
and becoming a freer and better society (Mail Online, 19 February 2014). 
 
Among the three media outlets, the BBC offered the most coverage with 110 
articles available for analysis highlighting the use of tear gas by riot police to force 
back the crowds. The Guardian offered less attention to the Ukraine conflict with 78 
articles and an average of 684 words. The tabloid-style media – Mail Online during 
these early stages of the Ukraine conflict paid the least attention, with 55 articles, but 




Table 6. 1: Press attention by the British media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 
 Quantity                          Mean Length 
BBC 110 (45%)                                  623 
The Guardian   78 (32%)                                   684 
Mail Online   55 (23%)    1,004 
Total  243                                             
 
 
2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014.  
The overall press attention paid by the British media during the second period 
slightly decreased to 236 pieces of news covering 22 days of deepened conflict in 
Ukraine (Table 6.2). In spite of the reduction, the British media provided an average 
quantity of 11 reports per day and a mean length of 908 words. This time all the three 
British media offered more extended coverage than during the previous period. The 
emphasis was put largely on Russia’s illegal involvement in the crisis and its military 
movement in the Crimean Peninsula. The shortest and the longest length of coverage 
on the subject were provided by The Guardian and the BBC with 148 words and 
6,535 words respectively. For example, The Guardian on 3 March 2014 published an 
148-word piece on the opposing views on Crimea of Barack Obama who insisted that 
Putin violated ‘Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity which is a breach of 
international law’, and Vladimir Putin who responded that ‘the US-backed interim 
Ukraine administration was threatening "the lives and health of Russian citizens and 
the many compatriots" in Crimea’ (The Guardian, 3 March 2014). The speech of 
Putin on 19 March 2014 on Crimea’s returning home was covered extensively by the 
BBC (6,535 words), containing critical annotations by the BBC diplomatic 
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correspondent Bridget Kendall. For instance, Kendall was sceptical about what Putin 
announced as ‘more than 82% of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96% of 
them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia’: 
 
Was the turnout really 82% of all Crimea's voting population? The 
result suggests most of those who voted wanted to rejoin Russia. But what 
about the many Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and some Russians who didn't 




Table 6. 2: Press attention by the British media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 
   Quantity                           Mean Length 
BBC   82 (35%)                                    757 
The Guardian   85 (36%)                                    751 
Mail Online   69 (29%)     1,281 
Total  236                                             
 
 
3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014. 
The third period covered a longer duration of almost 4 months’ worth of news 
coverage from 21 March to 17 July 2014. A total of 616 articles were selected for 
analysis. The ranking of reporting quantity in the third period among the British 
media came with the BBC on top with 264 articles, followed by Mail Online and The 
Guardian with 186 and 166 items respectively. The three media labelled what had 
been going on in the South-Eastern Ukraine in similar terms: firm belief in Putin’s 
military and financial backing for pro-Russian separatists on the ground. Again, the 
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shortest article (92 words) among the British media came from The Guardian. The 
newspaper discussed Russia’s severely affected economy in terms of capital flight 
due to the sanctions imposed by the West, yet without hurting Vladimir Putin’s poll 
ratings which in reality soared more than 20% (The Guardian, 28 March 2014). Mail 
Online contributed the lengthiest article among the three media on the downing of 
MH17 with a particular focus on victims. The media attributed the cause to the pro-
Russian rebels:  
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has blamed Ukraine for the 
tragedy that claimed the lives of all 298 people on board, including about 
100 children - but did not deny Russian-backed separatists were to blame for 
shooting it out of the sky. Ukrainian authorities laid the blame for the attack 
on the rebels by denying any responsibility for the missile launch, with 
President Petro Poroshenko called the downing an act of terrorism as he 




Table 6. 3: Press attention by the British media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
 Quantity                        Mean Length 
BBC  264 (43%)                            615 
The Guardian  166 (27%)                            726 
Mail Online  186 (30%) 915 




4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015.  
The media attention paid to the Ukraine crisis during the final time period 
reached 815 out of 2,319 articles, responsible for 35% of the whole coverage (Table 
6.4). The BBC remained first among the British outlets offering 372 pieces (46%) of 
news on the topic, while Mail Online came second with 294 articles (36%). There 
was a noticeable reduction in coverage attention on the subject in T he Guardian – 
the Ukraine crisis only appeared in 149 articles (18%), as the topic completely faded 
away from the news agenda in October 2014. The Guardian’s less significant 
attention was also evident in it offering the shortest piece (99 words) that discussed 
gas crisis fears among European countries as ‘Russia could once again turn off the 
tap on gas supplies to Ukraine, as it did in 2006 and 2009’ (The Guardian, 9 
September 2014). The most extensive news article (5,558 words) was from the Mail 
Online on 18 July 2014 presenting an emotional narrative about the downing of 
MH17. The report laying the blame on the Kremlin for supporting the pro-Russian 
rebels, was titled: ‘This baby's death is on your conscience, Putin – damn you for 
centuries: Ukrainian government releases horrific picture of infant lying in a field 
that it says was killed when rebels shot down MH17’. The media quoted statements 
from several world leaders such as Stephen Harper, the Canadian prime minister, in 
relation to the Russian aggression that was believed to be ‘the root of the ongoing 
conflict […] While we do not yet know who is responsible for this attack, we 
continue to condemn Russia’s military aggression and illegal occupation of Ukraine’ 
(Mail Online, 18 July 2014).  
The overall narrowed interest in the subject shown by the British media is 
predominantly attributed to the disappearance of the story from The Guardian; 
although the newspaper dedicated most of its coverage to condemning Putin for his 
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direct involvement in Ukraine thus causing the catastrophe there. The BBC continued 
to accuse pro-Russian rebels of exacerbating the conflict and Russia of its 
involvement. The final observation is that the Mail Online tended to offer lengthier 
articles.  
 
Table 6. 4 Press attention by the British media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
 Quantity                         Mean Length 
BBC  372 (46%)                               631 
The Guardian  149 (18%)                               703   
Mail Online  294 (36%) 1,038 
Total             815                                            
 
 
6.3 Framing of the Ukraine Crisis 
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014.  
Generic news frames. 
To answer the third research question scrutinising the frames used by the 
media during the crisis, the subsequent interpretative analysis follows what was 
established in the previous chapter structure. Within each period the set of frames 
consisting of generic, diagnostic and prognostic frames are quantitatively and 
qualitatively displayed and analysed. This section is structured chronologically 
starting with the first time period: 30 November 2013 – 26 February 2014.  
Table 6.5 shows the overall picture in the UK with regard to the use of 
generic frames during the first period. The three media tended to describe the 
Ukraine conflict through the lens of conflict (54% of coverage), 24% of the overall 
coverage used the responsibility frame while the human-interest frame was evident in 
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15% of the articles. This is followed by a marginally smaller use of the economic 
consequences frame (5%), whereas the morality and nationalisation frames stood at 
1% each.  
 
Table 6. 5: Distribution of Generic frames by the British media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 (1st 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online   Total 
Conflict 63 (57%) 40 (51%)  29 (53%) 132 (54%) 
Responsibility 26 (24%) 20 (26%)  12 (22%)   58 (24%) 
Human interest 14 (13%) 12 (15%)  10 (18%)   36 (15%) 
Economic consequences   6 (5%)   3 (4%) 3 (5%)   12 (5%) 
Morality   0   2 (3%) 1 (2%)     3 (1%) 
Nationalisation   1 (1%)   1 (1%) 0     2 (1%) 
Total 110 78  55   243 
 
 
Looking at each British media outlet more closely, the BBC used the conflict 
frame most in 63 out of its 110 articles (57%). Mail Online came second using the 
conflict frame in 29 out of its 55 articles (53%); while The Guardian offered 40 out 
of its 78 articles (51%). As the table shows, the responsibility frame was the second 
favoured frame used by the British media, with The Guardian offering 20 articles – 
26% of the overall coverage suggesting that the Yanukovych government and Putin 
should be responsible for the Ukraine crisis. The BBC and Mail Online provided 
24% and 22% of their overall coverage respectively.  
What Mail Online used more than the other two media outlets was the 
human-interest frame. The media distributed 18% of its whole sample of 55 articles 
to the frame focusing on the Maidan protestors and theYanukovych family circle 
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with a high level of corruption. The ratio was followed by The Guardian which used 
the frame in 15% of its coverage. The BBC came last with 13% of its coverage using 
the frame. In the use of the economic consequences frame, the BBC and Mail Online 
offered 5% of their overall coverage each, while The Guardian provided 4%. The 
BBC discussed the Ukraine crisis through the lens of economic deals offered by the 
EU and Russia, and offered multiple views. Mail Online, on the other hand, 
discussed the impact the economic situation in Ukraine would have on the UK. For 
instance, the media used the economic consequences frame in an article, talking 
about the UK’s position: 
 
New government says it needs $35 billion aid in next two years. 
[…] The plea was issued within hours of George Osborne saying that British 
taxpayers' money would be available - and saying: “We should be there with 
a chequebook to help the people of Ukraine rebuild their country." But the 
Polish foreign minister cautioned against unconditional help, saying the new 
government had to strike a proper agreement with the [IMF] and stick by it 
(Mail Online, 23 February 2014). 
 
The British media devoted minimal space – 3 and 2 articles respectively – to 
the morality and nationalisation frames. The BBC did not use the morality frame and 
Mail Online during this period showed zero interest in the nationalisation frame.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
The British media during the first period offered diagnostic frames explaining 
why and how the crisis occurred and developed. A total number of 186 diagnostic 
frames were identified occupying 77% of the whole of 243 articles from the British 
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media. Table 6.6 shows the general trend by the British media in terms of offering 
diagnosis. The three media outlets showed a great interest in explaining the Ukraine 
crisis through global dimensions. Mail Online in particular favoured the frame in 
59% of its coverage, implying Russia’s involvement: Russia offered financial aid in 
an attempt to keep Ukraine in its orbit. The media also used Poland as a 
demonstrative example of a country that had dramatically benefited from being a 
member of the EU block. For instance, Mail Online regarded the Ukraine crisis as a 
conflict between the West and the East, and the EU deal as an opportunity for 
Ukraine to benefit from: 
 
The deal would have given Ukraine access to Western Europe’s vast 
market of more than 500 million people and helped modernise what is a 
relatively backward and predominantly agricultural country. […] Those in 
the west of the country […] were desperate to take advantage of the chances 
offered by the European Union […] But if Ukraine allied itself to Western 
Europe, Putin’s idea of a revived Soviet empire would be in tatters, given 
the country’s importance to that empire (Mail Online, 19 February 2014). 
 
Mail Online was also aligned with the BBC in the news coverage of the 
leaked phone call, focusing on Nuland and UN’s role in the attempts to search for a 
solution to the Ukraine crisis. For instance, Mail Online stressed the importance of 
Russia’s dangerous role throughout the article, and stated that: ‘Mr Pyatt adds that he 
fears if their plan starts taking shape “the Russians will try to do something behind 
the scenes to torpedo it”. The US last night accused Russia of leaking the tape to do 
precisely that’ (Mail Online, 7 February 2014). Likewise, in explaining the US’s 
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effort to reach a peaceful solution, the BBC diplomatic correspondent Jonathan 
Marcus said:  
 
The clear purpose in leaking this conversation [by Russia] is to 
embarrass Washington and for audiences susceptible to Moscow's message 
to portray the US as interfering in Ukraine's domestic affairs […] The US is 
clearly much more involved in trying to broker a deal in Ukraine than it 
publicly lets on […] [I]s the interception and leaking of communications 
really the way Russia wants to conduct its foreign policy? [A]fter Wikileaks, 
Edward Snowden and the like could the Russian government be joining the 
radical apostles of open government? I doubt it (BBC, 7 February 2014). 
 
Table 6. 6: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the British media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 
(1st period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Global dimensions   35 (45%)  27 (35%)  24 (59%) 86 (46%) 
Particular triggers     19 (24%)  20 (26%) 8 (20%) 47 (25%) 
Political causes   15 (19%)  12 (15%) 4 (10%) 31 (17%) 
Human rights violations  8 (10%) 8 (10%) 5 (12%) 21 (11%) 
Socio-economic   1 (1%) 0 0 1 (1%) 
Religious prescriptions  0 0 0 0 
Total      78 (71%)  67 (86%)  41 (75%) 186 (77%) 
 
 
Following the global dimensions frame, the British media tended to use the 
particular triggers frame, with a total of 47 out of the whole 186 items (25%). The 
Guardian used the frame the most. The newspaper mainly suggested that the 
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Yanukovych government’s crackdowns were the main reasons for the escalation of 
the Ukraine crisis. Like The Guardian, the BBC and Mail Online used the frame to 
specifically stress the importance of Yanukovych’s crackdowns on the protesters. For 
example, the BBC published an article titled ‘Ukraine unrest: Nato condemns 
crackdown on protesters’ in the beginning of the Ukraine crisis (BBC, 3 December 
2013). Ten days later, the BBC described Ukraine as a divided country due to the 
continuing protests, and wrote: ‘The violent crackdown energised the pro-EU 
protesters, who are now camped out in the capital's Independence Square’ (BBC, 14 
December 2013).  
The political causes was the second commonly used diagnosis frame by the 
British media to explain the roots of the Ukraine crisis. The BBC, The Guardian, and 
Mail Online all expressed the opinion that the Yanukovych regime’s corruption and 
abuse of power that impacted on people were the dominant roots of the continually 
deepening conflict.  
The fourth diagnosis frequently used by the British media was the human 
rights violation frame, with the BBC and The Guardian giving 10% of the attention 
respectively. Mail Online dedicated 12% of its sample to the frame for the most part 
criticising Yanukovych’s anti-protest law. The least referred to diagnosis in the 
British media was the socio-economic causes one discussed only once by the BBC. 
The media pointed out that people from Eastern Ukraine resented the pro-EU 
protests in Kyiv due to the poor economic reality in the region where the existing 





[A] housewife said that "before joining any international 
organisations, Ukraine should first develop our own economy. Look at our 
poor pensioners surviving on the breadline. I am against joining the EU". 
[…] [M]ost of Donetsk's inhabitants remain unconvinced that Ukraine's 
future lies in Europe. After all, local industries are hugely dependent on 
Russian supplies and markets, with Russia itself closer than the Ukrainian 
capital, Kiev (BBC, 3 December 2013). 
 
Table 6. 7: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the British media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 
(1st period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Change in government 20 (54%) 14 (44%) 10 (62%) 44 (52%) 
Internal reforms   10 (27%)  5 (16%)    0 15 (18%) 
Financial intervention  4 (11%)  4 (13%)   6 (38%) 14 (16%) 
External co-operation         3 (8%)  9 (28%)    0 12 (14%) 
Total 37 (34%)   32 (41%)      16 (29%) 85 (35%) 
 
 
The British media delivered 85 prognoses in a total of 243 articles (35%). 
Table 6.7 above shows that the change in government frame came on top dominating 
the whole ranking. The British media suggested this solution in 44 out of the 85 
articles (52%). The second mostly recommended prognosis was internal reforms. 
The British media articulated the prognosis to reflect what they previously 
considered the Yanukovych administration’s notorious issues such as the lack of 
freedom, democracy, abuse of power, and persistent corruption. The subsequent 
financial intervention prognosis was largely promoted by Mail Online dealing with 
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the promising future for Ukraine after Kyiv restructures its financial system with 
help from the EU. The external co-operation is identified as the least favoured 
solution by the British media coming solely from The Guardian and the BBC. The 
latter two media focused mainly on the EU and the US that could fix the anti-
democratic disease in Ukraine.  
 
2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. 
Generic news frames. 
The general breakdown of the use of generic frames by the British media in 
the second time period – 27 February-20 March 2014 – is shown in Table 6.8 below. 
Overall, the positions remained identical to those in the previous period. The conflict 
frame led solidly among all the generic frames used by the British media. However, 
the researcher found a visible decline in the frame in The Guardian’s coverage – 
from 51% to 34% as compared to the first period (Figure 6.8.1). Unlike the conflict 
frame, the use of the responsibility frame enjoyed an overall increase in the British 
media outlets – from 24% to 30%. Especially the BBC which used the frame in 32% 
of its whole sample of 82 articles, compared to the first period when the media 
devoted 24% of space to the frame. This was followed by Mail Online and The 
Guardian that increased the uses of the frame by 6 and 5 percentage points 
respectively. Overall, the three media outlets used the frame to suggest that Russia 
should be responsible for the crisis. This was mostly evident in the BBC and Mail 
Online. For example, out of the 26 occurrences in the BBC using the responsibility 
frame, 22 items (85%) were accusing Russia of breaking global order through Putin’s 
illegitimate actions in Ukraine including the Crimean Peninsula. Mail Online 
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published 15 out of 19 (79%) responsibility frames alluding to the fact that Russia 
should be punished.  
 
Table 6. 8: Distribution of Generic frames by the British media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online   Total 
Conflict 42 (51%) 29 (34%) 39 (57%) 110 (47%) 
Responsibility 26 (32%) 26 (31%) 19 (28%)   71 (30%) 
Human interest   4 (5%) 15 (18%)   4 (6%)   23 (10%) 
Economic consequences   3 (4%)   9 (11%)   1 (1%)   13 (6%) 
Morality   5 (6%)   3 (4%)   5 (7%)   13 (6%) 
Nationalisation   2 (2%)   3 (4%)   1 (1%)     6 (3%) 




Figure 6. 8. 1 
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The third generic frame the British media persistently preferred over the two 
periods was the human-interest frame, with a slight intensification in the frame from 
The Guardian offering diverse point of views. The BBC and Mail Online, on the 
other hand, reduced the use of this frame. The common point shared by these three 
media outlets was the articulation of fears from different communities such as Tatars, 
the former Soviet Union countries, and those small and vulnerable neighbouring 
countries of Russia. For example, Mail Online put it: ‘Many in Crimea’s ethnic Tatar 
minority were wary of the referendum, fearing that Crimea's break-off from Ukraine 
will set off violence against them’ (Mail Online, 18 March 2014). 
The BBC and Mail Online again showed a generally aligned tendency in the 
uses of the economic consequences and morality frames. This trend was different 
from that displayed by The Guardian. On the one hand, the economic consequences 
frame was featured in The Guardian with a growth of 7 percentage points in 
comparison with the previous period, whilst the BBC and Mail Online decreased the 
use of the frame. In similar vein, whereas the BBC and Mail Online showed an 
observable increase in the use of the morality frame during the second period, The 
Guardian increased its use only subtly – from 2 to 3 pieces. The three British media 
used the morality frame less, mainly accentuating on the immoral Russia. One 
demonstrative example can be found from the BBC citing Charles Lane from the 
Washington Post:  
 
Mr Putin's speech started with a lie - that the Crimean referendum 
was legitimate - and continued down that track for the next 40 minutes or so: 
“Putin presented a legal and historical argument so tendentious and so 
logically tangled - so unappealing to anyone but Russian nationalists such as 
those who packed the Kremlin to applaud him - that it seemed intended less 
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to refute contrary arguments than to bury them under a rhetorical avalanche” 
(BBC, 20 March 2014). 
 
Another example of a tougher tone came from Mail Online comparing 
Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler with references to Putin’s fascist behaviour towards 
Crimea, by repetitively quoting political officials from the US and the UK such as 
Hilary Clinton and Malcolm Rifkind. The media wrote: 
 
Whatever the historic arguments for Crimean secession from 
Ukraine - and some exist - Putin’s act of armed aggression, with threats of 
more to come, relies on exactly the same arguments that Hitler deployed to 
justify his 1938-39 lunges into Czechoslovakia and Poland. Russia’s brutish 
president plays golf abroad with only one club in his bag — force, or the 
threat of it (Mail Online, 19 March 2014). 
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
The British media during the second period provided less diagnostic frames 
than during the first period, with a total of 140 out of the 236 articles (59% of 
coverage). Table 6.9 illustrates the media engaging with the Ukraine crisis 
predominately via the global dimensions frame. This diagnosis was particularly 
favoured by Mail Online in 27 out of its 36 articles (75%) offering diagnoses. The 
BBC paid marginally less attention to the frame in 33 out of its 45 diagnoses (73%). 
The Guardian was the one that tended to give various and diverse explanations of the 
Ukraine conflict, with the global dimensions coming on top (71%) out of 59 
diagnostic frames. The BBC and Mail Online believed that the Russian military 
movements at the Western border and in Crimea reflecting Putin’s regional 
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ambitions caused the Ukraine conflict. A less commonly noted factor was the battle 
between the West and Russia, which the BBC and The Guardian focused on in 5 
articles each. For example, the BBC used the frame and disapproved of the 
comparison between Crimea’s secession and Kosovo’s: 
 
[A]ccording to international precedent, it cannot simply secede 
unilaterally, even if that wish is supported by the local population in a 
referendum. […] [I]nternational law does not recognise a divorce at 
gunpoint. Crimea cannot proceed with a possible secession or even 
incorporation into Russia while Moscow holds sway on the ground. In this 
way the situation differs from Nato's armed action in Kosovo in 1999. The 
Kosovo Albanians were exposed to extreme repression and subsequently 
forced expulsion by Serb forces. Nato intervened for genuine humanitarian 
purposes. (BBC, 7 March 2014). 
 
 
Table 6. 9: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the British media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Global dimensions 33 (73%) 42 (71%) 27 (75%) 102 (73%) 
Human rights violations   8 (18%) 13 (22%) 4 (11%)   25 (18%) 
Particular triggers   3 (7%)   1 (2%) 3 (8%)  7 (5%) 
Political causes   1 (2%)   0 2 (6%)  3 (2%) 
Socio-economic   0   1 (2%)  0  1 (1%) 
Religious   0   2 (3%)  0  2 (1%) 




Figure 6. 9. 1 
 
The second commonly suggested diagnosis was the human rights violations 
frame during the second time period. As Figure 6.9.1 shows, this frame enjoyed an 
overt increase in the British media compared with that in the first period.  The British 
media used the frame in 25 out of the 140 articles (18%). The BBC and The 
Guardian used the diagnostic frame to label Putin as violating international law due 
to his illegal annexation of Crimea thus aggravating the Ukraine conflict. For 
instance, The Guardian published a news article prior to the referendum taking place 
in the Crimean Peninsula, and quoted David Cameron: 
 
We are all clear that any referendum vote in Crimea this week will 
be illegal, illegitimate and will not be recognised by the international 
community […] We must stand up to aggression, uphold international law, 
and support the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people who want 
the freedom to choose their own future (The Guardian, 11 March 2014). 
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What the British media tended to use less were the particular triggers (7 
articles) and political causes (3 articles) diagnoses. Again, the BBC and Mail Online 
contributed most of these. For example, the two media outlets maintained that the 
toppling of Russian-backed Yanukovych regime had triggered the subsequent chaos 
in Eastern Ukraine, leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The socio-
economic causes (1 item) and religious prescriptions (2 items) were only mentioned 
by The Guardian; the BBC and Mail Online paid zero attention to these diagnoses.  
The overall use of prognostic frames by the British media dropped from 35% 
to 19% during the second time period. In addition to the decrease, there were 
apparent shifts in preferences of the prognoses (Table 6.10). The third favoured 
prognosis by the British media during the first period, the financial intervention 
solution, became the first prognosis highly recommended by all the three media 
during the second (Figure 6.10.1). The Guardian suggested the prognosis in 6 out of 
its 9 diagnoses (67%), the ratio was the same to the BBC that used the frame in 12 
out of 18 prognoses (67%). Notably, Mail Online offered 17 prognoses, all of which 
recommended the financial intervention solution (100%). What the media 
specifically supported was a financial isolation of Russia from the international 
community and the imposition of further economic sanctions on the country. The 
second frequently recommended solution was the external co-operation mainly 
coming from the BBC and The Guardian. This consisted of diplomatic negotiation 
and assistance from international community. Lastly, the military action solution 
came at the bottom with 4 occurrences solely from the BBC. Among the 4 items, 2 
(50%) suggested the US to send troops to fight with the Russian militaries in Eastern 
Ukraine and Crimea. The other 2 articles (50%) resisted any military action arguing 
that it would only exacerbate the Ukraine conflict. None of the internal reforms, 
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change in government, and dismantling weapons frames were brought up by the 
British media.  
 
Table 6. 10: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the British media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Financial intervention 12 (67%) 6 (67%) 17 (100%)  35 (80%) 
External co-operation 4 (22%) 3 (33%) 0 7 (16%) 
Military action 4 (22%) 0 0 4 (9%) 
Internal reforms   0 0 0 0 
Change in government 0 0 0 0 
Dismantling weapons 0 0 0 0 




Figure 6. 10. 1 
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3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014. 
Generic news frames. 
The third period is characterised by longer timespan of nearly four months 
from 21 March to 17 July 2014, including 616 articles on the Ukraine conflict in the 
British media. The overall use of the generic frames did not change with the conflict 
frame coming first (Table 6.11). This period manifested a common trait for all the 
three media where they experienced a sharp increase in the conflict frame (Figure 
6.11.1). Especially The Guardian with a notable increase by 26 percentage points 
over the two periods. As shown in Table 6.11, the responsibility frame came second 
among the generic frames from all the British media outlets, although there was a 
decline in the overall quantity of the frame. The Guardian decreased significantly the 
use of the frame, from the previous 31% of coverage to 23% during this period. The 
BBC and Mail Online meanwhile dropped moderately. In spite of the decline in 
quantities, the three media – like the previous period – used the frame to continually 
accuse Russia of backing the violent separatists in South-Eastern Ukraine. For 
instance, out of a total of 78 responsibility frames from the BBC, 44 occurrences 
(56%) were focused on blaming Russia for its involvement. The Guardian used the 
frame to accuse Putin in 26 out of its 38 items (68%); while Mail Online attributed 
the blame directly to Putin in 22 out of its 44 responsibility frames (50%), suggesting 
that Russia could de-escalate the crisis in 6 items (14%). In contrast, The Guardian 
contributed a small number of 6 articles (16%) to the frame with blame being laid on 





Table 6. 11: Distribution of Generic frames by the British media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Conflict 141 (53%) 99 (60%) 123 (66%) 363 (59%) 
Responsibility   78 (30%) 38 (23%)   44 (22%) 160 (26%) 
Human interest   36 (14%) 13 (8%)   16 (9%)    65 (11%) 
Economic consequences   5 (2%)   6 (4%)  3 (2%) 14 (2%) 
Morality   2 (0.7%) 10 (6%)  0 12 (2%) 
Nationalisation   2 (0.7%)   0  3 (2%)   5 (1%) 




Figure 6. 11. 1 
  
The third commonly used generic frame – the human-interest frame enjoyed a 
clear overall growth from the British media during the third period. The three media 
published 65 out of 616 articles (11%) using the frame to give voice to various 
groups of people. For example, the BBC presented different views and opinions from 
the Eastern city of Odessa (but with an overall message of Ukraine being victimised) 
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where bloody clashes broke out between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian 
demonstrators that left over 40 people killed: 
 
[M]any believe that the victims were Ukrainian citizens. Some 
people are crying, many are angry. “They took our own city from us. 
Fascists!” one woman shouts […] “We are not pro-Russian, we are from 
Odessa. It's just about Odessa, about peace.” […] “They [pro-Russian 
activists] are terrorists, brought here from elsewhere. And the people of 
Odessa defended themselves, saved the city. The police just did nothing,” 
she says (BBC, 4 May 2014). 
 
After the human-interest frame, the British media paid less attention to the 
economic consequences and morality considerations, offering 14 and 12 instances 
respectively. The BBC and The Guardian contributed the majority to the economic 
frame, talking about economic sanctions by the Western bodies, as well as the impact 
mainly on Russia. The BBC for example, sketched out the economic sanctions on 
Russia in 4 out of 5 occurrences (80%), while simultaneously explained the EU 
Agreement with Ukraine in 2 articles (40%). The Guardian, with a total quantity of 6 
articles devoted 3 of them (50%) to the negatively affected economy in Russia. Two 
articles (33%) were focused on the deteriorating Ukrainian economy, whilst one 
article (17%) reflected on how British enterprises such as BP were directly affected 
by the economic sanctions. What Mail Online was interested in was demonstrating 
increased gas prices.  
The least used generic frame by the British media during this period was the 
nationalisation frame with a total occurrence of 5 out of 616 articles (1%). The BBC 
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and Mail Online used the frame 2 (40%) and 3 (60%) times respectively, with The 
Guardian not using it at all.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
With the radically intensified conflict particularly in the South-Eastern part of 
Ukraine over the third period, the trend of providing diagnosis continued in the 
British media with a total number of 348 out of 616 articles (56%) available for 
analysis. The overall focus in increasing the use of diagnostic frames remained 
significant. The particular triggers frame came on top among the diagnoses (Table 
6.12). The BBC and Mail Online had the same percentage of stories using the frame 
– 63%, whereas The Guardian was slightly behind with 57% diagnosis stories in 
explaining the Ukraine crisis.  
 
Table 6. 12: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the British media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Particular triggers  86 (63%) 45 (57%) 83 (63%) 214 (61%) 
Global dimensions 33 (24%) 27 (34%) 40 (30%) 100 (29%) 
Human rights violations   6 (4%)   1 (1%)   7 (5%)   14 (4%) 
Political causes 11 (8%)   4 (5%) 10 (8%)   25 (7%) 
Socio-economic   1 (0.7%)   2 (3%)   6 (5%)  9 (3%) 
Religious prescriptions   0   0   1 (1%)  1 (0.2%) 





Figure 6. 12. 1 
 
First, the BBC used 67 out of the 86 particular triggers framed stories (78%) 
to suggest that the violent unrest in Eastern Ukraine with support from Russia behind 
the scene was responsible for the deterioration of the Ukraine crisis. A smaller 
number of 14 framed stories (16%) regarded the Anti-Terrorism Operations carried 
out by the Ukrainian military from new Kyiv as the reason for the conflict. Second, 
similar to the BBC, Mail Online used this particular triggers frame in 55 out of its 83 
frames (66%) to explain the worsened conflict by pointing out the eastern unrest 
between the new Kyiv government and the pro-Russian separatists. Three articles 
(4%) put emphasis on the violence of the Ukrainian nationalists, whilst 13 items 
(16%) suggested that the Anti-Terrorism Operations were the main reason for the 
conflict but in an attempt to calm down the unrest. For example, Mail Online wrote: 
‘Government forces used aircraft, helicopters and artillery in a fierce attack to try to 
root out the separatists who have controlled Slaviansk and surrounding areas since 
early April’ (4 June 2014). Third, The Guardian differed slightly from the other two 
media, extensively stressing the importance of the fact that the Anti-Terrorism 
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Operations launched by the new Kyiv against the pro-Russian protestors were the 
main factor exacerbating the conflict in Ukraine, in 25 out of its 45 items (56%). The 
newspaper suggested the unrest in Eastern Ukraine as the reason in 16 items (36%). 
This explaination was essentially used by the BBC and Mail Online.  
The previously most preferred diagnosis – global dimensions, came second 
with 100 items offered by the British media. The critical attitude towards Russia 
continued. As Table 6.12.1 below shows, in the case of the BBC out of the 33 items 
using the frame, 21(64%) presented Russia as sowing discord in the East by illegally 
annexing Crimea, militarily threatening Ukraine at the border, and aiming to boost its 
economic and political influence in Ukraine, the region, as well as globally. The 
media published 6 articles (18%) suggesting that the battle between NATO and 
Russia caused and continued the chaos in Ukraine. Five articles (15%) published by 
the BBC pointed directly to the referenda introduced by the separatists in the South-
Eastern region of Ukraine. Only 1 article (3%) spoke to the West’s meddling being 
responsible for triggering and worsening the crisis.  
 
Table 6. 12. 1: Use of the global dimensions frame by the BBC: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
Global Dimensions Percentage (out of 33 items) 
Russia’s interest 64% 
NATO vs. Russia 18% 
Separatists’ referenda 15% 





For its part, Mail Online used global dimensions in 32 out of 40 cases (80%) 
to suggest Russia’s imperialist mind-set as the main motivation. Five articles (13%) 
from Mail Online illuminated the conflict through a struggle lens of the West versus 
East. The Guardian (Table 6.12.2) talked about Russia’s aggressive mentality in 12 
out of its 27 articles (44%), followed by the battle between the West and East 
articulated in 6 articles (22%). Five articles (19%) believed that the referenda in 
Eastern cities aggravated the conflict in Ukraine. The Guardian published another 4 
articles (15%) with a particular focus on the role of NATO and US who were argued 
to have ambitiously intervened in the region. Overall, for the most part the British 
media held opposite views on the root of the Ukraine conflict from the Russian 
media.  
 
Table 6. 12. 2: Use of the global dimensions frame by The Guardian: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
(3rd period) 
Global Dimensions Percentage (out of 27 items) 
Russia’s aggression 44% 
West vs. East 22% 
Separatists’ referenda 19% 
NATO and the U.S.’ intervention 15% 
 
 
The third and fourth diagnosis employed by the British media were the 
political causes frame and the human rights violations frame during the third period. 
The BBC in particular used the political causes frame 9 times (out of 11) suggesting 
that the on-going conflict in Ukraine was initially caused by Yanukovych who 
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decided to terminate the political and economic package with the EU. For example, 
the media in reporting the battle on the ground in Donetsk region between Ukrainian 
forces and rebels, stated that: ‘The current crisis started last November when then 
President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign an agreement with the EU. The 
decision led to street protests in Kiev, and Mr Yanukovych was eventually 
overthrown’ (BBC, 7 July 2014).  
The human rights violations diagnosis was mostly used by the BBC and Mail 
Online which accused Russia of breaking international law by annexing Crimea, thus 
intensifying the whole situation in Ukraine. For instance, Mail Online expressed 
concern over France’s continued business deal with Russia by quoting President 
Obama:  
 
Mr Obama emphasised the importance of the G7 allies marching in 
‘lockstep’ […] “I have expressed some concerns - and I don't think I'm alone 
in this - about continuing significant defence deals with Russia at a time 
when they have violated basic international law and the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of their neighbours” (Mail Online, 5 June 2014).  
 
The final diagnoses used by the British media were the socio-economic 
causes and the religious prescriptions frames, which were mainly offered by Mail 
Online. The media highlighted the fact of Ukraine’s unpaid debt for the gas from 





Table 6. 13: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the British media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd 
period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Financial intervention 17 (61%) 4 (29%) 9 (82%) 30 (57%) 
Military action  4 (15%) 5 (35%) 2 (18%) 11 (21%) 
Dismantling weapons  4 (14%) 2 (14%) 0  6 (11%) 
Internal reforms    3 (11%) 2 (14%) 0   5 (9%) 
External co-operation  0 1 (7%) 0   1 (2%) 
Change in government  0 0 0   0 
Total  28 (11%)  14 (8%)  11 (6%) 53 (9%) 
 
 
Table 6.13 specifies the preferred solutions to the Ukraine crisis offered by 
each media in the UK from 31 March to 17 July 2014. Compared with the previous 
period, the British media reduced the use of the prognostic frames, and suggested 
solutions in 9% of the sample (53 out of 616 articles). In addition, the overall 
preference from the British media changed slightly (Figure 6.13.1). The financial 
intervention prognosis remained on top. Especially the BBC and Mail Online 
together used the prognosis in 26 out of 30 items, while The Guardian showed less 
interest in the solution with 4 occurrences. Nevertheless, what the three media 
commonly suggested was to continue the economic sanctions on Russia because of 




Figure 6. 13. 1 
 
The second prognosis frame the British media tended to use was the military 
action referring to the use of military action to assist Ukraine. It is important to 
reiterate here that the military action diagnosis has been broken into three categories. 
They included the suggestion to use the military to intervene in the crisis, the 
suggestion of using the military to assist Ukraine, and the suggestion of not using any 
military action. The BBC (Table 6.13.1) dedicated 4 articles to the solution, 2 of 
them (50%) however supporting the view that Ukraine should resort to Anti-
Terrorism Operations. One article (25%) published by the media discussed NATO’s 
military readiness to enter the conflict region to fight with Russia. Another piece 
(25%) from the BBC rejected the notion of conducting any military crackdown. The 
position from Mail Online once again resonated with that of the BBC, with 1 out of 2 
military action frames being supportive of Ukraine’s supression of the riots in the 
Eastern cities. One article made references to NATO that could provide Ukraine with 
military support. The Guardian on the one hand, shared the prognostic solution of 
sending troops to the Eastern Baltic in 2 out of its 5 articles (40%). On the other 
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hand, the newspaper used the prognostic frame in 3 articles (60%) to argue that any 
military action would only deteriorate the Ukraine conflict.  
 
Table 6. 13. 1: Use of the military action frame by the BBC: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
Military action Percentage (out of 4 items) 
ATO 50% 
NATO’s military readiness  25% 
No military crackdown 25% 
 
 
The next prognosis recommended by the British media was the dismantling 
of weapons with a total number of 6 news items. Four of them came from the BBC, 
and two from The Guardian. The BBC demanded pro-Russian rebels to disarm in 3 
out of 4 stories, with 1 item explicitly stating that there should be no inflow of 
weapons from Russia. What The Guardian suggested in its two prognoses was that 
rebels disarm and both sides remove weapons. The last two prognoses recommended 
by the British media during this period were the internal reforms with 5 occurrences 
in total presented by the BBC and The Guardian, and the external co-operation frame 
coming from The Guardian. The change in government frame that was highly 
recommended during the first period, has not been touched upon by the British media 




4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015. 
Generic news frames. 
The British media during the final time period reported the Ukraine conflict 
in 815 news items. The BBC published 372 articles (46%), Mail Online – 294 pieces 
(36%), and 149 (18%) came from The Guardian (Table 6.14). The overall use of the 
generic frames by the British media remained similar to the third period, but with a 
worth-noting increase in the economic consequences frame from The Guardian by 
11 percentage points (Figure 6.14.1). This was regardless of the fact that the press 
dramatically reduced attention to the Ukraine crisis over the period. The BBC and 
Mail Online used minimally the economic consequences frame monopolising the 
narration of the fact that Russian economy appeared to fall and the negative effect 
that would occur if the economic sanctions on Russia are not continued. The 
Guardian tended to provide multiple perspectives while using the economic 
consequences frame. These consisted of the positive and the negative impacts on 
both EU countries and Russia caused by the economic sanctions. For example, The 
Guardian used the frame showing how the sanctions have impacted the German 
economy in one article titled ‘German economic morale falls’, quoting the polling 
firm GfK from Germany:  
 
Referring to the situation in Ukraine and the effect of EU sanctions 
against Russia, GfK added: “Given that no long-term solutions appear to be 
on the cards yet for any of the crises, uncertainty is rising in the population 
on the potential consequences for the German economy. In particular, the 
sanctions against Russia, which are already significantly impacting exports, 




Table 6. 14: Distribution of Generic frames by the British media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
(4th period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Conflict 168 (45%) 45 (30%) 118 (40%) 331 (41%) 
Responsibility 139 (37%) 60 (40%) 125 (43%) 324 (40%) 
Human interest   58 (16%) 18 (12%)   35 (12%) 111 (14%) 
Economic consequences     7 (2%) 22 (15%)     2 (1%) 31 (4%) 
Nationalisation     0   0   10 (3.4%) 10 (1%) 
Morality     0   4 (3%)     4 (1.3%)  8 (1%) 




Figure 6. 14. 1 
 
There was also a tendency of increasing the use of the responsibility frame by 
the British media during the final period. As Table 6.14 clearly indicates, the 
increased use of the responsibility frame (324 in total) was almost the same as the 







Dynamics of the Generic frames
4th period 3rd period 2nd period 1st period
218 
 
conflict frame – 331 articles. There was an observable rise in the number of articles 
using the frame from The Guardian by 17 percentage points. Out of 60 occurrences, 
the newspaper published 25 articles (42%) blaming Russia for destabilising the 
Eastern region. Nine items (15%) accused the pro-Russian rebels of shooting down 
flight MH17 and shelling the areas of the Eastern region. The media implied that 
Russia could make peace in its 6 articles (10%). Two articles (3%) laid the blame 
directly on the West in terms of their economic sanctions on Russia and the political 
meddling in Ukraine. Likewise, the BBC used the frame blaming Russia in 67 out of 
139 items (48%), and accusing Russian-backed separatists of shooting down MH17 
and shelling in 15 items (11%). The BBC used 25 times the responsibility frame 
(18%) to express that Russia could alleviate the chaos in Ukraine.  
The use of the responsibility frame by Mail Online slightly differed, with the 
media extensively focusing on blaming Russia in 71 out of 125 articles (57%). 22 
articles (18%) were concentrated on accusations against Russian-backed separatists, 
while 13 articles (10%) pointed out that Russia had the ability to improve the 
deteriorating situation in Ukraine. In responding to Putin’s denial of involvement in 
the catastrophe, Mail Online implied Russia’s responsibility for the MH17 tragedy 
by reminding the readers of the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 ‘by a 
Russian fighter in 1983 [...] Initially the Soviet Union denied the responsibility’ 
(Mail Online, 18 July 2014). Overall, the British media showed a high interest in the 
blame game towards Russia, the Russia-backed separatists, and especially President 
Putin. For instance, the BBC highlighted Putin’s ambitions and military threat 
towards Ukraine in an article titled: ‘Russia “to alter military strategy towards Nato”’ 
(2 September 2014). After having described the presence of Russian troops in 
Ukraine, the BBC quoted Putin as saying: ‘If I want to, I can take Kiev in two 
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weeks’. Mail Online too quoted the words in an article titled: ‘” If I want to I can 
take Kiev in a fortnight”: Putin’s threat to Europe revealed by EU boss as Ukraine 
loses control of key airport’ (Mail Online, 1 September 2014). This salient indicator 
was also shared by The Guardian in an article titled with ‘Nato summit: EU leaders' 
meeting: Don't appease Putin like we did Hitler in 1938, warns Cameron’. The 
newspaper continued: ‘Nato says there are at least 1,000 Russian forces on the wrong 
side of the border. The Ukrainians put the figure at 1,600. “The problem is not this, 
but that if I want I'll take Kiev in two weeks,” Putin said, according to La 
Repubblica’ (The Guardian, 3 September 2014).  
The overall use of the human-interest frame that came third in the British 
media also enjoyed an increase as compared to the previous time period. Out of the 
total of 111 human-interest framed stories, the BBC used the frame 58 times (52%). 
The BBC focused on suffering refugees and victims from severely hit areas in 
Eastern Ukraine in 17 articles (29%). 11 articles (19%) described the rebels as 
mistreating the MH17 crush site, and as being led by Russian leaders.  
Following the conflict, responsibility, human-interest, and economic 
consequences frames, the British media used the nationalisation and morality frames 
in 10 and 8 articles respectively. The tabloid-style Mail Online used the 
nationalisation frame the most. But the morality frame was not of significant interest 
to the British media with The Guardian and Mail Online contributing each 4 news 
items. The two media outlets used the frame critiquing the lies from Kremlin 
propaganda and again likening Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler. For example, The 
Guardian in one article with a title using the Prime Minister David Cameron’s appeal 




[T]he prime minister told an EU summit that Putin had to be 
stopped from seizing all of Ukraine […] Cameron likened the west's 
dilemma with Putin to the infamous conduct of the British prime minister, 
Neville Chamberlain, with Hitler in Munich in 1938, when Anglo-French 
appeasement encouraged the Nazi leader to invade Poland the following 
year, sparking world war […] The European commission president […] told 
the summit that Putin had told him his forces, if ordered to do so, could 
conquer Kiev in a fortnight (The Guardian, 3 September 2014). 
 
 
Table 6. 15: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by the British media: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Global dimensions 119 (47%) 83 (82%) 126 (64%) 328 (60%) 
Particular triggers  158 (63%) 45 (45%)   99 (51%) 302 (55%) 
Human rights violations     8 (3%)   3 (3%)   13 (7%)   97 (18%) 
Political causes   15 (6%)   4 (4%)     3 (2%)   88 (16%) 
Socio-economic      3 (1%)   5 (5%)     0   38 (7%) 
Religious prescriptions     0   0     0     0 
Total 252 (68%)     101 (68%) 196 (67%) 549 (67%) 
 
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
The British media during the final period paid significant attention to the 
Ukraine conflict with a total of 815 articles, and provided 67% of the space to 
diagnosis. Among the 549 occurrences of the prognostic frame offered by the British 
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media, the global dimensions (328 articles) frame came on top, followed by the 
particular triggers (302 articles) frame (Table 6.15).  
 
 
Figure 6. 15. 1 
 
What the British media mostly articulated by using the global dimensions 
frame was Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in the battles next door. For 
example, the table below (Table 6.15.1) shows that The Guardian with its 83 
occurrences of the diagnosis, distributed 58 of them (70%) to explain the root of 
unceasing conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine by highlighting the fact that rebels 
received weapons from Russia. 21 articles (25%) from the press specifically pointed 
out Russia’s mentality of building and revitalising an empire. The power struggle 
between the West and the East as a main reason behind the Ukraine crisis was 
suggested in 3 articles (4%), while the notion of NATO’s expansionism was 
mentioned in 2 items (2%). Following the pattern from The Guardian, the BBC and 
Mail Online offered similar explanations with a major part revealing Russia’s 
geopolitical interests in the region. What was different was that in spite of the 
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insignificant reference to the battle between the West and East, the BBC and Mail 
Online did not interpret the NATO’s expansionism as a direct diagnosis.  
 
Table 6. 15. 1: Use of the global dimensions frame by the BBC: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th 
period) 
Global dimensions Percentage (out of 83 items) 
Inflow of weapons from Russia 70% 
Russia’s ambition  25% 
West vs. East 4% 
NATO’s expansionism 2% 
 
 
The second diagnosis the British media tended to use was the particular 
triggers frame. The BBC in particular used the frame (158 items) in 63% of its 
coverage, contributing the greatest quantity to the whole of 302 items. The media 
manifested this diagnosis in 67 out of 158 items (42%) by noting that the fighting 
between pro-Russian separatists and Kyiv forces worsened the Ukraine conflict. 
Another 64 articles (41%) specified that the fighting between the two sides with the 
rebels starting the attacks and the shelling led to the aggravated crisis. Eight articles 
(5%) suggested the Ukrainian forces initiated attacks. In the same vein (Table 
6.15.2), Mail Online suggested the fighting between parties as the cause without 
specifically pointing out which side started it, in 39 out of its 99 items (39%). A 
smaller number of 26 items (26%) identified the role of rebels in leading to violence 
and shelling as the specific reason for the unending conflict. Eight articles (8%) from 
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Mail Online gave details on the shelling in South-Eastern Ukraine, as the Ukrainian 
forces attempted to retake some of the cities there.  
 
Table 6. 15. 2: Use of the particular triggers frame by Mail Online: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
(4th period) 
Particular triggers Percentage (out of 99 items) 
Fighting between rebels and Kiev 39% 
Violence from rebels  26% 
Shelling from Kiev 8% 
 
 
The Guardian highlighted the fighting without identifying the initiators, 
whilst offering more space to pointing at the new Kyiv’s shelling than to the rebel-
led violence. Additionally, The Guardian argued that rebels shot down the flight 
MH17 in 14 articles, and that Russia caused the tragedy in 6 articles. Generally, the 
British media put forward the idea that the violence between the two sides escalated 
the Ukraine conflict.  
After the particular triggers frame, the British media tended to use the human 
rights violation and political causes frames. First, Mail Online and the BBC together 
published 21 out of 24 articles to describe Russia’s involvement and so-called 
humanitarian convoy as an invasion that broke international law. A smaller number 
of articles suggested that rebels conducted crimes as they shot down the MH17. 
Second, the BBC and The Guardian published 19 out of 22 items that used the 
political causes frame to explain the on-going Ukraine conflict. The BBC in 
particular stressed Yanukovych’s corruption and his one-sided ending of the EU deal 
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in 15 articles. The Guardian used little of the frame, but mainly pointing out 
Yanukovych’s corruption, and discussing such facts as corruption in current 
government, US backed coup, and communist party members being abused by 
Poroshenko’s administration. The Guardian’s characteristic of offering various 
views, was also evident in its use of the socio-economic causes frame, where the 
newspaper talked about Ukraine’s gas debt, its falling economy, Putin’s 
‘humanitarian’ convoy to Eastern Ukraine, as well as Russia’s cutting off of gas 
supply to Ukraine. None of the media from the UK engaged with the religious 
prescriptions diagnosis during the final period.  
The use of the prognostic frames by the British media over the final period 
remained exactly the same as during the third period, with 72 out of 815 (9%) items 
selected for analysis. In Table 6.16, the financial intervention prognosis continued to 
be the first choice in relation to the Ukraine conflict, recommended by the British 
media, with a total number of 45 items.  
 
Table 6. 16: Distribution of Prognostic frames by the British media: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
 BBC The Guardian Mail Online Total 
Financial intervention   15 (56%) 12 (75%) 18 (62%) 45 (63%) 
Military action  6 (23%)   4 (29%) 12 (41%) 22 (31%) 
Dismantling weapons  9 (33%)   0   3 (10%) 12 (17%) 
Internal reforms    3 (11%)   2 (13%)   0 5 (7%) 
External co-operation  2 (7%)   0   0 2 (3%) 
Change in government  0   0   0   0 




Figure 6. 16. 1 
 
Specifically, The Guardian contributed 10 items (83%) to the solution 
(financial intervention) by suggesting economic sanctions on Russia (Table 6.16.1), 
followed by 3 occurrences (25%) of calling for help for Ukraine’s economy, and 2 
items (17%) of supporting the EU to cut the import of Russia’s gas.  
 
 
Table 6. 16. 1: Use of the financial intervention frame by The Guardian: 18.07.2014 – 
28.02.2015 (4th period) 
Financial intervention Percentage (out of 12 items) 
Economic sanction on Russia 83% 
Assistance to Ukrainian economy  25% 
Termination to Russia’s gas 17% 
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The focus on economic sanctions on Russia was also what the BBC mostly 
suggested, in 11 out of 15 articles (73%), whist the other 4 articles (27%) suggested 
the need to help Ukraine’s economy. Mail Online held the same opinion by 
promoting EU sanctions on Russia, in 14 out of 18 occurrences (78%). Apart from 
appealing for economic aid to Ukraine from IMF in 1 item (6%), Mail Online also 
issued 2 articles (11%) being supportive of further investing in NATO in order to 
confront Russia. For example, Mail Online covered NATO’s summit where the 
world leaders prepared to tell Russia to retreat from Ukraine’s borders, quoting the 
then UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon:  
 
“It’s time now to toughen up so that Nato can deal with the 
aggression and the threats that we face […] It means the first ever public 
commitment to increase defence spending. That will demonstrate to all those 
who threaten us that the state of our transatlantic bond is strong”. His 
comments reflected Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond” (Mail Online, 3 
September 2014).  
 
The military action was second frequently recommended solution by the 
British media over the third and fourth time periods. All the British media without 
exception highly recommended the idea that NATO should combat directly with 
Russia to assist Ukraine. This was evident in 19 out of 22 articles. The remaining 3 
articles (from the BBC and Mail Online) rejected the solution of military action.  
The third commonly suggested solution by the British media was dismantling 
weapons. What the media implied was firstly a removal of heavy weaponries by both 
sides; secondly a call for Russia to stop supplying weapons to rebels. The internal 
reforms was the next solution the British media preferred (the BBC and The 
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Guardian in particular); although they expressed the solution in different terms. For 
instance, the BBC used the term of ‘decentralisation’ (9 February 2015), while The 
Guardian articulated it as ‘federal autonomy’ (4 September 2014). Finally, the 
external co-operation was mentioned two times by the BBC, suggesting to co-operate 
with Russia, and to form a global monitoring group.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the performance of the British media outlets in 
terms of their news coverage of the Ukraine crisis between 30 November 2013 and 
28 February 2015. The second research question that scrutinises the attention paid to 
the Ukraine crisis was answered, which disclosed a gradually reduced focus for each 
time period. Generally speaking, what the British media tended to emphasise was 
human-focused reporting. This resonated with the media’s featured engagements 
with the blame game (responsibility generic frame) and human-interest generic 
frames, alongside their preferences for the diagnostic frames in terms of global 
dimensions and particular triggers. During the first period, particular triggers 
signified Yanukovych’s crackdowns on his people at the Maidan. This led to the 
recommendation (prognostic frame) for change in government through broad focus 
on the direct quotes from politicians and the protests’ voice to topple the 
Yanukovych regime and have a snap election. During the subsequent three periods, 
the majority of the coverage pointed fingers directly at Russia due to its involvement 
in the crisis. As a result, the financial intervention (prognostic frame) – economic 
sanctions on Russia – was largely recommended as a solution to the Ukraine conflict. 
The British media barely used religions and nationalisation frames to explain the root 
of the Ukraine crisis. As explained in Chapter five, religion was not the dividing 
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factor. The rare usage of nationalisation frame could be explained by the fact that the 
UK was not militarily involved in the crisis. So far the press attention and the frames 
used by the British media outlets have been identified thus answering the research 
questions 2 and 3. The focus next moves to the qualitative comparison between the 









As Entman (1990) has previously suggested ‘genuine empirical accuracy 
demands going beyond the numbers to qualitative data and informed speculation’ (p. 
viii). This chapter aims to compare the findings about the media coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis in Russia and the UK as outlined in Chapter five and Chapter six. The 
analysis is based on a comparative approach combining the quantitative findings, the 
qualitative elements and an overall in-depth qualitative analysis.  
To answer the proposed questions about the differences between the news 
framing of the Ukraine crisis from hybrid and liberal regimes, and to assess the 
extent to which their news coverage of the Ukraine crisis reflected or refuted the 
media systems models, the chapter focuses on a comparison between the two 
countries’ media coverage of the crisis. It brings together the data from all studied 
Russian and British media, thus making it possible to answer the fourth research 
question about the differences between the Russian and British media characterising 
the narrative of the Ukraine crisis. The analysis follows the structure of the previous 
two chapters highlighting firstly the press attention and secondly the use of generic, 




7.2 Press Attention 
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014.  
As the findings in Chapters five and six suggest at the early stage of the 
Ukraine crisis, between 30 November 2013 and 26 February 2014 (Table 7.1), the 
British media offered less attention to the Ukraine crisis than the Russian media. 
However, the second measure used – that of mean length – showed more interest in 
the British media compared to the Russian with 729 words on average per news item. 
Mail Online tended to publish longer articles than the other media outlets under 
examination in this study, especially its counterpart – Pravda.ru. Both the BBC and 
The Guardian showed less interest compared to their analogues in the Russian media 
– RT and The Moscow Times. Firstly, the BBC issued 110 pieces focusing on 
freedom and democracy while its Russian counterpart RT published 128 articles 
distancing Russia from the conflict. Secondly, The Guardian like its analogue The 
Moscow Times, offered less attention to the Ukraine conflict with 78 articles and an 
average of 684 words. 
 
Table 7. 1: Press attention by media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 
 Quantity                         Mean Length 
BBC 110                                 623 
The Guardian   78                                 684 
Mail Online   55                              1,004 
UK 243 (44%)                      729   
RT 128                                 741 
The Moscow Time 117                                  702 
Pravda.ru   67                                  491 
Russia 312 (56%)                       673 





2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014.  
During the second time period (22 days), the British media decreased the 
quantity of news coverage of the Ukraine crisis to 236 pieces, while the Russian 
media intensified their coverage on the topic to 401 pieces (Table 7.2). Despite the 
reduction, the British media provided an average of 11 reports per day and a longer 
mean length of 908 words compared to the Russian media. The latter offered 18 
pieces per day on average with a mean length of 679 words. This time all the three 
British media outlets offered more extended coverage than their Russian 
counterparts.  
 
Table 7. 2: Press attention by media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 
 Quantity                            Mean Length 
BBC   82                                             757 
The Guardian   85                                             751 
Mail Online   69   1,281 
UK   236 (37%)                                  908 
RT  146                                            747 
The Moscow Time  155                                            685 
Pravda.ru  100                                            572 
Russia     401 (63%)                                 679 
Total  637                                             
 
 
Putin’s speech on the 19th of March 2014 on Crimea’s returning home was 
covered extensively by both the RT (5,259 words) and the BBC (6,535 words), the 
latter containing critical annotations by the BBC diplomatic correspondent Bridget 
Kendall. The comparison between RT and the BBC here was quite revealing. While 
the former frequently linked the case of 1999 Kosovo crisis to the legitimacy of 
Crimea’s reunification, the latter held completely different views on the two cases. 
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This will be further explained in more detail in the later section focusing on the 
results of the framing analysis.  
 
 
3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014.  
As Table 7.3 below displays, the British media produced 31% of the whole 
coverage, whereas the Russian media published more than two times that – 69%. The 
British media labelled what had been going on in South-Eastern Ukraine in similar 
terms: firm belief in Putin’s military and financial backing for pro-Russian 
separatists on the ground. In contrast, the Russian media’s attitudes remained 
different, disentangling Russia from the violence in Eastern Ukraine whilst claiming 
to resettle the refugees from severely hit areas in that part of the country due to the 
new Kyiv’s ongoing Anti-Terrorism Operations.  
 
Table 7. 3: Press attention by media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 
 Quantity                             Mean Length 
BBC  264                                            615 
The Guardian  166                                            726 
Mail Online  186      915 
UK  616 (31%)                                 735 
RT  543                                            588 
The Moscow Time  560                                            652 
Pravda.ru  302                                            536 
Russia             1,405 (69%)                                 602 
Total              2,021                                            
 
 
4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015.  
The British media’s attention paid to the Ukraine crisis during the final time 
period reached 815 out of 2,319 articles (35%), with the Russian media responsible 
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for the remaining 65% of the total coverage (Table 7.4). Quite similar to The 
Moscow Times was the noticeable reduction in coverage attention on the subject in 
The Guardian – the Ukraine crisis only appeared in 149 articles, as the topic 
completely faded away from the news agenda in October 2014.  
 
Table 7. 4: Press attention by media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 
 Quantity                          Mean Length 
BBC  372                                          631 
The Guardian  149                                          703   
Mail Online  294 1,038 
UK  815 (35%)                               791 
RT  583                                          614 
The Moscow Time  493                                          677 
Pravda.ru  428                                          561 
Russia 1,504 (65%)                                619  
Total 2,319                                            
 
 
In comparison with the examined Russian media, the overall narrowed 
interest in the subject shown by the British media was predominantly attributed to the 
disappearance of the story from The Guardian; although the newspaper dedicated 
most of its coverage to condemning Putin for his direct involvement in Ukraine thus 
causing the subsequent catastrophe (e.g., The Guardian, 1 September 2014). 
Meanwhile its Russian counterpart The Moscow Times discussed various 
perspectives regarding the ongoing conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine (e.g., 18 
February 2015). While RT devoted a lot of attention to the Anti-Terrorism 
Operations carried out by new Kyiv using chemical weapons (e.g., 9 February 2015), 
the BBC hardly regarded this as an important issue but continued to accuse pro-
Russian rebels of exacerbating the conflict and Russia for its involvement (e.g., 5 
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February 2015). The final observable comparison is that while Pravda.ru tended to 
have the least and the shortest articles among the studied Russian media, among the 
British media the Mail Online also devoted relatively less attention but had the 
lengthiest articles. Table 7.5 summarises the number of articles from each media 
outlet over the four periods.  
 
Table 7. 5: Number of articles from media outlets for each time-period 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
BBC 110 82 264 372 
The Guardian 78 85 166 149 
Mail Online 55 69 186 294 
UK 243 (44%) 236 (37%) 616 (31%) 815 (35%) 
RT 128 146 543 583 
The Moscow Time 117 155 560 493 
Pravda.ru 67 100 302 428 
Russia 312 (56%) 401 (63%) 1,405 (69%) 1,504 (65%) 
Total 555 637 2,021 2,319 
 
 
Generally, what this study uncovered is that the Russian media outlets 
dedicated more attention in terms of quantity to the Ukraine crisis, most likely 
reflecting the geopolitical interest of the Russian government. Although tabloid-style 
Pravda.ru published the shortest articles compared especially with Mail Online that 
offered the lengthiest ones, the former provided more stories on the topic than the 
latter. Furthermore, the Russian media published longer stories only during the first 
time period, especially RT and The Moscow Times. This could be explained by the 
fact that the Russian media framed the Ukraine crisis from various perspectives. For 
example, during the first period while The Moscow Times and Pravda.ru explained 
the roots of the Ukraine crisis through a socio-economic lens in their 9 articles in 
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total, the British media mentioned this only once by the BBC. This will be explained 
and discussed further in the next section where the use of frames is the main focus. 
The British media tended to offer longer articles from the second to the final time 
period. This can be connected to the fact that overall the British media devoted more 
attention to the roots of and the solutions to the Ukraine crisis than the Russian 
media. Next, the focus shifts to a qualitative and analytical comparison between the 
Russian and the British media in relation to their uses of generic, diagnostic and 
prognostic frames. 
 
7.3 Framing the Ukraine Crisis  
1st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014.  
Generic news frames. 
Table 7.6 shows the overall picture relating to the use of generic frames by 
the Russian and British media outlets during the first time period. All the media 
outlets from both countries tended to describe the Ukraine conflict through the lens 
of conflict (47% of coverage), 24% of the overall coverage used the responsibility 
frame, while the economic consequences frame was evident in 11% of the articles. 
This was followed by a marginally smaller use of the human-interest frame (10%), 
whereas the morality and nationalisation frames stood at 5% and 3% respectively. 
Importantly, the BBC was the media that used the conflict frame the most, among all 






Table 7. 6: Distribution of Generic frames by media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 (1st period) 
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Figure 7. 6. 1 
 
The differences between the two countries’ media revealed first a noteworthy 
gap between the uses of the human-interest frame. The British media favoured it – it 










Morality Human interest Nationalisation
Distribution of Generic frames by the Russian and British 
media : 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014
Russian media British media
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morality frames which, on the contrary, were the preferred ones by the Russian 
media. For example, one notices that The Moscow Times during this period 
employed more economic frames, in 21 out of 117 articles (18% of the total) 
highlighting the positive and negative sides of each offer from the EU and Russia, 
compared to The Guardian with only 3 articles representing 4% of the total of 78 
articles. The same pattern is true for the BBC and RT, and Mail Online and 
Pravda.ru.  
There were no statistically significant differences between the two countries’ 
media outlets in their uses of the conflict frame. The British media devoted slightly 
more coverage with 132 occurrences compared to the Russia media – 129 items. The 
second most commonly used frame was the responsibility frame. The frame was 
evident in 58 and 75 articles in the British and Russian media respectively. It is 
worth noting that while the self-claimed independent media – RT (30%) used more of 
the frame than The Moscow Times (21%) and Pravda.ru (18%); among the British 
media the centre-left press – The Guardian dedicated more space (26%) to the frame 
than the BBC (24%) and Mail Online (22%).  
The third overall most frequently used generic frame – the human-interest 
frame – was more pronounced in the British media with 36 out of 56 articles using it, 
compared to the Russian media where it was present only in 20 articles. Compared to 
Mail Online (18%), the tabloid-style Pravda.ru used the frame only in 5% of its 
coverage. Apart from the economic consequences frame, the morality and 
nationalisation frames were both also favoured by the Russian media, whereas the 




Two observations are worth highlighting here. First, RT was the media that 
used the morality frame the most, while its British counterpart the BBC did not use 
the frame at all. Second, Pravda.ru – as highlighted in Chapter six – was 
characterised by its tendency to use the nationalisation frame, whereas Mail Online 
during this period showed zero interest in the frame.  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
Despite the fact that the Russian media generally paid more attention to the 
Ukraine conflict compared to the British media during the first period, the latter 
offered slightly more diagnostic frames explaining why and how the crisis occurred 
and developed. A total number of 186 diagnostic frames were identified amounting 
to 77% of the whole of 243 articles from the British media, compared to the Russian 
media offering diagnosis in 71% of its coverage. 
 
Table 7. 7: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 (1st period) 
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Figure 7. 7. 1 
 
 
Similar to the Russian media, the British media expressed a great interest in 
explaining the Ukraine crisis through global dimensions (Figure 7.7.1). However, the 
two held different views. While the British media highlighted the positive role of the 
West (the EU and the US) in helping Ukraine; the Russian media saw the West 
(especially the US) as an aggressor. As exemplified in Chapter five and Chapter six, 
the leaked conversation between the U.S. Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland and 
the US ambassador to Ukraine – Geoffrey Pyatt was covered by the BBC and Mail 
Online on 7 February 2014, highlighting the West’s constructive role in trying to find 
and negotiate a solution to the Ukraine crisis. The Guardian did not report this issue 
until 25 February 2014 mentioning the leaked call in only few words. The Russian 
media, on the other hand, expressed strong discontent with the West. RT reported the 
issue first on 6 February 2014 believing that the leaked phone conversation had 
further proved Washington’s meddling in Ukraine. Pravda.ru covered the issue on 8 
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denying Russia’s involvement. Similar to The Guardian, The Moscow Times only 
covered the issue several days later (13 February 2014), but sending an overall 
message of a Cold War between the U.S. and Russia. 
The second diagnostic frame the British media tended to use was the 
particular triggers frame. This frame was the third favoured one among the Russian 
media. The British media used this frame (as the second favoured one) to specifically 
stress the importance of Yanukovych’s crackdown on the protesters at Maidan (e.g., 
BBC, 3 December 2013). This view was also reflected by The Moscow Times (13 
February 2014), while RT (24 February 2014) and Pravda.ru (2 December 2013) 
used the frame to indicate that the protesters, the radical groups, and the interim 
government’s attacks had led to the chaotic developments in Kyiv.  
The BBC (11 December 2013), The Guardian (12 December 2013), and Mail 
Online (31 January 2014) all used the political causes frame to express the opinion 
that the Yanukovych regime’s corruption and abuse of power had caused the Ukraine 
crisis. The Russian media outlets, in contrast, used this diagnostic frame to suggest 
that this was an internal/domestic issue. This included discussing the protest in Kyiv 
(RT, 24 February 2014), the power struggles between political parties (Pravda.ru, 2 
December 2013), and Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the country’s EU Association 
Agreement (The Moscow Times, 17 February 2014). The least referred among the 
diagnoses in the British media were the socio-economic causes discussed only once 
by the BBC (3 December 2013). In comparison, the Russian media had 9 occurrences 
coming from The Moscow Times (8 times) and Pravda.ru (once, 12 December 2013).  
Table 7.8 and Figure 7.8.1 show the use of prognostic frames by the Russian 
and the British media. While the Russian media offered only 32 prognoses out of its 
312 articles (10%), focusing primarily on external co-operation; the British media in 
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addition to providing larger sets of diagnoses, delivered 85 prognoses out of 243 
articles (35%). The British media suggested the change in government solution (44 
articles) more often than the Russian media (5 articles). 
The second most recommended prognosis was internal reforms. Both the 
Russian and the British media suggested the frame as their second favoured solution 
to the Ukraine conflict. The Russian media suggested the internal reforms as an ideal 
solution to the crisis, which was coherent to their uses of the political causes frame 
(diagnosis) that indicated the Ukraine crisis as domestic/internal issues. In contrast, 
the British media articulated the same prognosis as a solution to what they previously 
considered the Yanukovych administration’s notorious issues such as the lack of 
freedom, democracy, abuse of power, and persistent corruption. The external co-
operation was identified as the most favoured solution by the Russian media, but as 
the least preferred solution from the British media coming only from The Guardian 
and the BBC. 
 
Table 7. 8: Distribution of Prognostic frames by media: 30.11.2013 – 26.02.2014 (1st period) 
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Figure 7. 8. 1 
 
 
2nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. 
Generic news frames. 
The general breakdown of the use of generic frames by the British and the 
Russian media in the second time period: 27 February – 20 March 2014, is shown in 
Table 7.9 below. The conflict frame was the most popular out of all the generic 
frames used by the British media. This went in line with the Russian media offering 
extensive descriptions of the Ukraine crisis through the conflict lens. However, there 
was a visible decline in the frame in the The Guardian’s coverage – from 51% to 
34% as compared to the first period. Interestingly, the tendency also applied to its 
Russian comparable counterpart – The Moscow Times.  
Unlike the conflict frame, the use of the responsibility frame enjoyed an 
overall increase in the British media outlets – from 24% to 30%. This was different 
from the Russian media. Initially, RT was the only media that increased marginally 
the use of the responsibility frame from 30% to 31%, while The Moscow Times and 
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(2 March 2014) and Pravda.ru (27 February 2014) in particular – laid blame on the 
West and new Kyiv, the British media used the responsibility frame to suggest that 
Russia should be responsible for the crisis. This was mostly evident in the BBC (17 
March 2014) and Mail Online (1 March 2014). 
 
Table 7. 9: Distribution of Generic frames by media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd period) 
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The Russian media preferred the morality frame over the human-interest 
frame, criticising the manipulative political power of the West, and the deliberate 
propaganda and misinformation from the Western mainstream media (Pravda.ru, 2 
March 2014). In contrast, the British media firstly used the morality frame less but 
accentuating the immoral Russia (Mail Online, 20 March 2014). They secondly 
described Putin as a threat and neo-imperialist who made a wrong parallel between 
Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and Crimea’s annexation by Russia. Russia’s claim 
of the new Kyiv as fascists was part of the Kremlin propaganda (The Guardian, 19 
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March 2014). The human-interest frame came third among the British media, 
highlighting the fears among minority ethnic – Tatars and other ex-Soviet states after 
Russia’s takeover of the Crimea (BBC, 19 March 2014). An ‘invasion’ was also 
frequently used by the British media to question the legitimacy of the Crimean 
secession. Russia was blamed for breaking the international law. The Russian media 
used the economic consequences frame as its third favoured generic frame, 
highlighting one ‘good’ and one ‘bad’ alternative (RT, 5 March 2014). After the 
West had imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on Russia, the Russian 
media subtly reduced the promotion of Putin’s deal and turned to describe the 




Figure 7. 9. 1 
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
The British media during the second period were similar to the Russian media 
in providing fewer diagnostic frames than during the first period. But some 
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140 out of 236 articles (59% of coverage), which was more than the Russian media 
with 39%. Table 7.10 illustrates the second commonality between the two countries’ 
media in terms of engaging with the Ukraine crisis via the global dimensions frame. 
 
Table 7. 10: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd period) 
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RT (28 February 2014) and Pravda.ru (27 February 2014) used the global 
dimensions frame mainly to refer to the NATO’s expansionism. In comparison, the 
BBC (28 February 2014) and Mail Online (7 March 2014) believed that the Russian 
military movements at the Western border and in Crimea reflected Putin’s regional 
ambitions and had caused the Ukraine conflict. More importantly, a distinguishably 
conflicting assessments between RT and the BBC were uncovered in relation to the 
parallels drawn between the events in Crimea and the Kosovo crisis. As exemplified 
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in Chapter five, RT (14 March 2014) accused NATO of creating an artificial crisis in 
Kosovo as a pretext for the intervention. The BBC (7 March 2014), on the other 
hand, disapproved of the comparison between Crimea’s secession and Kosovo’s, as 
the latter was based upon a humanitarian dimension. 
The third shared characteristic identified between the Russian and the British 
media was the shift in the human rights violations frame. RT (27 March 2014) used 
the frame to highlight new Kyiv revoking Russian language which caused fears 
among minorities in Eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, the BBC (3 March 2014) and 
The Guardian (15 March 2014) used this diagnostic frame to label Putin as violating 
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Table 7. 11: Distribution of Prognostic frames by media: 27.02. – 20.03.2014 (2nd period) 
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Figure 7. 11. 1 
 
The overall use of the prognostic frames by the British media was still higher 
than that of the Russian media. The financial intervention came on top used mainly 
by the British media to suggest financial sanctions on Russia (Table 7.11). Especially 
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counterpart Pravda.ru did not mention this at all. The Russian media preferred the 
military action frame, while the British media used the frame in 4 articles only from 
the BBC. Among the 4 articles, 2 (50%) suggested the US to send troops to fight with 
the Russian militaries in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The other 2 articles (50%) 
resisted any military action arguing that it would only exacerbate the Ukraine 
conflict. This was similar to RT which suggested that Russia could send troops to 
start a military battle with Ukrainian armies in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. 
Unlike the Russian media, none of the internal reforms, change in government, and 
dismantling of weapons frames were brought up by the British media. 
 
3rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014. 
Generic news frames. 
During the third period, the overall use of generic frames by the British media 
did not change with the conflict frame coming first, which was in line with the 
Russian media (Table 7.12). This period manifested a common trait for all of the six 
media outlets where they experienced a sharp increase in the conflict frame. The 
responsibility frame came second among the generic frames from all the studied 
media outlets. However, there was a decline in the overall use of the frame by the 
British media, while the Russian media remained unchanged. The Russian media (RT 
and Pravda.ru in particular) used the frame to predominately blame the West and the 
US. This however was a marginal view in the British media, with The Guardian and 
Mail Online blaming the West and the US in only 6 articles. The Moscow Times 
tended to be critical of Russia, which was in line with the British media.  
The human-interest frame enjoyed a clear overall growth from both 
countries’ media during the third period. The British media used this frame to firstly 
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emphasise the sufferings of Eastern Ukraine due to Putin’s intervention (BBC, 4 May 
2014), secondly to give a voice to various groups of people (The Guardian, 7 July 
2014). In comparison, the Russian media (RT and Pravda.ru in particular) 
highlighted the victims in Eastern Ukraine due to the new Kyiv government 
launching Anti-Terrorism Operations (RT, 16 July 2014). The use of the term 
‘nationalist’ by the Russian media, highlighted the existence of a far-right party in 
the newly formed government under Petro Poroshenko (RT, 22 March 2014). The 
constant deleterious depiction of the new Kyiv by the Russian media such as 
Pravda.ru (7 July 2014) allowed a coherent moral sensibility via focused reports of 
refugees fleeing from the conflict zone in Ukraine such as Donetsk.  
 
Table 7. 12: Distribution of Generic frames by media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
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Figure 7. 12. 1 
 
The economic consequences frame was the fourth commonly used generic 
frame by both countries’ media outlets. In the UK, the BBC and The Guardian 
contributed the majority to the economic frame, talking about the economic sanctions 
by the Western bodies, as well as the impact mainly on Russia (The Guardian, 1 May 
2014). This was especially different from the RT which tended to positively describe 
Russian economy while portraying Ukrainian economy as being worsened largely 
due to the conditional financial aid from the West (28 March 2014).  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
Despite the simultaneous increase in using diagnostic frames by both media, 
the overall focus remained greater in the case of the British media. The most 
favoured diagnostic frame used by the media from Russia, the particular triggers 
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Table 7. 13: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
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First, the particular triggers frame was used by the British media mainly 
referring to the violence taking place in Eastern Ukraine between the new Kyiv and 
separatists. However, what the Russian media (mainly RT and Pravda.ru) generally 
articulated was the Anti-Terrorism Operations carried out by the Ukrainian military 
from new Kyiv, which were seen as the reason for the continuing conflict. The 
British media, on the other hand, hardly regarded this as the reason. For instance, this 
was only mentioned in a small number of 14 framed stories out of 86 items from the 
BBC. In fact, the Western media mainly saw separatists as stirring the region thus 
escalating the tension in Ukraine. The Anti-Terrorism Operations were considered as 
part of the efforts to calm down and de-escalate the tension caused by pro-Russian 
rebels (e.g., Mail Online, 4 June 2014). Second, The Guardian differed slightly from 
the other two British media. The newspaper spoke of the fact that the Anti-Terrorism 
Operations launched by new Kyiv against the pro-Russian protestors were the main 
reason for the exacerbation of the conflict in Ukraine, in 25 out of its 45 items (56%). 
This explanation was applied by the newspaper over the one (16 items) suggested 
essentially by the BBC and Mail Online – the unrest in Eastern Ukraine. This pattern 
was identical to the Russian media, where the centre-left leaning press – The Moscow 
Times described the roots of the Ukraine conflict differently from the other two 
media outlets – RT and Pravda.ru. 
The global dimensions frame was the second commonly used diagnosis. 
Overall, for the most part the British media continued holding opposite views on the 
root of the Ukraine conflict from the Russian media. Russian media used more of the 
human rights violations frame highlighting the new Kyiv revoking Russian language 
and attacking its own people (RT, 30 March 2014). The political causes frame was 
used less in the Russian media pointing out the political coup by current government 
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imposed by the US (Pravda.ru, 24 March 2014). On the other hand, the BBC in 
particular used the political causes frame 9 times (out of 11) suggesting that the on-
going conflict in Ukraine was initially caused by Yanukovych who decided to 
terminate the political and economic package with the EU (24 March 2014). The 
human rights violations diagnosis was mostly used by the BBC (25 March 2014) and 
Mail Online (5 Jun 2014) which accused Russia of breaking international law by 
annexing Crimea, thus intensifying the whole situation in Ukraine.  
 
Table 7. 14: Distribution of Prognostic frames by media: 21.03. – 17.07.2014 (3rd period) 
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Compared with the previous period, both the Russian and the British media 
reduced the use of prognostic frames. While the former suggested solutions in 6% of 
the whole sample, the latter provided 9%, with 53 out of 616 articles. As Table 7.14 
shows, overall the financial intervention prognosis came second, with the BBC and 
254 
 
Mail Online using the frame the most. What the three British media commonly 
suggested was to continue the economic sanctions on Russia because of the country’s 
destructive involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This solution was the 
fourth favoured prognosis by the Russian media, predominantly suggested by The 
Moscow Times thus aligning with the British media. What the Russian media mostly 
articulated was the internal reforms referring specifically to constitutional reforms. 
The internal reforms prognosis came fourth in the British media.  
Both the Russian and the British media tended to use the military action 
frame during the 3rd time period. While the Russian media used the frame mainly 
resisting the very idea of any military action, the British media used the prognostic 
frame referring to using military action to assist Ukraine. Another observable 
difference came from the use of the dismantling weapons frame. Holding 
diametrically opposing views from the Russian media (mainly RT) which called on 
all sides and especially nationalists to disarm, the BBC demanded pro-Russian rebels 
to disarm in 3 out of its 4 stories, with one item explicitly stating that there should be 
no inflow of weapons from Russia (BBC, 13 April 2014). 
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4th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015. 
Generic news frames. 
The British media during the final time period reported the Ukraine conflict 
in 815 news items, compared to the Russian media’s 1,504 pieces (Table 7.15). The 
overall use of the generic frames by the British media remained similar to the third 
period, but with a worth-noting increase in the economic consequences frame from 
The Guardian. The BBC and Mail Online used minimally the economic 
consequences frame mainly focusing on the fact that the Russian economy appeared 
to deteriorate as a result of the sanctions (BBC, 21 July 2014) as well as the negative 
result of not imposing economic sanctions on Russia (Mail Online, 21 July 2014). 
The Russian media used the economic frame to offer a contrasting view. For 
instance, RT largely criticised the economic sanctions that would hit EU economies 
as well (RT, 30 July 2014). In comparison, The Guardian is identified as the one that 
tended to provide multiple perspectives by using the economic consequences frame. 
These consisted of the positive and the negative impacts on both EU countries and 
Russia caused by the economic sanctions (The Guardian, 29 August 2014).  
There was also an increase in the use of the responsibility frame by both the 
Russian and the British media during the final period. The Russian media, especially 
RT and Pravda.ru, kept alignment in blaming the new Kyiv for shelling the 
residential areas in South-Eastern Ukraine and the West for intervening and covering 
up the truth (RT, 26 January 2015); whilst The Moscow Times criticised Russia’s 
involvement and offered less space to criticisms of the West. At the same time, the 
British media showed a high interest in blaming Russia and the Russia-backed 
separatists for shooting down the MH17 and worsening the situation in Ukraine (e.g., 
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Mail Online, 18 July 2014). Putin was seen by the British media as the enemy of 
Ukraine and the West during the Ukraine crisis.  
 
Table 7. 15: Distribution of Generic frames by media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th period) 
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The third commonly used frame was the human-interest frame. Regarding the 
overall use of this frame, the views from the British media were again conflicting to 
the ones offered by the Russian media that gave extensive coverage to the mistreated 
journalists and victims from Eastern Ukraine as a result of new Kyiv’s military 
action in the region. Like the tabloid-style Russian media Pravda.ru, Mail Online 
used the nationalisation frame the most. But the morality frame was not of interest to 
the British media with The Guardian and Mail Online contributing each 4 news 
items. Compared to the Russian media which (mostly RT and Pravda.ru) used the 
morality frame attacking the US and Ukraine, Mail Online (3 December 2014) and 
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The Guardian (3 September 2014) applied the frame critiquing the lies from Kremlin 
propaganda and again likening Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler. 
 
 
Figure 7. 15. 1 
  
 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
The British media during the final period paid significantly less attention to 
the Ukraine conflict with a total of 815 articles, compared to 1,504 articles coming 
from the Russian media. Yet the former provided greater space (67%) to diagnosis, 
than the latter (40%). Among the 549 occurrences of the diagnostic frames in the 
British media, the global dimensions (328 articles) frame came on top, followed by 
the particular triggers (302 articles) frame; whereas the Russian media favoured the 
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Table 7. 16: Distribution of Diagnostic frames by media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th 
period) 
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Figure 7. 16. 1 
 
In the use of the global dimensions frame, the three British media outlets 
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interests in the region. What was different was that in spite of the insignificant 
reference to the battle between the West and the East, the BBC and Mail Online did 
not interpret NATO’s expansionism as a direct diagnosis. This was comparable to RT 
and Pravda.ru that used the global dimensions frame predominantly suggesting the 
West’s expansionist ambitions. However, The Moscow Times tended to critically 
provide various perspectives, which was in line with The Guardian.  
Overall the particular triggers frame was the first commonly suggested 
diagnosis. The Russian media contributed the most to it. Generally, the British media 
put forward the idea that the violence between the two sides escalated the Ukraine 
conflict, while the Russian media used the frame to address the fact that new Kyiv 
shelling in the region made it impossible to end the crisis. The fact that the new Kyiv 
used chemical weapons in the battle was scarcely discussed by the British media, in 
comparison with the Russian media that used this storyline in most of the human 
rights violations frames.  
After the human rights violations frame, both countries’ media also used the 
political causes frame to explain the roots of the Ukraine crisis. In the UK, the BBC 
in particular stressed Yanukovych’s corruption and his one-sided ending of the EU 
deal in 15 articles, while The Guardian continued to provide multiple perspectives in 
using the frame. On the contrary, the Russian counterparts – RT and Pravda.ru used 
the political causes diagnosis to highlight the West-backed political coup in Kyiv. 
The Guardian’s characteristic of offering various views, was also evident in its use 
of the socio-economic causes frame, where the newspaper talked about Ukraine’s gas 
debt, its falling economy, Putin’s convoy, as well as Russia’s cutting off of gas 
supply to Ukraine (31 July 2014). The Russian media, however, suggested that 
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Ukraine’s socio and economic blockade of the Eastern region prevented peace 
development (RT, 19 February 2015).  
The use of the prognostic frames by the British media was still more than by 
the Russian media (Table 7.17). The financial intervention prognosis continued to be 
the first choice in relation to the Ukraine conflict, recommended by the British 
media. The military action was the second frequently recommended solution by both 
the British and Russian media over the third and fourth time periods. However, the 
two countries’ media tended to make different suggestions. While the Russian media 
(as illustrated in Chapter five) used the military action prognosis resisting any 
military action, all the British media without exception highly recommended the idea 
that NATO should directly confront Russia to assist Ukraine. 
 
 
Table 7. 17: Distribution of Prognostic frames by media: 18.07.2014 – 28.02.2015 (4th 
period) 
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Figure 7. 17. 1 
 
Moreover, there was a minor difference between the British and Russian 
media with regards to using the solution of dismantling weapons. What the British 
media implied was firstly a removal of heavy weaponries by both sides; secondly a 
call for Russia to stop supplying weapons to rebels. On the other hand, the Russian 
media mostly suggested a withdrawal of weapons by both sides. The Moscow Times 
echoed the BBC demanding to prevent Russia’s outflow of weapons to Ukraine. The 
internal reforms were the third solution the British media preferred (the BBC and The 
Guardian in particular), which was the first prognosis suggested by the Russian 
media; although they expressed the solution in different terms. Finally, the external 
co-operation was mentioned two times by the BBC, suggesting co-operating with 
Russia, and forming a global monitoring group. This was in line with the Russian 
media. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
Overall, throughout the Ukraine crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 
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in terms of using the conflict and responsibility generic frames, and the global 
dimensions and particular triggers diagnostic frames, albeit with key opposing 
perspectives between the two. Second, while the Russian media (especially The 
Moscow Times and RT) constantly reported using the economic consequences 
generic frame and the external co-operation prognostic frame during the first time 
period (30 November 2013 – 26 February 2014), the British media highlighted the 
human-interest perspective alongside the change in government solution to the crisis. 
Third, during the second time period (27 February – 20 March 2014) the Russian 
media (RT and Pravda.ru in particular) increased the use of the morality generic 
frame and the human rights violation diagnostic frame along with the military actions 
prognostic frame. In comparison, the British media not only kept their preference in 
using the human-interest generic frame, but also increased the use of the human 
rights violation diagnostic frame and the financial intervention prognostic frame. 
Fourth, the human-interest generic frame and the human rights violations diagnostic 
frame were frequently used by both countries’ media over the last two periods. At the 
same time, the Russian media suggested the internal reforms as a solution to the 
crisis; the British counterparts, on the other hand, kept using the financial 
intervention prognostic frame. Finally, the British media were more likely to offer 
diagnostic and prognostic frames compared to the Russian media, although overall 
the former paid less attention to the Ukraine crisis than the latter. These findings 
clearly illustrate the nature of the differences between the media framing of the 
Ukraine crisis in Russia and the UK. The focus next moves to an analytical 
discussion of the news framing between the Russian and British media coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis in the context of the wider debates about the nature of the media 
systems of liberal and hybrid regimes and the notion of liberalism and illiberalism. 
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This will answer the first and main research question about the extent to which the 
revealed characteristics in Russia and the UK support or refute media systems theory. 
This discussion also assesses the findings in the context of the wider question of 









This chapter offers an analytical comparison between the media system of 
Russia – a country with a hybrid political regime and the media system of the UK – 
characterised as liberal democracy. It starts with a theoretical reflection based on the 
identified features of the two countries’ news coverage of the Ukraine crisis – the 
manufacturing consent thesis. This section covers four features that show the 
evidence supporting the theory: One good vs. one bad alternative, legitimise ‘ours’ 
and delegitimise ‘theirs’, good vs. evil – including humanitarianism and sovereignty, 
and both-side construction. The disclosed characteristics of the Russian and UK 
news framing of the crisis feed into the analysis responding directly to the main 
research question which will be dicussed in the second part of this chapter: To what 
extent and in what ways does the coverage of the Ukraine crisis support or refute 
media systems theory as discussed in Chapter one and Chapter two. 
 
8.2 Manufacturing Consent 
In this study, as the above comparative account in Chapter seven illustrated, 
morality and human rights were featured as powerful framing patterns of news 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis in both Russian and UK media outlets. The frequent 
use of these frames to shed light on competing political interpretations of the crisis, 
however, revealed one-sided journalistic practices in both countries serving to justify 
their political and military involvement. Their self-conceived roles as moral agents 
and bringers of justice have created ‘close proximity’ to their respective political 
power (Robinson, 2018, p. 55), thus making their news products blurry from 
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government propaganda (O’Shaughnessy, 2004). The media’s acquiescence from 
national foreign policies on Ukraine when defining the news agenda was consistent 
with what Herman and Chomsky (1988) have claimed of the manufacturing consent 
thesis.  
The British media defined Yanukovych’s U-turn – the suspension of the 
country’s EU Association Agreement – as stemming from Russian pressure; the 
protests at the Maidan as revolutionaries in support of democracy; the Crimean issue 
as Russian invasion or annexation; the anti-Maidan forces as separatists/rebels; and 
the Russian aid as intervention. Consequently, the responsibilities were shifted 
directly to the Yanukovych’s regime and Russia, appealing to a particular 
interpretation of Russia: as the geopolitical enemy of the West (Ojala & Pantti, 
2017). The overall disposition to favour one interpretation of the Ukraine crisis and 
to marginalise any other runs in parallel with British media being uncritical of 
European politicians’ interference, demonising Yanukovych, Putin, and pro-Russian 
forces whilst promoting the Anti-Terrorism Operations as ‘liberators’, and 
exaggerating Putin’s political and military ambitions in terms of his 20th-century 
imperial mind-set. On the other hand, the Russian media defined the same events 
differently: Yanukovych’s U-turn was Ukraine’s domestic affair and EU’s economic 
and geopolitical strategy; the protests at Maidan were a well-organised political coup 
backed by the West (the U.S. in particular); the Crimean issue was about 
reunification/returning home; the anti-Maidan forces were self-defence forces; 
Russian aid was humanitarian assistance to heavily victimised people in Eastern 
Ukraine. A shared weakness between the Russian and the British media, thus, was 
the failure to go beyond their governments’ political lines and into an in-depth 
investigation of the mentioned events taking place during the Ukraine crisis.  
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As the primary aim of this study was to assess how the Ukraine crisis has 
been framed by the media in Russia – a country with a hybrid political regime and 
the media in the UK – a liberal democracy, the following analytical discussion 
demonstrates in detail the one-sidedness characteristic of both countries’ media. The 
empirical evidence is provided to support the argument whilst linking back to the 
theories around the manufacturing consent thesis discussed in Chapter one.  
 
8.2.1 One good vs. one bad alternative: economy. 
The one ‘good’ and one ‘bad’ alternative was evident in the first time period 
when the Russian media in general used the economic consequences frame to search 
for public support for the deepening conflict and the upcoming military campaigns. 
Despite The Moscow Times’ mostly aligned position with the West in the coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis, the Russian media overall (especially RT and Pravda.ru) showed 
a great degree of alliance with the national policies on the topic. As shown in 
Chapter five, there was an emphasis on the prevalence of descriptions of Putin’s 
financial offer to Ukraine. This suggests the media were active in justifying and 
naturalising Russia’s geopolitical involvement. The Russian coverage largely 
explained how Ukraine would benefit from Putin’s deal to recover from the present 
economic crisis, while the EU offered no full membership with little financial aid for 
the country. Here, the economically framed narratives represented one ‘good’ and 
one ‘bad’ alternative. Specifically, Putin’s deal was promoted through a positive 
description, while the counterpart EU offer was described in a negative light. The 
implication was: Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the country’s EU Association 
Agreement and turn to closer economic and political ties with Russia was a wise 
choice; although the EU claimed that Brussels had prepared a document showing the 
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long-term benefit that could have flowed to Ukraine over seven years (The Moscow 
Times, 20 December 2013). The efforts aimed to divert the attention from the general 
perception that Yanukovych is responsible for the Ukraine crisis to a rather glorified 
one that Yanukovych committed himself to dealing with the country’s current debt 
crisis for all Ukrainians interests. Such means of misdirection led to an appeal to the 
readers that either you support the EU who could not guarantee a promising 
economic future or Russia who will solve the country’s financial problem 
immediately with a further bonus of being a member of the Eurasian Union. 
This type of journalistic practice – one ‘good’ and one ‘bad’ alternative – was 
also manifested in the subsequent periods after the West had imposed several rounds 
of economic sanctions on Russia. The Russian media reduced the promotion of 
Putin’s deal and turned to describe the country’s economy in a positive light. The 
West was presented as miscalculating the importance of Russia to the Western and 
global economies and as exaggerating its ability to affect the ‘strong’ Russia. Yet the 
positive information flow was privileged over any reference to possible negative 
economic consequences. The use of positive storylines can be explained by the 
notion of gatekeeping (e.g., Perloff, 2014; Koltsova, 2006; Oates, 2007; Vartanova, 
2012). Perloff (2014) refers to the gatekeeping as an information selection process 
including ‘exclusion, selection, and framing’ (p. 400). Koltsova (2006) suggests that 
following the information policies of the Russian government, skilfully 
manufactured ‘positive information flow’ goes to the public sphere thus replacing 
negative information (p. 40). Especially in the months when the Russian economy 
encountered severe economic contraction due to the tit-for-tat sanctions between 
Russia and the West, the media continued suggesting that the illegal sanctions 
against Moscow would eventually backfire on the EU economy. This type of 
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narrative seemed to further prove the merit of Putin’s deal offered at the beginning of 
the Ukraine crisis, while continuing to condemn the West for interfering in Ukraine’s 
national affairs at the expense of the country’s economy. The presented narratives in 
relation to the Russian government’s competence to overcome the economic 
recession and the Western enemy not only allow the public to place their faith in 
Russia, but also remind them that ‘Russia always will be a world power’ (Cooley & 
Stokes, 2018, p. 13).  
As the overall goal of this study was to examine the news frames used by the 
media, the economically framed narratives – highlighting one good and one bad 
alternative – is identified as one of the characteristics of the Russian news coverage 
of the Ukraine crisis. The positive descriptions of Moscow’s deal, as previous studies 
of Russian media being supportive of national foreign policy suggest (e.g., Heywood, 
2014), served a propaganda function aimed at securing public support and justifying 
and naturalising Russia’s involvement, thus reflecting the manufacturing consent 
thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). It is important to reiterate that throughout the 
crisis the Russian media – RT and Pravda.ru – insisted that the Ukraine conflict was 
an internal issue but with what the media regarded as immoral assistance from the 
West. This was further presented in the increased use of morality frames to criticise 
the West and delegitimise the new Kyiv while legitimising ‘ourselves’, especially 
from the end of the first period to the second period, and during the final period.   
 
8.2.2 Legitimise ‘ours’ & delegitimise ‘theirs’: morality.  
During the second time period, RT and Pravda.ru in particular following 
President Putin’s political rhetoric used the morality frame to express discontent over 
the Western bodies in terms of what the media presented as the Western ‘moral 
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bankruptcy’ (RT, 5 March 2014). This is the second characteristic identified in the 
Russian news coverage of the Ukraine crisis, which directly reflects the 
manufacturing consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The references included 
discussions of a double-standard policy against Russia, immoral direct meddling in 
other country’s internal issues, as well as the aggressive propaganda in Western 
mainstream media. According to the moral unfairness claimed by the Russian media, 
the new Kyiv regime backed by the West treated the Maidan participants as heroic 
revolutionaries. However, the anti-Maidan protesters who were against the new Kyiv 
and demanded for autonomy, were considered ‘separatists’ and ‘terrorists’ 
(Pravda.ru, 23 September 2014). The moral discussion can be perceived as to prevail 
and legitimise political rhetorics such as taking over Crimea and participating in the 
battles in Eastern Ukraine. These were practiced through the media blaming the 
Maidan protesters, accusing the new Kyiv of conducting violence and the Anti-
Terrorism Operations, and condemning the West for its strategic manoeuvring of 
geopolitics and economies against Russia.  
A noticeable example is Pravda.ru during the second period aligning with RT 
to condemn the West’s expansionism through a moral lens and the use of the human 
rights violations frame (diagnosis) to explain why the conflict escalated: the 
illegitimate neo-Nazis in Ukraine – including the new Kyiv and the far-right parties – 
supported by the West conducted war crimes against ethnic Russians. As Pravda.ru 
reported ‘gangs of neo-Nazis are patrolling the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian 
cities, beating and killing defenceless people […] The victims are ethnic Russians, 
ethnic minorities, Jews – who have been warned to leave Kiev’ (4 March 2014). On 
the topic of solutions, the media (especially RT) for the most part reported in favour 
of military action – Russia could send troops to South-Eastern Ukraine to protect 
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ethnic Russians (as shown in Table 5.10). This is an observable shift from the first 
period when the Russian media distanced the country from the Ukraine crisis and 
preferred external co-operation as an ideal solution. The presentation of ‘neo- Nazis’ 
and ultra-nationalist threats over ethnic Russians alongside the recommended 
military action could be explained as key justifications paving the way for Russia to 
take over Crimea: legitimising ‘our’ side while delegitimising ‘theirs’. The 
justification for the country’s involvement was evident not only in the direct usage of 
morality frame but also in the human-oriented coverage addressing the humanitarian 
issues by distinguishing good from evil.  
 
8.2.3 Good vs. evil.  
8.2.3.1 Humanitarianism.  
The human-oriented coverage from the Russian media became especially 
prominent in the final two time periods. The Russian media put forward the idea of 
humanitarianism by highlighting an internal split in South-Eastern Ukraine where 
victims asked for Russian help; whilst overlooking the existence of those who 
supported the new Kyiv. Dominant subjects the Russian media focused on were: the 
civil war, the immoral Western interference and sanctions, Novorossiya (or new 
Russia) – consisting of Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s 
Republic (LPR), the Ukrainian fascists, and the Anti-Terrorism Operations. Among 
these the Novorossiya, Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were presented in a 
positive light. In comparison, the new Kyiv was described in a negative context: 
Ukraine was dangerous (fascist), incapable of political and economic independence, 
and deteriorating without Russia. When the anti-fascist account was embedded in a 
wider narrative highlighting human suffering, it became more effective. The 
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deleterious depiction of the new Kyiv allowed for a coherent moral sensibility via 
focused reporting of refugees fleeing from the flamed regions of Ukraine. For 
example, allegations of massacre/genocide by the new Ukrainian government forces 
were significantly underlined by RT that painted a very black and white picture of 
what was a volatile and intricate situation on the ground. In reporting the shelling in 
the South-Eastern city of Slavyansk, the media wrote:  
 
Many of the people gathering in central Slavyansk told Phillips 
[RT’s stringer] that they are frightened for their lives and do not want any 
Ukrainian military sent by the “Kiev junta” in their city. One woman 
interviewed by Phillips appealed to Russia and personally to President 
Vladimir Putin for help, saying the people are getting desperate. The others 
had a message for US President Barack Obama, whom they blame for the 
chaotic developments in Ukraine (RT, 2 May 2014).  
 
Three days later, RT quoted Maksim Grigoryev – a Public Chamber member 
who chaired the non-commercial Foundation for Problems of Democracy and 
prepared to sue the new Kyiv in the European Court of Human Rights:  
 
After the Odessa massacre the statements of UN and OSCE 
representatives were quite soft, but after some time the sobriety will come, 
like it happened with the Georgia war of 2008 and Western nations will 
understand that the people that they are supporting now are typical neo-Nazi 
groups, discriminating against people by their ethnicity and ready for any 




The coverage of the massacre might have aimed to increase empathy towards 
the ethnic Russians. The media was deliberately or instinctively provoking an 
emotional response from the international audiences through the dehumanisation of 
new Kyiv. The intention can be understood as a way of justifying a humanitarian 
intervention, as previous studies have illustrated (e.g., Hammond, 2007a, 2007b, 
2017, 2018; Parry, 2011; Robinson, 2017). Hammond (2007b) suggests that the 
British media talked about ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia in order to promote the 
Western intervention in 1999. By the time of the Kosovo conflict, the media framed 
the NATO bombings ‘as an epic struggle of good against evil’ to justify ‘military 
action in terms of moral values based on human rights’ (p. 219). Similarly, RT 
highlighted the war crimes conducted by the new Kyiv, used the term ‘massacre’, 
and labelled the anti-Maidan fighters as ‘self-defence forces’, thus advocating further 
discontents over new Kyiv and the West. This was regardless of the likelihood that 
some of the testimonies would have been intentionally selected among those pro-
Russian or anti-new Kyiv populations. The human suffering was again increasingly 
covered by the Russian media in August 2014, potentially reflecting Russia’s 
motivation to offer the so-called humanitarian aid that was criticised by the West as 
an ‘invasion’. The represented atrocities equipped with humanitarian sentiments 
were in war mobilisation efforts to cover for political or military involvement.  
This notion of humanitarianism is disputable and reminiscent of the 4th 
December 1992 when the decision was made by the US government of going for war 
in Somalia. President George Bush Snr. clarified that the mission was humanitarian, 
although the notion of humanitarian intervention is not universally accepted, 
remaining largely contested in the post-Cold war era (Balabanova, 2015, p. 59). To 
some researchers (e.g., Kaldor, 2010), humanitarian intervention is about helping 
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people from other countries to halt severe humanitarian crises. This is what Bush 
referred to, after the image of suffering children bombarded the public who as a 
result called for doing something. The action was then named ‘Operation Restore 
Hope’ which Bush believed to be ‘doing God’s work’; as well as showing American 
leadership (Hammond, 2007a). This stressed the importance of an overwhelming 
moral imperative. But many doubt such assumption and believe the media to be 
primarily responsible for the moral construct. As Moorcraft (2016) argues ‘the media 
were no longer reporting on the agenda, but setting it’ (p. 278). The consequence is 
the appearance of the coverage of conflict as an overgeneralised ‘morality play’, 
where one side in a conflict is depicted as evil, and the other as a victim, with a 
procedure that puts pressure on the international community either to intervene and 
rescue the victim, or to withdraw the troops from the battlefield (Hammock & 
Charny, 1996, pp. 115-116). Other researchers (e.g., Chomsky, 1999; Robinson, 
2017, 2019a; Hammond, 2007a, 2007b; 2017, 2018; Hammond et al., 2019; Parry, 
2011; Balabanova, 2015) make a similar argument but are critical of the universal 
values as justifications covering for military imperialism.  
New Kyiv’s shelling in Eastern Ukraine was also described by the Russian 
media as violating human rights. This was to imply that the form of ‘self-defence 
forces’ and the establishment of Novorossiya together was a result of the new Kyiv 
that got to power through so-called a political coup and conducted war crimes against 
its own people. Taken together, the message deeply rooted in human values not only 
criticised the new Kyiv, but also served as the pretext to justify the establishment of 
Novorossiya. The use of human rights reinforced the humanitarian rationale in news 
coverage in a way of constructing and highlighting distinct groups, speaking for them 
and acting in their name, potentially advocating defensive or retaliatory violence, and 
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justifying political/military involvements with rhetoric of ‘humanitarian’ missions 
and higher moral values (Baysha, 2017; Baden & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2018). The 
selective reporting on human suffering alongside the claimed violation of human 
rights without the historical, political, social, and local context, as Balabanova (2017) 
argues, fails to fulfil the media’s democratic role in offering in-depth analysis, thus 
possibly missing some real human rights stories (p. 233). Hence, the use of human 
rights by the Russian media – the third characteristic identified in the mediated 
Ukraine crisis coverage – is rather a tool to justify the national interests and 
geopolitics (e.g., Balabanova, 2015; Robinson, 2017, 2019a; Gowing, 1994, 2000; 
Jakobsen, 1996, 2000; Strobel, 1997) in the context of the Ukraine conflict, thus 
supporting the manufacturing consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The 
delivered sense of assisting Ukraine by the media reflects Russian geo-strategic 
interests that have been sugar-coated under ‘humanitarian sentiment’ to justify the 
interference in the country (Robinson, 2017; Freedman, 2017). The journalistic 
performance of highlighting human values was not exclusive to the media in Russia. 
The British media were equally identified as a moral agent using human-focused 
coverage to identify the evil and stress the importance of sovereignty. This 
overarching reporting pattern characterises the British news coverage throughout the 
Ukraine crisis.   
 
8.2.3.2 Sovereignty.   
During the first period, a human-oriented focus applied to all three British 
media and manifested itself in their preference for the human rights violations and 
the government’s crackdown frames (particular triggers frame) – as shown in Figure 
7.6.1 about the difference between the British and Russian media’s preferences in the 
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use of diagnostic frames. Moreover, most of the British coverage reflected the 
involved parties’ efforts to pursue a long-lasting solution to the crisis and engaged in 
the blame game. The presented responsibility frame possibly aimed to influence the 
audiences’ perspective on who was responsible for the crisis. As previous literature 
on news agenda and framing (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Brown & Deegan, 1998; 
Entman, 1993; Robinson et al., 2010; Freedman, 2017) suggest the perceptions of 
events depend on how the media select and organise the information about them by 
framing them one way or another. The significance of frames may also explain why 
the British media were more likely to use the human-interest frame. The implication 
of their preference for the two frames is double-fold: One may suggest that the 
British media’s relatively high interest in using the responsibility frame to blame the 
former President Yanukovych for his crackdowns proves that the media still play an 
important role as watchdogs in democratic societies by holding politicians 
accountable. On the other hand, it also seems that the British media outlets 
conformed to international norms in which human values are at the core. The norm is 
based on the value of ‘equality, democracy, and freedom’ that aim to develop equal 
rights of peoples and to maintain universal peace (Charter of the United Nations, 
1945). By highlighting Russian-backed Yanukovych’s ‘anti-freedom’ stand, the 
emotional feeling of ‘to do something’ could be spread across the audiences. This is 
what Entman (1993) refers to as salience that together with information selection 
constitute essential part of the news framing process. However, promoting particular 
frames means an omission of counter narratives that may be as important as the 
inclusions (Entman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Robinson et al., 2010). 
Hence, the salient indicator of ‘anti-freedom’ narrative was set on to the agenda 
whereas other viewpoints were played down.  
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For example, the British media allocated minimal space to portraying how the 
protesters (including what the Russian media regarded as ‘far-right extremists’) 
started attacks and the severe injuries in the riot police during the battles, while they 
gave extensive coverage to Yanukovych’s disputed use of brutal force to suppress 
the pro-democracy protests. As journalist Parry writes:  
 
Neo-Nazi and other extremist elements from Lviv and other western 
Ukrainian cities began arriving in well-organized brigades or “sotins” of 100 
trained street fighters. Police were attacked with firebombs and other 
weapons as the violent protesters began seizing government buildings and 
unfurling Nazi banners and even a Confederate flag (Consortiumnews, 11 
April 2016).  
 
The same is noted by scholars (e.g., Van der Pijl, 2018; Sakwa, 2015) who 
point out the important role of Stepan Bandera-worshiping6 forces in the violence in 
February 2014. When riots reached a peak on 20 February 2014 with anonymous 
snipers on roofs opening fire on both the police and protesters, the British media 
immediately blamed the Yanukovych administration for the assumed default 
understanding: pro-government forces targeting the protesters. This was regardless of 
various voices outside the Western mainstream media, one of which suggesting that 
the sniper fire came from mercenaries trained by the Right Sector (RS) extremists led 
by Dmirtiy Yarosh (Katchanovski, 2015; Parry, 2014, 2016; Zuesse, 2018).7 The 
group allegedly owned ‘CIA-and-oligarch-backed army numbering probably 
between 7,000 and 10,000’ people (Zuesses, 2 May 2018). 
                                                          
6 A Ukrainian far-right leader – Nazi collaborator who lived from 1909 to 1959. 
7 Yarosh later became a member of Parliament in Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s interim government 
that was established following the collapse of Yanukovych’s regime in February 2014. 
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As a result, there was no equal treatment of the subject by the British media 
who took it upon themselves to justify the ‘good’ anti-authoritarian forces. In this 
interpretation, the good forces – the protesters, opposition parties at the Maidan, and 
the new Kyiv – deserve our understanding and sympathy; whereas Yanukovych-led 
parties, the police, Russia, and the pro-Russian rebels – deserve condemnation as 
they were brutal killers who fired on unarmed supporters of ‘democracy’ and 
escalated the Ukraine conflict resulting in a number of victims. The omission of 
information intending to discredit Yanukovych regime during the first period was 
further evident in the three British media’s higher interest in a change of government 
(prognostic frame) as the most possible solution to the conflict, where the Russian 
media preferred the external co-operation (e.g., Figure 7.7.1).  
Even at the early stage of the conflict, the British media without directly 
suggesting the regime-change agenda (Ojala & Pantti, 2017; Van der Pijl, 2018; 
Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018; Robinson, 2019a), constantly embraced Western 
politicians who came to the Maidan cheering the uprising. These included the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland who passed out cookies and announced financial 
aid from the U.S., and the late Senator John McCain who stood on stage together 
with far-right group – Svoboda Party8, giving a speech suggesting that ‘Ukraine will 
make Europe better and Europe will make Ukraine better’ (BBC, 15 December 2013) 
and the United States is with them in their challenge to the current regime. The 
leaked phone call conversation between Nuland and Pyatt – US ambassador to 
Ukraine (as discussed in Chapters six and seven) was portrayed by the British media 
as the West’s (the U.S. and UN) constructive role in searching for solutions to the 
conflict rather than ‘the US-backed political coup’ as interpreted by the Russian 
                                                          
8 A party describing itself as ‘the last hope of the white race, of humankind as such’ and 
‘throwing up a sieg heil Nazi salute during a speech’ (Blumenthal, 27 August 2018). 
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media. This indicates the media’s alignment with the Western position in the Ukraine 
crisis while distancing Russia (Sakwa, 2015; Ojala & Pantti, 2017; Boyd-Barrett, 
2017a, 2017b; Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018). Ojala and Pantti (2017) propose that 
the EU policies on the conflict coordinated with the U.S. partly hinged on 
‘favourable public opinion within Western Europe’, which stemmed from an existing 
perception that President Putin is ‘the culprit and aggressor’ and Ukraine is ‘the 
victim of a foreign attack’ (p. 51). This important finding is also evident in Ojala et 
al.’s (2017) study suggesting that while Ukraine and its people were reported as 
victims, Russia and Putin were portrayed as villains. The concentrated manufacturing 
of consent drives to demonise Russia that has been blamed for disrupting 
‘democratic processes throughout Western states’ (Robinson, 2019b, p. 1). 
The omission of information continued in the following three periods, with 
the media persistently focusing on accusations of Russia and pro-Russian forces for 
destabilising the region in the East and breaking international law (as shown in 
Chapter seven in relation to the differences in using the global dimensions and 
human rights violations frames between the British and Russian media outlets), and 
suggesting NATO to start military action against Russia to help Ukraine (e.g., Figure 
7.16.1). The media set the agenda mainly around Yanukovych’s ‘crackdowns’ and 
Russia’s interference, whilst failing to appropriately reflect the evidence of new 
Kyiv’s wrongdoings. The media’s acquiescence also included the West’s 
involvement in supporting the new Kyiv by providing military, technical, and 
financial assistances. When the UK’s sale of Saxon armoured troop carriers to 
Ukraine was disclosed by the Russian media, the BBC explained that the vehicles 
were defensive in nature: ‘The Ministry of Defence confirmed these were out-of-
service unarmed vehicles and not lethal equipment […] the delivery did not represent 
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an escalation of British involvement in Ukraine […] “They offer protective mobility 
to personnel”’ (13 February 2015). Mail Online quoted the former head of the British 
Army Lord Dannatt who had encouraged Britain to commit troops against Russia, 
and explained that the delivery was ‘“nothing short of immoral”, as the vehicles were 
so decrepit as to be “quite useless”’ (Mail Online, 14 February 2015). The next day, 
the media continued to glorify the military assistance: ‘Ukrainian President 
Poroshenko paraded himself proudly by one of the Saxons. Soon they will be fitted 
out with guns’ (Mail Online, 15 February 2015).  
Quite different to Yanukovych, Poroshenko was portrayed as a hero who sees 
human life as the highest value. The rebels were depicted as evil resisting peace and 
insisting on secession, and Putin’s denial of assisting separatists was presented as 
illogical. The British media suggested that the EU would save the civilisation from 
barbarism. But in this context ‘evil is both the answer to a question and itself a 
question’ (Silverstone, 2007, p. 58). Silverstone (2007) points out that the media in 
collusion with those who identify evil articulate judgements of good and evil for 
public consumption, thus legitimating and amplifying them. The judgements imply 
practices of inclusion and exclusion and justifications for actions. This means that the 
media’s identification of evil alongside the resulting moral discussion for action, is in 
fact a problem for practical morality. As he argues the moral discussion is derived 
from its ‘capacity to make the singular judgements of absolute right and wrong that 
humanity must make if it is to survive’ (Silverstone, 2007, p. 56). Therefore, the 
alignment between the media and the politics, in the context of the Ukraine crisis, 
shows the evidence of the manufacturing consent thesis, where the former promoted 
‘explanations for conflicts that assert a righteous moral stance and legitimise an 
interventionist policy orientation’ (Hammond, 2018, p. 443).  
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Overall the British media stressed the importance of sovereignty, through 
supportively representing the will of the majority of the people at the Maidan and 
promoting a universal value of democratic unity of the Ukrainian nation. The media 
identified evil individuals such as the separatists backed by what they regarded as 
aggressive and imperialist Putin who dominated coverage through the sheer volume 
of information; while downplaying the ‘good’ guys’ offences (the violence at Maidan 
and the Anti-Terrorism Operations in Eastern Ukraine). Thus, the media treated the 
presence of ultra-rights in Kyiv as a legitimate part of the Maidan, and the new 
Kyiv’s military attacks as a legitimate action to alleviate the crisis. This characteristic 
of one-sidedness, however, was not always the case. There was news coverage that 
tended to blame both sides in certain events, which was tracked through the frequent 
use of responsibility and conflict frames. This yet further exemplified the one-
sidedness. The BBC’s frequent use of the conflict frame may be explained by the fact 
that the media value objective reporting (Schudson, 2001) in order to balance 
between the conflicting positions (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Nevertheless, it 
may also result in negative effects. For example, De Vreese and Tobiasen (2007) 
ascribe the democratic potential of conflict frames to the notion that the more the 
conflict presents, the more the public believe in the significance of political decision-
making. Vliegenthart and Schuck (2008) drive this point further and suggest that the 
frequent use of conflict frame can increase the public support for national policies. 
The use of ‘blame on both sides’ during the Ukraine conflict is analysed in detail in 




8.2.4 Both-side construction.  
When there were clear events regarding new Kyiv’s use of chemical weapons 
confirmed by the Human Rights Watch, the British media’s response was to either 
juxtapose situations between players or blame both sides for the violence. Thus, guilt 
was equally shared. By presenting the seemingly ‘balanced’ report, the British media 
were ignoring the imbalance in the fact that the new Kyiv was as well conducting 
war crimes on its civilians. ‘The both sides’ construction was a manipulation victory 
for the new Kyiv, and perhaps for the EU too. The sufferings of those who were 
attacked by a government (new Kyiv) allied to the EU attracted less press attention, 
seemed to be more likely degraded by the media, than the sufferings of those who 
were disputably attacked by the previous government (the Yanukovych regime) 
unconnected to Western interests (Boyd-Barrett, 2017b). As Yarchi et al. (2013) 
suggest political value proximity plays an important role in attracting media 
attention.  
In this study, the new Kyiv had a closer political value such as ‘pro-
European’ leadership that embraced democracy and human rights, the British media 
tended to frame in detail the regime as victim thus downplaying its wrongdoings. 
Freedman (2017) in the discussion on the equal representation of both sides in 
relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict in 2014 suggests that this is a journalistic 
strategy that should be objected because of the unequal nature of the assault on Gaza. 
Accordingly, in the case of Ukraine the British media were very much in consensus 
with the British government and the EU, consenting to subsequent rounds of 
economic and political sanctions on Russia (Ojala & Pantti, 2017; Sakwa, 2015). In 
the context of economic sanction, the perceived threats were in play at least for 
propagandistic purposes: people would be thinking that Russia was dangerous and 
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that supporting the government’s political decision – economic sanctions was 
essential (Bakir et al., 2018, p. 14). As Vliegenthart and Schuck (2008) argue the 
conflict frame can contribute to the increase in the public support for certain national 
polices.  
Whether the media were passively disseminating the one-sided coverage or 
unconsciously reporting based on their own established ideology, the uncovered 
characteristics reflect the media’s close concordance with national foreign policy 
establishments as the manufacturing consent thesis suggests (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988). Ukraine and Russia’s perspectives predominated in the British and Russian 
media coverage of the Ukraine crisis respectively, resonating the Cold War rhetoric 
of an ideological battle. As Herman and Chomsky (1988) claim on the subject of the 
treatment of national elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua by the US 
media: ‘where relations are friendly, the election is seen as “democratic”; where they 
are unfriendly, the coverage is less sympathetic’ (as cited in Street, 2011, p. 41). 
Herman and Chomsky call this kind of reporting ‘double standards’ that is in fact not 
new especially during wartime (e.g., Hallin, 1986; Thussu, 2000; Yarchi et al., 2013; 
Herring & Robinson, 2014). Both the Russian and the British media constructed one-
dimensional stereotypes simplifying complex issues under a manufactured common 
banner in terms of national foreign policy. The manipulation of public opinion was 
masked as a morality play about doing what is right. 
This study found that although some critical coverage such as that on the 
Western sanctions on Russia did occur in the British media, this did not operate 
without boundaries. As presented in Chapter six about how the British media used 
the economic consequences frame during the final period, the critical coverage was 
mainly about whether the economic sanctions would successfully drive Russia out of 
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Ukraine, whether the sanctions would affect ‘our’ economy, or whether NATO and 
the U.S. should send further (lethal) military assistance to Ukraine and the Baltic to 
confront Russia (e.g., BBC, 5 February 2015). In other words, at a broader level this 
sporadic critical coverage still reflected the manufacturing consent theory with 
limited dissensus among European politicians (Robinson, 2002; Hallin, 1986; 
Bennett, 1990; Wofsfeld, 1997; Robinson et al., 2010). The political 
consensus/dissensus factor in this study reflects the elite version of manufacturing 
consent theory (Robinson, 2002) as well as the indexing hypothesis (Bennet, 1990). 
Ojala and Pantti (2017) address that the EU position in the Ukraine crisis internally 
differed owing to the member-states’ very different relationships with Russia, 
ranging from histories to economic co-dependencies and foreign policy traditions (p. 
51). But overall the studied British media’s dominant framing patterns showed a 
great alignment with the majority Western position in terms of isolating Russia.  
 
8.3 The Media Systems of Hybrid and Liberal Regimes 
8.3.1 The statist commercialised model. 
The Russian media started manufacturing consent since the opening week of 
the Ukraine crisis, demonstrating deep suspicions about Western intentions in 
Ukraine while creating an idealistic picture of Russia. The media deemphasised and 
diverted attention from certain issues in relation to the Russian government and the 
country’s involvement in the crisis was presented as a heroic answer to the call of 
justice (Yaff, 2014). The influence of Putin’s administration as the major owner of 
the media outlets alone might have shaped the one-sided news coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis, but it is also important to take into account the limited media freedom 
and the journalistic culture in Russia that differ from those of the West (Becker, 
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2014; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018; Oates, 2013). As discussed in Chapters one and 
two the Russian media system is characterised by partisan reporting practiced by 
journalists with a low level of professionalism. Commercial media outlets experience 
high level of government interference, and media elites often associate with the elite 
political network (Vartanova, 2012; Watanabe, 2017), serving as passive outlets for 
the distribution of foreign policy line in the context of the Ukraine crisis. This 
combination was expected to increase the degree of reflecting the country’s political 
agenda by the studied Russian media.  
Some scholars (e.g., see Shekhovtsov, 2018) explain the reason behind this 
phenomenon with the fact that on a global level, Russia – the country, its leaders, and 
its people, are willing to pay a price for ‘getting up off its knees’ at all levels in the 
post-Cold War era; whilst ensuring and reinforcing its global prestige and authority 
among the top ranking great powers (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017; Cooley & 
Stokes, 2018). A forfeiture of Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe is perceived as a 
threat to its role as a regional hegemon and its desires for global major-power status 
(Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018). As Sakwa (2015) writes ‘the asymmetrical end of the 
Cold War effectively shut Russia out from the European alliance system’, while 
European politicians failed to establish a symmetrical and inclusive political and 
security order within the region (p. x). The watershed events such as the Crimean 
annexation were driven by ‘realist geo-strategic’ and ‘ethno-national concerns’ in 
terms of developing ‘the Russian world – a sphere of Russophone interests’, which 
boosted nationalist sentiment in the country (Sakwa, 2015, p. 108). According to 
Bauer et al. (1959), the majority of Russians regard the government as ‘a just but 
benevolent father’ – a concept that persists since Soviet times (as cited in De Smaele, 
2010, p. 54). President Putin highlighted four traditional Russian values in his 
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millennium speech: étatism (or statism), patriotism, derzhavnost (the belief in a great 
Russia), and social solidarity (De Smaele, 2010). This marks a common will of the 
public who have faith in a collectivist society: ‘what good is for the state has to be 
good for the people’ (De Smaele, 2010, p. 54). Any criticism of policies would be 
seen as unpatriotic thus ‘undermining Russia’s traditional values’ (Lipman, as cited 
in Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018, p. 34). These along with the consequential resentment 
towards the West including the Western media may explain why the submissive 
media outlets (especially RT and Pravda.ru) seemed to be patriotically politicised 
and defensive of the country’s policy by targeting what they see as the cultural and 
news imperialism of the West. As Koltsova (2006) and Oates (2013) point out 
journalists’ self-censorship is key to understanding part of the characteristics of 
Russian journalistic culture; while Slavtcheva-Petkova (2018) emphasises media 
subsidies from the government as a factor that influences journalists’ self-perceived 
roles as political players (Oates, 2013). Cooley and Stokes (2018) see this media 
gatekeeping process to have resulted in ‘parallel groups with different ideologies and 
motives’ in today’s Russian public sphere and mass media (pp. 5-6).  
Notably RT is counter-hegemonic in virtually all of the senses discussed in 
this study, intending to signal its exceptionalism and take on the Western 
counterparts like the BBC by providing different perspectives (Miazhevich, 2018). 
Miazhevich (2018) connects RT’s counter-flow remit to national branding campaigns 
that aim at attracting positive global attention and impacting external (foreign) 
audiences who thus are in ‘awe’ of Russia (Bolin & Miazhevich, 2018). Hence, the 
media outlet attempted to bring the Russian view on global news such as the Ukraine 
crisis in opposition to the monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon media (Spahn, 2019), while 
simultaneously finding out what the British media were keeping silent about. This 
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included the role the far-right groups played in contributing to the violence in both 
Maidan and Eastern Ukraine fighting against anti-Maidan and pro-Russian forces. 
The aligned view from RT and Pravda.ru were evidently in service of the state, 
perceiving ‘aggressive’ otherness coming from Brussels and Washington as 
attempting to lure Ukraine into their orbits. Yet, The Moscow Times, for the most 
part, was critical of the policies and ideologies of Putin’s regime during the Ukraine 
crisis. This persisted even after the end of 2014 when the newspaper’s ownership 
was transferred significantly to a leading opposition figure in Russia – Demyan 
Kudryavstsev. Kurdryavstsev had a close connection with the late Russian oligarch 
Boris Berezovsky who was later exiled by President Putin and fled to Britain 
(Pomerantsev, 2014; Jeffries, 2013). According to Zhegulev (2015), the two together 
were said to have helped organise support for Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution.  
Therefore, the revealed features of the Russian media outlets reflected what 
Vartanova (2012) has identified and characterised as the statist commercialised 
model highlighting the co-existence of statist mentality and commercial practice. On 
the one hand, the ‘depolitization’ element (or the empty roles of political 
programmes) within the model was especially evident in this study (RT and 
Pravda.ru). Vartanova’s (2012) explanation of the ‘depolitization’ lies at the state’s 
efforts to minimise media’s political engagement. This in turn benefits the 
advertising and commercialism-oriented media business which could focus on 
entertainment content thus naturally supporting the ‘depolitization’ strategy (p. 134). 
In this study, the politicised media (RT and Pravda.ru) also implied the 
‘depolitization’ strategy owing to their compliant thus ‘empty’ role, which reflected 
the instrumentalisation of political communication (Vartanova, 2012). The process 
was part of the efforts to support the vertical power system of Putin’s administration. 
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This also means that the professionalisation in terms of journalistic autonomy was 
consequently low (De Smaele, 2010; Vartanova, 2012). This finding is in line with 
other studies on the topic (Nygren et al., 2018; Roman et al., 2017; Slavtcheva-
Petkova, 2018; Nelson, 2019) where the journalists’ self-censorship and strong 
political control over mainstream media are stressed. On the other hand, the evidence 
from The Moscow Times firstly demonstrated what Vartanova (2012) has highlighted 
the growing commercialism/market-driven economy element in the Russian media 
system. Secondly, it proved a high level of political parallelism during the Ukraine 
crisis from October 2014 to February 2015, which was embedded in power struggles 
among business and political players (Vartanova, 2012; Koltsova, 2005; Lehtisaari, 
2015). 
  
8.3.2 The liberal model. 
In comparison, the British media focused on issues around democracy, 
freedom, and the financing of Ukraine, thus responding to the demands from the 
majority of the people at the Maidan since the early stages of the Ukraine crisis in 
November 2013. However, the setting of the news agenda involves selection of 
particular news stories at the expense of other information that was potentially as 
important as the inclusions (Entman, 1993). The British media adopted the same 
approach as the Russian media, playing down what the counterpart (the Russian 
media) highlighted, thus intensifying anti-Russian hyperbole and covering reality. 
The explanation is two-directional.  
First, since ‘melodrama sells’ especially during wartime (Wolfsfeld, 2011), 
journalists tend to dramatise and de-contextualise news (Aalberg & Curran, 2012), 
thus simplifying subjects and making them appealing to the mass audience (Franklin, 
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1997). As a consequence, news becomes ‘spectacle’ (Louw, 2010). As Bennet (2003) 
points out with reference to the US media the lack of analysis and explanation 
degrades the media’s information role. In this study, one of the pervasive 
assessments was viewing Putin’s policy as reflecting Russia’s imperialist ambitions. 
In defending Ukraine’s sovereignty, the British media exaggerated Putin’s ambitions: 
Putin using military force to threaten Ukraine was reasonable as he aspired to power 
and influence. As previously discussed Putin’s announcement – ‘If I want to, I can 
take Kiev in two weeks’ (e.g., BBC, 2 September 2014) – that the three British media 
chose to cover, was later proved inaccurate by the EU: Putin’s words had been 
‘“taken out of context”, said a spokeswoman for the European Commission President 
in a written response to The Wall Street Journal’ (RT, 5 September 2014). The 
unproven statement masquerading as fact gives an unfair advantage to one point of 
view, therefore becoming a means of manipulating a conversational partner – the 
global reader. The explanation of the Ukraine crisis was hence reduced to a single 
proposition of ‘Putin’s aggression’ (Stockman, 2014; Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018), 
which is reminiscent of the stereotypical demonisation of Saddam Hussein for 
allegedly using poison gas on his people prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion – the war 
that resulted in internecine strife in the country (Parry, 2011). The over-simplified 
frame of Putin without offering sufficient context or background could result in ‘the 
atmosphere of fear and our sense of insecurity’ (Kaldor, as cited in Somerville, 2017, 
p. 2). This was further exaggerated by The Guardian and Mail Online’s comparisons 
of Vladimir Putin and Russia to Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany (as discussed in 
Chapter six), the media used this fear factor to sell news and attract readers. Dorman 
and Livingston (1994) refer to this type of historical content as the media’s practice 
of driving up their negatives that overwhelm the alternatives in order to create 
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enemies. Emotional speculation equipped with responsibility and greater legitimacy 
superseded rigorous and inclusive analysis, blurring the real and imaginary. 
The second explanation follows from the claim that there was geo-political 
play over Ukraine between the West and the East (Mearcheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2015, 
2017), wherein the British media seemed more likely to ‘facilitate the engineered 
outcomes’ by the western establishments, through ‘manufacturing a type of 
consensus reality’ with omission of information (Henningsen, 2017). The 
downplaying of events could mean a news reader might miss out on what drives a 
large part of international politics. Putting more voices of ‘suppressed 
protesters/victims’ at the Maidan on the news may generate too uncritical a view of 
their actions. At worst it could also mean a lack of scrutiny of the British government 
or the EU, in their justification for the involvement in Ukraine. The media’s attacks 
on Russia for Putin’s nostalgic vision of resuscitating the Soviet empire, resurrects 
the knee-jerk Russo-phobia (Putz, 2016; Robinson, 2017b; Kuzmarov & Marciano, 
2018) of the Cold War legacy causing a deeper misunderstanding of the rather 
complex Ukraine crisis (Ojala & Pantti, 2017). As MacLeod (2019) suggests, 
Western media’s collective obsession with, mistrust of, and treatment of Russia as 
the West’s bête noire has always existed since a century ago. Mearcheimer (2014), 
Sakwa (2015), Malyarenko and Wolff (2018), and Gotz (2015) point out that the 
competitive geopolitical play between the Kremlin and the West (e.g., EU, NATO) is 
the main factor causing the conflict for influence in the post-Soviet space. But rather 
than reflecting ‘structural contradictions in the international system’, the 
scapegoaters often externalise responsibility for Ukraine’s issues and demonise 
Russia (Sakwa, 2015, pp. 5-6). The corollary is a failure in seeking constructive 
contributions to the Ukrainian state-building project (Sakwa, 2015).  
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The dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (the Warsaw Pact) in 
1991 with the end of the Cold War did not foreclose opportunities for NATO’s 
expansion to incorporate many former Soviet members such as Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, and the Baltic states (Sakwa, 2015). This was regardless of a vocal 
promise made by the Soviet Union and the US in late 1990: Russia withdrew troops 
from East Germany in exchange for NATO’s non-enlargement towards the Russian 
border (Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018). Scholars (e.g., Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015; 
Sakwa, 2015) suggest that the eastward integration aiming to enhance their security, 
however, triggered ‘a security dilemma for Russia that undermined the security of 
all’ – aggravating the Ukraine crisis (Sakwa, 2015, p. 4). In this context, Putin’s 
takeover of the Crimea peninsula can be seen as in response to the overthrow of 
Ukraine’s democratically elected president, because Crimea is a strategic site Russia 
feared would host a NATO naval base (Mearcheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2015, 2017; 
Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018; Van der Pijl, 2018).  
The legitimacy of the Crimean secession was denied by the British media 
without exception which accused the secession of being unfree and Putin of breaking 
international law. During the Ukraine crisis, the Crimean – including ethnic 
Russians, Ukrainians, and Tartars – mostly wished to join Russia rather than belong 
to Ukraine (Boyd-Barrett, 2017a; Van der Pijl, 2018). In addition to the long-
entrenched connection between Russia and Crimea as explained in Chapter three, the 
primary reason was that ‘Russian pensions were three times higher than Ukrainian, 
and that Ukrainian pensions were in the process of being slashed as the [new] 
Ukrainian government conceded to IMF demands’ (Boyd-Barrett, 2017a, p. 1021). 
The living conditions were jeopardised and further deteriorated as the new Kyiv 
blocked water supply and the system of payments in April 2014 (Van der Pijl, 2018; 
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Sakwa, 2015). After the reunification, a presidential decree promised Tatar, Russian, 
and Ukrainian to be state languages – a movement the Crimean Tatar in particular 
had demanded since 1986 (Sakwa, 2015). Apart from the resistance led by Mustafa 
Dzhemilev who was accused of ramping up tensions at the price of the Tatar’s real 
needs, Sakwa (2015) points out that, several Tatar organisations embraced the 
reunification of Crimean with Russia. As a leader of one such organisation – Vasvi 
Abduraimov states: ‘Only after Crimea became part of Russia did Kiev even 
remember that we exist’ (as cited in Sakwa, 2015, p. 112). Nevertheless, the British 
media such as the BBC ignored the historical and local account when discussing 
Crimea, and denied the comparability between the Crimean secession and the 1999 
Kosovo crisis. Instead, the BBC regarded the latter as a legitimate humanitarian war 
without mentioning the absence of UN Security Council authorisation for the use of 
military force. Van der Pijl (2018) adds to this the fact that the West (Washington 
and Brussels) articulated its indignation at the incorporation of Crimea while paying 
no attention to the new Kyiv’s violating of the Ukrainian constitution as well as its 
dismissal of the Supreme Court. The British media did not offer this analytical 
assessment either.  
The media in the UK, especially the BBC and Mail Online, helped spread 
Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine via omitting to mention several 
controversial subjects discussed above, resonating with the West’s solution of 
detaching Kyiv from Moscow. As Balabanova (2015) notes the important role of the 
media in raising awareness of problematic human issues before and during wartime 
however ‘is not the only or even the most important factor’ driving interventions (p. 
102). National interests and geopolitics are often the focus (Balabanova, 2015; 
Robinson, 2017a; Freedman, 2017). Thus, the British media in the case of the 
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Ukraine crisis have rather played a subservient role justifying the Western position in 
the conflict, which however refutes the Liberal model proposed by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004). Although the evidence did not indicate a high level of political 
parallelism supporting the liberal model, as The Guardian, the BBC, and Mail Online 
were all supportive of the Western policies on Ukraine and the isolation of Russia; 
which itself indicates an alignment between the media and the politics to some 
extent. As a result, the level of journalistic professionalism cannot be proven to be 
high, due to the lack of rigorous analysis in the case of the Ukraine. This can be 
explained by the fact that while the media are increasingly dependent on government 
or public relations sources (Boyd-Barrett, 2019), the number of investigative 
journalism has declined (Balabanova, 2019). 
In addition, the state may have played a significant role as well. As 
Bruggemann et al. (2014) argue the British media enjoy a ‘high level of state 
intervention’ in terms of ownership regulation and broadcasting (p. 1058), which 
(especially the BBC) represents an official apparatus for reinforcing ‘a common 
sense: that the United Kingdom’s foreign policy interventions are necessarily 
legitimate despite the odd mistake’ (Freedman, 2018, p. 214). Freedman (2018) 
suggests that the relationship between the BBC and the government is filled with 
three factors that help define and police a ‘centre ground’: unspoken assumptions, 
bureaucratic procedures, and stubborn hierarchies. Regardless of the sporadic 
conflicts between the two parties, the centre ground does its job in favour of the 
long-run interests of the establishment. Therefore, the BBC is more of a public 
service broadcaster that is ‘based on state patronage and elite consensus’ than a form 
of social control that is ‘based on market forces’ (Freedman, 2018, pp. 213-214). 
Speaking of the privately-owned media practice in capitalist democracies such as the 
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UK, Hammond (2017) argues that free media often ‘act as agents of power despite 
relatively little direct state interference’ (p. 88). Nonetheless, the aim of such 
criticism of media’s compliant role ‘seems to be to encourage greater official 
regulation’ (Media Reform Coalition 2012, as cited in Hammond, 2017, p. 88). In the 
ways of supporting the socio-economic status quo such as ‘the prevailing system of 
power and privilege’ thus cultivating a ‘climate of conformity’, the media are seen as 
‘a crucial element in the legitimation of capitalist society’ (Miliband, 2013). As 
many scholars (Robinson, 2017a, 2018, 2019b; MacLeod, 2019; Boyd-Barrett, 2019; 
Hammond, 2017; MacLeod & Chomsky, 2019) suggest, Herman and Chomsky’s 
(1988) propaganda model drawing from the broader political economy and 
ideological perspectives still applies to current media landscape in the West – in the 
UK in this study. There is no fundamental change in mainstream media’s dependence 
on governmental lines. The media are still manufacturing consent as the examined 
here case demonstrates.  
 
8.4 Conclusion  
Since no one knows more than a certain part of the facts and it is unfeasible 
to present all the facts, objectivity or fairness in the construction of news stories is 
considered an illusion (Paul & Elder, 2004). The presented facts are therefore 
thought to be important. But it is equally important to question what has been left out 
of the reporting. Would the narrative be interpreted the same way if different facts 
had been highlighted? Accordingly, by comparing the Russian and British news 
media coverage of the Ukraine crisis, the shared nature of the one-dimensional news 
reporting was uncovered. Both the Russian and the British media outlets un-
proportionately stereotyped the Ukraine conflict although in different light, but 
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followed a similar logic of othering the counterpart. This was tracked through the 
different frames used by the Russian and British media, revealing illiberal trends. In 
addition to the judgemental rhetoric replacing sensible discussion, a shared particular 
characteristic is the humanitarian rationale that the Russian media used to discuss the 
taking over of Crimea and the country’s involvement in Eastern Ukraine; the British 
media used it to justify the West’s interference throughout the Ukraine crisis. The 
humanitarian mission/intervention alongside an attribution of blame not only failed 
to resolve existing tensions but simultaneously fed the spiral of aggression (Baysha, 
2017).  
The evidence presented in this discussion chapter demonstrates an illiberal 
trend in both the hybrid regime – Russian and the liberal democracy – the UK media 
outlets. The study supports the Statist commercialised model (Vartanova, 2012). 
While RT and Pravda.ru have been identified as being submissive to the Russian 
foreign policy on Ukraine, The Moscow Times has played a critical role throughout 
the crisis. Given the nature of the liberal democracy where the media are expected to 
perform their democratic roles, the studied British media during the Ukraine crisis 
nevertheless were characterised by one-sided reporting that legitimated the national 
foreign policies on Ukraine and Russia. Similar to the Russian media, the self-
claimed impartial and independent media outlet – the BBC and the right-winger – 
Mail Online not only paid more attention to the conflict than The Guardian, but also 
tended to play compliant roles to the Western politics especially when the stories 
were associated with Russia and the President Putin. Although The Guardian has 
offered multiple perspectives on the Ukraine crisis and stopped paying attention to it 
in October 2014, it has rather set the nation’s agenda in terms of anti-Russia rhetoric 
particularly in the context of economic sanctions on Russia. Thus, the British news 
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coverage of the Ukraine conflict without critical and in-depth analysis reflects a 
higher degree of state intervention (Bruggemann et al., 2014), and a lower degree of 
journalistic professionalism than what has been expected. This, to some extent, 




Nearly five years later the conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues despite the 
settlement agreements reached in Minsk in September 2014 and February 2015 
(Pifer, 2018). The IMF has stopped distributing funds to the country since the early 
2017. The EU followed the IMF withholding assistance due to the new Kyiv’s failure 
to deliver on reform measures such as land privatisation and harmonisation of gas 
prices (Brookings, 22 February 2018). The existing issues of corruption and the 
political power of the oligarchs have resulted in increasing public dissatisfaction with 
Poroshenko’s administration (Brookings, 22 February 2018). These along with 
inefficiency have significantly influenced today’s Ukrainian economy, that remains 
one of the poorest in Europe (Kalymon & Havrylyshyn, 2018). Importantly, the 
British media stressed the corruption issues in late 2013, suggesting that Ukraine 
should continue the political and economic package with the EU and that Victor 
Yanukovych should step down. However, these controversial issues alongside the 
battles on the ground, by the time of writing in September 2019, have slipped off the 
media’s agenda in the West, with very little mention of a conflict that has claimed 
more than 10,000 lives. Why did anti-corruption and civilisation matter to the British 
media in 2013 under Yanukovych’s rule, but seem unnewsworthy under the new 
Kyiv’s regime since 2014?  
The current comparative study explored and answered this question in detail 
by examining the role the Russian and the British media played during the Ukraine 
crisis as representative of two media systems that are described as belonging to two 
different media models: the statist commercialised and the liberal. Since the Ukraine 
crisis appeared in headlines globally from the end of 2013 through to the beginning 
of 2015, there had been varied versions of the Ukraine crisis posited across the 
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world. It became virtually impossible to distinguish between what was simply 
information and what was in fact propaganda. Given the characteristics proposed by 
Vartanova (2012) and Hallin and Mancini (2004), the news coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis from both Russia and the UK was expected to be biased to different extents.  
This final chapter sums up the in-depth comparative study into the media 
coverage of war and conflict from hybrid and liberal regimes, focusing on the role 
the Russian and the British media have played during the Ukraine crisis. The chapter 
offers an overall conclusion of this comparative research. The key findings will be 
highlighted in order to shed light on their significance to the developments of news 
framing of war and conflict and theories on media systems. The chapter will also 
outline the limitations of this study, proposing recommendations for further research.  
 
General Summary of the Study 
Chapter one offered the foundation for the study, exploring the relationship 
between media and conflict. The first part of the chapter discussed the normative 
frameworks of media within democracy. The second part discussed the media 
systems theory. In order to fully understand the models developed by Vartanova 
(2012) and Hallin and Mancini (2004), this section first of all introduced the political 
contexts in liberal and hybrid regimes since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The 
third part of the chapter looked at the literature on media coverage of conflict. This is 
significant as the relationship between the media and government within 
democracies has implications for the way media cover conflict. The main 
frameworks of the thesis, the manufacturing consent and the CNN effect, were used 
as concepts aiming to identify the media’s role in the context of the Ukraine crisis. 
The manufacturing consent thesis indicates the way media are manipulated by the 
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economic and political elites, who thus protect their privileges. The CNN effect 
theory provides an opposite view of the media, which supports the view of media 
influence on foreign policy during conflicts being possible on humanitarian grounds. 
By critically looking at these two theories, the emphasised discourse sheds light upon 
the core axis that the media are more likely to manufacture consent in the context of 
war/conflict. 
Chapters two and three together offered a context for the subsequent analysis. 
While the former focused on the nature of the Russian and the British media linking 
their characteristic features with the media systems models; the latter introduced the 
story of the Ukraine crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015, including 
the different foreign policies of Russia and the UK in relation to it. 
Chapter four discussed the research method incorporating both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis. The adopted framework was a set of news frames consisting 
of generic, diagnostic and prognostic frames, deriving from Godefroidt et al. (2016) 
who applied them to scrutinise four countries’ news articles of the Syrian conflict in 
a comparative content analysis. The sample for this study included six media outlets 
from two countries covering 15-months’ worth of news coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis (30 November 2013 – 28 February 2015). The British media coverage was 
collected from three publications – the BBC, The Guardian, and Mail Online. The 
Guardian and Mail Online are on the opposite sides of the political spectrum while 
the BBC is claiming to be independent. As counterparts, the selection of the Russian 
media coverage of the Ukraine crisis was based on three media sources – RT, The 
Moscow Times, and Pravda.ru. They are either entirely English-language media or 
have English editions in print or online. Overall, a sample of 5,532 pieces of news 
articles was selected for final analysis.  
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Chapter five presented the findings of the Russian media coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015. The data showed that 
the media, first, paid an increased attention to the crisis during the second (27 
February – 20 March 2014) and the third (21 March – 17 July 2014) time periods. 
Second, the framing assessment disclosed the Russian media’s preferences in the use 
of the economic consequences, morality, and human-interest frames. RT and 
Pravda.ru tended to articulate the Ukraine crisis by criticising the new Kyiv’s launch 
of the Anti-Terrorism Operations and suggesting decentralisation, autonomisation, or 
federalisation as solutions to the crisis. The Moscow Times, on the other hand, 
offered various perspectives on the Ukraine crisis, including critical stances toward 
the Putin regime.  
Chapter six examined the British media news coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
between 30 November 2013 and 28 February 2015. The findings showed a gradually 
reducing focus for each time period. The human-focused news coverage was 
extensively adopted by the British media throughtout the Ukraine crisis. The use of 
diagnostic frame shifted from Yanokovych’s crackdown on people at the Maidan 
(particular triggers frame) during the first period to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine 
(global dimensions and particular triggers frames) during the subsequent three 
periods. As a result, the focus on change in government moved to that on economic 
sanctions (financial intervention) as solutions to the Ukraine crisis.  
Chapter seven focused on comparison between the Russian and British media 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis, thus addressing the fourth research question. What the 
evidence specifically revealed was that although the British media paid less attention 
to the Ukraine conflict compared to the Russian media, the former tended to offer 
longer stories. This was also evident in the media offering more diagnostic and 
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prognostic frames than the latter. In addition, the humanitarian sentiments were 
interpreted and conveyed by both the Russian and the British media during the crisis, 
although with conflicting perspectives. The findings were tracked through the focus 
on the human-interest and human rights violations frames along with accusations of 
the counterparts’ respective governments.  
Chapter eight offered an analytical discussion in relation to the different 
narratives that characterised the Russian and the British media during the Ukraine 
crisis. The first part of the chapter focused on the theoretical implications for media 
and conflict – illustrating how the study offers support for the manufacturing consent 
thesis developed by Herman and Chomsky (1988), in the sense of media following 
governmental lines in its construction of the story of the Ukraine crisis (e.g., Hallin, 
1986; Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Robinson et 
al., 2010; Balabanova, 2007, 2015; Carruthers, 2011, Robinson, 2017, 2018, 2019a; 
Freedman, 2017, 2018; Hammond et al., 2019; Boyd-Barrett, 2019; MacLeod, 2019). 
Once the question of humanitarian sentiment was set on to the agenda, both the 
Russian and the British media outlets paid significant attention to the human-interest 
issues. The Russian media’s (RT and Pravda.ru in particular) frequent employment 
of morality frame served the state purpose of condemning the West for having 
double standards in treating key parties involved in Ukraine. The media stressed the 
importance of what the British media overlooked, thus offering alternative views to 
the British media narratives. The commonality here shared by the Russian and the 
British media was that Russia’s involvement and the Western interference in Ukraine 
were hardly questioned in its respective media outlets. Given the fact that the 
Russian media operate under a hybrid regime (Hale, 2010; Sukosd, 2018) that holds 
the majority of media ownership in the country, it is not surprising that the media 
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followed the national political line and frequently justified Russia’s course of action 
on the Ukraine while accusing the Western bodies of applying double standards. 
Following this, a moral obligation to assist those suffering in Eastern Ukraine due to 
new Kyiv’s launch of Anti-Terrorism Operations and the minorities who faced abuse 
in terms of outlawing Russian language was at the core of the message delivered by 
the media.  
In comparison, the British media engaged in setting the anti-Russia agenda by 
selectively reporting human-focused stories. In other words, the British media 
identified evil – the Yanukovych regime, eastern separatists, and Putin, while 
downplaying the misconduct of the ‘good guys’: the new Kyiv’s launch of Anti-
Terrorism Operations and use of chemical weapons. Despite the less frequent usage 
of the morality frame, the British media delivered the sense of immoral Russia and 
Russian-backed parties (e.g., Yanukovych and eastern separatists) since the early 
stage of the Ukraine crisis. Human rights were perceived to be at stake because of 
Russia, the resulting humanitarian rationale offered a reasoning of moral criteria. The 
articulation of ‘values’ vindicated the West’s positive role in Ukraine that seemed 
imperative and significant. The media largely presented the protests in Kyiv in a 
positive light to shore up the battle for freedom and democracy as well as embracing 
Western leaders who went to the Maidan cheering up the protesters in the name of 
respecting the sovereignty of a weak Ukraine. But this state violated its own citizen’s 
human rights. By giving the public a sense of urgency regarding the Ukraine crisis 
through the human-interest lens, with buried references to the right-wing extremists 
who played an important role in ousting Yanukovych and the new Kyiv’s use of 
chemical weapons in Eastern Ukraine, the following foreign policies on Ukraine and 
Russia would be legitimate – Ukraine successfully reshuffled the government with 
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the help from the EU talks, while Russia was to be liable for its involvement. The 
identification of evil – Yanukovych, eastern rebels, and Putin as the real force behind 
the scene – delivered a righteous message to the global audiences that Western 
politicians should interfere in the political contest against Russia that is perceived as 
the enemy in the current geopolitical context (Ojala & Pantti, 2017; Boyd-Barrett, 
2017a, 2017b; Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018; MacLeod, 2019; Robinson, 2019a, 
2019b).  
The second part of the chapter provided an analytical comparison between the 
media systems of hybrid and liberal regimes. This study discovered ostensible 
illiberal trends that remain significant during the Ukraine conflict – both the Russian 
and the British media reduced the rather complex issues into manufactured one-
dimensional narratives in accordance with national foreign policy. While the right-
leaning media outlets from Russia and the UK – Pravda.ru and Mail Online – 
strongly advocated the respective party’s interventionist role in Ukraine, the left-
wing newspaper in Russia – The Moscow Times – tended to report through various 
angles including constant criticisms of Putin’s policy. In the UK, the centre-left 
media – The Guardian – in addition to being critical of Russia and offering various 
perspectives on the subject of the Ukraine crisis, was supportive of the Western 
position of economic sanctions on Russia. While RT paid significant attention to the 
crisis, being submissive to politicians’ rhetoric; the BBC seemed to be balanced on 
the surface, yet relying heavily on story-selecting with an overall sense of anti-Russia 
hyperbole. Regardless of the less attention paid to the Ukraine crisis, the British 
media were more likely to offer diagnosis and prognosis frames to explain the roots 
of and suggest solutions to the crisis. Nevertheless, the majority of diagnoses and 
prognoses were, in fact, extra values added to support the anti-Russia discourse. 
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The decision to incorporate diagnoses and prognoses into the analysis helped 
identify salient framing patterns represented in the British media. Starting from the 
first time period of the Ukraine crisis, the British media in particular were more 
likely to explain the cause of and look for solutions to the conflict than their Russian 
counterparts, despite the fact that the latter provided the crisis with more coverage 
overall. However, using more diagnosis and prognosis does not mean that the media 
tended to investigate the subject more deeply. Instead, it helped the researcher to 
further detect how they viewed the conflict. Accordingly, the British media were 
found to be leaning upon UK national foreign policy through mostly suggesting the 
change in (Yanukovych’s) government as the key solution to the crisis during the 
first time period. This prognosis had not been suggested afterwards, as the Western 
position on Ukraine changed after the collapse of the Yanukovych regime. What the 
British media tended to suggest during the subsequent three time periods was in 
coherence with the political lines of imposing economic sanctions on Russia. In 
similar vein, the Russian media – mainly RT and Pravda.ru – offered explanations of 
the crisis and solutions to it in line with the declared Russian national interests. 
Therefore, the evidence showed in this study supported the statist commercialised 
model proposed by Vartanova (2012). However, the study did not find statistical and 
qualitative evidence to support some of the characteristics associated with the liberal 
model developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), due mainly to the media’s 
insufficient analysis on subjects especially if they were associated with Russia and 
President Putin.  
Based on the findings, this study concludes that the notion of 
humanitarianism was an overarching reporting pattern. The humanitarian rationale 
was used by the Russian media (RT and Pravda.ru) to justify its incorporating of the 
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Crimea and its political and military involvement in Ukraine. The British media, 
instead, used the idea to justify the West’s interference throughout the Ukraine crisis 
whilst minimising the wrongdoings conducted by the new Kyiv, as the two were 
political allies. Therefore, the media from both Russia and the UK essentially 
contributed to the humanitarian sentiment in Ukraine by reporting human suffering 
and violations of human rights, thus evoking moral obligation among the public who 
may give support to the national foreign policies on Ukraine. Based on this, it can be 
argued that the manufacturing consent thesis is evident in the context of the Ukraine 
crisis in the media system of hybrid regime as well as the one of liberal democracy. 
The disclosed evidence that characterised the English-presence of Russian media – 
RT, The Moscow Times, and Pravda.ru – supports the statist commercialised model 
proposed by Vartanova (2012). The British counterparts – the BBC, The Guardian, 
and Mail Online, did not prove to be successful in playing democratic roles such as 
watchdogs, thus not delivering on some aspects of the liberal model developed by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
 
Original Contribution 
As shown in the thesis, this study made seven significant contributions to 
knowledge in media studies. First, it is the first empirical comparative study on 
cross-section of news media between one hybrid regime – Russia and one liberal 
democracy – the UK, in the domain of global conflict reporting. Second, it 
broadened the applicability of theories on media and conflict – the manufacturing 
consent thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The fifth filter of anti-Communism in 
the Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), as demonstrated by the British 
media in this study in particular, can be revived as an ‘anti-Russian filter’ as 
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suggested by MacLeod (2019). The CNN effect theory – disputed among scholars 
examining the influence of media in driving foreign policy in the 1990s, was not 
applicable in the case of the Ukraine crisis. The findings of this study do not provide 
empirical support for the CNN effect. This resonates with several earlier studies 
(e.g., Robinson, 2002; Livingston & Eachus, 1995; Wheeler, 2000; Western, 2005; 
Balabanova, 2007) that demonstrate that the influence over the policy-making 
process can be largely contested and different geopolitical considerations are more 
significant. As Robinson (2002) argues in the case of Somalia, the change of policy 
was not media-related, rather reflected geostrategic considerations centring around 
Turkey – an important US/NATO ally. Livingston and Eachus (1995) and Wheeler 
(2000) similarly stress the significance of geostrategic formulation of political 
operations with news reporting simply responding to these decisions. Recent studies 
on war coverage (e.g., Robinson, 2017; Freedman, 2017; Balabanova, 2017; Parry & 
Goddard, 2017; Keeble, 2017; Hammond, 2017; Hammond et al., 2019; Boyd-
Barrett, 2019) suggest that the media do not freely practise any direct influence over 
policy decision. Instead, they claim that the media often exaggerate humanitarian 
sentiment while overlooking the importance of realpolitik that contributes to 
intervention decisions. 
Third, it is generally known that the media system of hybrid regimes such as 
Russia which owns and controls their press organisations (Vartanova, 2012), usually 
serve a propaganda function (Street, 2011; Hammond, 2017; Robinson, 2019b). This 
study found that the media in liberal regimes (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), as 
exemplified in the British news coverage of the Ukraine crisis, also align with 
national interests, seeking projection of Western political and military power in 
regions such as the Balkans (Hammond, 2017), the place that is also important to 
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Russia’s campaign for global influence (Stronski & Himes, 2019). Different from the 
Russian media that are filled with patriotic contents (De Smaele, 2010), Hammond 
(2017) argues that the Western media product is rather systemic and stems from the 
fundamental characteristics of the media influenced by wider socio-economic 
engagements. Private ownership and state regulation are two of the key factors that 
have contributed to the biased media coverage in war (Hammond, 2017). The 
wealthiest media situated at the centre of capitalist economy are likely to disseminate 
‘authoritative sources […] at the expense of less powerful but, sometimes, more 
credible sources’ (Boyd-Barrett, 2019, p. 101). As mentioned above, the 
manufacturing consent thesis is still applicable in understanding and explaining the 
agenda and function of the media today.  
Fourth, the study explored additional understandings of the Ukraine crisis. 
Apart from the pervasive view existing in the West on Russia’s military and political 
involvement in Ukraine, the West played a significant role as well in the form of 
being politically and financially supportive of a Western-friendly right-wing regime 
– the new Kyiv (Kuzmarov & Marciano, 2018), and imposing economic sanctions on 
Russia. Russia’s objection to NATO’s expansion and primary goal of establishing ‘a 
multi-polar world’ (Sherr, 2014) were underestimated by the EU who had promoted 
the free trade agreements with Ukraine thus stimulated Russia’s strong anti-Western 
stance (as cited in Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 108). Sakwa (2015) argues that 
economic sanctions are ‘less an instrument for the consistent defence of human rights 
than a political weapon against obstreperous countries’ such as Russia that ‘refuse to 
buckle down to Anglo-American leadership’ (p. 203). Rather than alleviating the 
suffering of Ukraine, the economic sanctions appeared to aim to lay all responsibility 
on Russia, punish Putin in particular, and isolate Russia on the international stage. 
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This externalisation of responsibility rendered the EU to avoid recognising their own 
contradictions as the roots of the Ukraine conflict (Sakwa, 2015). The geopolitics in 
the post-Cold War age exist between two legitimating ideologies: the Eastern bloc 
led by Russia and the Western counterpart (the EU and the US); or in the words of 
Van der Pijl (2018): between ‘two conflicting social orders: the neoliberal capitalism 
of the West’ and the ‘state-direct capitalism’ of Russia (p. 3).  
Fifth, it is necessary to recapitulate that the methods included traditional 
quantitative content analysis, a mixture of deductive and inductive framing analysis, 
and explanatory in-depth qualitative analysis – an extension of the framing analysis. 
The combination ameliorates the flaws in the singular methods so as to ensure a solid 
degree of validity and reliability.  
Sixth, the author applied the already tested on other cases set of frames – 
generic, diagnostic, and prognostic – as used by Godefriodt et al. (2016) examining 
the news framing of the Syrian crisis, and was effectively testing their applicability 
to a new case – the Ukraine crisis. Accordingly, the results add to our understanding 
of the dynamics of news framing of conflicts.  
Yet, the systematic quantitative content analysis alongside framing analysis 
with qualitative elements do not robustly untangle how and why the featured framing 
patterns were used in shaping the construction of the Ukraine crisis across the nations 
under study – Russia and the UK. To account for this, the researcher adopted an 
extension of the framing analysis explain and elaborate on the quantitative findings. 
The analysis provided essential interpretations and rich contextual descriptions by 
comparatively looking at qualitatively different constructions of the Ukraine conflict.  
Furthermore, as part of the effort to cultivate and sustain valid and reliable 
procedure and results, it was ensured that samples were representative of the target 
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items, and the measures were sensitive to technical practices of criticism. So that the 
quantitative results could be applied to deal with the following qualitative analysis in 
identifying difference in the framing of the Ukraine crisis between the Russian and 
British media outlets. To avoid subtle practices of bias that may occur through 
framing, it was ensured that categories in the coding procedure were not only clearly 
defined, they were equally applicable, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, thus 
assuredly sticking with the values of reliability and validity (Berelson, 1952; Budd et 
al., 1967; Holsti, 1981). More importantly, a pilot study aiming to pre-test the 
established coding system, as Wimmer and Dominick (1997) have suggested, was 
carried out. It focused on three months’ worth of news coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
in Russia (The Moscow Times) and the UK (The Guardian).  As a result, the category 
of ‘external co-operation’ was added to the list that had been established for 
identifying prognosis frames. 
Finally, the lesser use of nationalisation frame in all media – especially the 
British media, was in sharp contrast to previous studies (e.g., Van Cauwenberge et 
al., 2009; Godefroidt et al., 2016). This may challenge the framework of the generic 
frames, hence raising a question about the applicability of the nationalisation frame 
in war coverage and the conditions in which it is more or less likely to be used. 
However, it is also important to point out that the nature of the Ukraine conflict may 
have affected the results. Specifically, neither Russia nor the UK was a participant in 
the war that ensued – at least not officially. It brings us to the issue of the limits of 
this study: further research would be essential to complement the findings of this 
study. Yet, it is worth reiterating that the study was also a test to existing frames and 
their applicability. As such, it seemed to validate previous analyses in relation to the 
high occurrences of the conflict, responsibility, economic consequences, human-
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interest, and morality frames, thus adding to our understanding of the dynamics of 
news framing of conflicts. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
The scope of this study makes it the first comprehensive comparative 
research so far on media systems of hybrid and liberal regimes in the context of war 
and conflict, focusing on Russian and British media coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015. The findings of this study make an 
important contribution to the on-going debate with regards to the relationship 
between the media and war/conflict, as well as the existing understanding of the 
media systems of Russia and the UK. Nevertheless, it is also important to give a 
thorough account of its limitations. 
To begin with, this study’s primary focus was on how the selected Russian 
and British media outlets framed the Ukraine conflict throughout the defined four 
time periods, rather than how the public would perceive the given coverage or 
whether the media coverage has actually influenced the public opinion on the 
Ukraine crisis. These assessments were beyond the scope of this research project. 
The necessity of examining the journalistic practices in times of war and conflict 
should not be neglected. It is important to reiterate the media’s key roles in 
democracies where citizenry should be well-informed with credible information. It is 
part of the democratisation process. Recognising the flaw in the media tendency to 
acquiesce with the illiberal practice in the context of war and conflict is vital.  
Second, this study did not directly contribute to the question of how every 
specific issue has been covered during the entire Ukraine crisis from 2013 to 2015. 
Again, this study looked at how different media outlets from Russia and the UK 
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reported and framed the Ukraine conflict offering a macro-analysis. Thus, the issue-
based assessment, the specific way in which the sentences were formulated, and why 
journalists or reporters made such decisions on linguistic choices were not of interest. 
This has potentially downplayed some of the thought-provoking aspects of the news 
reporting of the Ukraine conflict. Therefore, speaking with journalists may have 
added valuable insights to how they understand their roles in both the liberal 
democracy and the hybrid regime and whether they experienced internal/external 
pressrues during the reporting of the crisis. This could enrich the discussion on how 
the Ukraine crisis was framed in a complementary way, thus responding to the 
theoretical development of the media systems theory. Nonetheless, while 
acknowledging the potential significance of conducting qualitative interviews to 
tackle those questions, the research design was developed to offer as wide-ranging 
and concrete a landscape of the media coverage as possible. Moreover, the researcher 
paid significant attention to determining which frame it was during the coding 
procedure, which not only reinforced the accuracy of the results but also reduced the 
likelihood of missing out any significant points.  
Third, the research has exclusively focused on six media outlets across two 
countries, because of the time constraints and the media source availability especially 
from among the English-language presence of Russian media. The lack of taking into 
account the news coverage from social media that is of an ever-increasing popularity 
and importance could be considered a limitation of this study. However, to 
incorporate the examination of social media news coverage would go far beyond the 
current scope of the project. In addition, traditional media such as newspapers along 
with their online versions are still one of the main media sources the general public 
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rely on. Overall, the study could have benefited from an inclusion of more media 
outlets and an extension of time periods. 
Fourth, this study deliberately omitted a visual assessment of images from the 
news coverage of the Ukraine crisis. Photographic representations are powerful 
constructions of visual storytelling in conveying the nature of crisis, as they are 
possibly what most people including audiences and foreign policy-makers would 
remember of conflicts, not least as they are key to the discussion of the CNN effect 
theory (e.g., Seib, 2008; Parry, 2010; Parry & Thumim, 2016; Dan, 2018). Hence, 
visual analysis could have provided further nuanced qualitative depth to the current 
analysis. For instance, the MH17 tragedy was controversial as several (un)official 
organisations had shown images of conflicting evidence that different media 
selectively reported alongside the traumatic nature of the tragedy to raise awareness 
(e.g., Parry, 2010, 2011; Sontag, 2003). Thus, the assessment of the visuals used by 
the Russian and UK media outlets during the Ukraine crisis could shed additional 
light on the applicability of the theories on media and conflict as well as add extra 
values to our understanding of this research. However, in this instance, to include the 
analysis of news photography would have gone beyond the scope of this study with 
its focus on textual framing. In addition, the used electronic databases – Lexis Nexis 
– do not always include images.  
Finally, in the process, this researcher was inevitably dependent on her social 
and cultural background to interpret the texts presented in this study. Yet the research 
benefited from the production of comparative knowledge in terms of contextualism 
that avoids standardisation. To be precise, the study looked at the Russian media and 
the British media in a comparative way that helped lead to contextual analysis of the 
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events across countries. The approach focuses on the light the study sheds on the 
issue for each party, rather than the question of universal ‘true value’.  
 
Suggestions for Further Studies 
As pointed out in the previous section, the researcher has accomplished a 
research in the field of political communication focusing on the on-going debate in 
relation to the media’s role in war and conflict in the context of different political 
regimes: hybrid and liberal. In order to reinforce the validity and reliability of the 
findings of this study, this researcher has outlined four suggestions. First, conducting 
in-depth face-to-face interviews with journalists would be helpful. This study has 
found a number of framing patterns used by the Russian and the British media in 
constructing the different narratives of the 15-months’ worth of the Ukraine crisis 
analysed here. Further investigation into the why the journalists covered the conflict 
the way they did would help to understand whether or not the journalistic practices 
were internalised as a result of editorial and political pressures or were embedded 
from their own ideological perceptions and interpretations. The generated new data 
from interviews would certainly help explain the relationship between the media and 
the politics in the case of Ukraine, as well as offer a deeper insight into the explored 
here theories such as the manufacturing consent thesis and the media systems theory. 
Second, given the fact that the study has discovered a predominant framing 
pattern of human-interest and human rights violations that were applied by both the 
Russian and the British media outlets, it might be worth investigating this topic 
specifically beyond the context of this study. For example, further research could 
look at other international conflicts where conflicting parties are militarily involved, 
and examine how the media from the conflicting parties have covered specifically 
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the subject of human-interest stories. This could also be an opportunity to test the 
applicability of the nationalisation frame that was not used often in this study. The 
findings would potentially add to the existing understandings of the media’s role 
during wartime.  
Third, the evidence showed in this study has supported the features and 
patterns of behaviour identified in Vartanova’s (2012) statist commercialised model 
of Russian media system and identified how British media system fails to fully 
deliver on all expectations associated with Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) liberal model 
due to the shared feature of one-sidedness of news coverage. As mentioned above, it 
would be more inclusive and comprehensive to incorporate social media because of 
its growing significance and compatibility of constant news reporting where the 
uncovered issue of story-selection might not be in evidence. The findings therefore 
may differ from the ones of the current study. The focus will still be on the English-
language presence of Russian media as they are the ones that are outward facing, 
targeting the global audience.  
Finally, given the fact that Vartanova’s (2012) model is built mainly upon 
national-language media landscape in Russia, a further research could explore the 
news coverage of the Ukraine crisis, focusing on Russian-speaking media and 
comparing it with the English-speaking Russian ones. In addition, visual analysis as 
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Framing Analysis Codebook 
Variables and Codes: Derivations and Meaning 
  
Section A – Descriptive variables (Level 1 coding) 
The first set of variables are descriptive, allowing for identifying the article 
and for subsequent traditional quantitative analysis (e.g. word count and 
frequencies). 
A1 – Article ID 
This is the same article identity code that has been assigned to when 
constructing the database. Sequence number is needed if there are more than one 
articles for each daily issue of the media. For example, the first article you code for 
the 1st December issue of a media should be coded 1 for sequence number, the 
second article in the same issue is a 2, and so forth. For each new day or new media, 
restart the sequence at 1.  
A2 – Media 
This variable will need to be coded according to the media that have been 
selected. Each media has been assigned a one-digit code. See Appendix B for a list of 
these codes.  
A3 – Number of Words 






Section B – Variables analysing the frames (Level 2 coding) 
The second set of variables analyse the frames for each article to answer the 
third and fourth research questions in terms of identifying and comparing the frames 
used by the selected media. 
Level 2 coding identifies Generic frames consisting of six pre-defined 
frames, and diagnostic and prognostic frames. The combination of this set of frames 
was guided by the work of Godefroidt, Berbers, and d’Haenens (2016) scrutinising 
four countries’ news articles of the Syrian conflict. Identifying these eight frames 
will be done by answering the listed yes/no questions (see Appendix C).  
 
Note that in the subsequent analysis, unit of analysis is the individual 
article. When more than one frame appear in an article, the researcher uses the 
headline to help determine the leading frame.  
 
B1 – Generic frames  
B1a - Conflict frame  
B1b - Human-interest frame  
B1c - Economic consequences frame  
B1d - Morality frame  
B1e - Responsibility frame  
B1f - Nationalisation frame  
B2 – Diagnostic frame  
B3 – Prognostic frame  





List of Media Outlets 
Russian Media British Media 
1. The Moscow Times  2. The Guardian  
3. Pravda.ru 4. Mail Online 








List of Twenty-One Framing Items (Adopted from Semetko &Valkenburg, 2000) 
Generic Frames 
Conflict frame 
Does the story revolve around disagreement between parties, individuals, groups, 
countries? 
Does the story refer to fights, riots, and confrontation between two or more parties, 
individuals, groups, countries? 
Does the story refer to two sides or more than two sides of the problem? 
Does the story refer to winners and losers? 
Human interest frame 
Does the story provide a human example or 'human face' on the issue? 
Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings? 
Does the story emphasise how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problems? 
Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors? 
Economic consequences frame 
Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future? 
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved? 
Is there a reference to economic consequences of (not) pursuing a course of action? 
Morality frame 
Does the story contain any moral message? 
Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets? 
Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave? 
Responsibility frame 
Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the 
issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest some level of the government (including President Yanukovych) is 
responsible for the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest that an individual or group of people in society (including any 
coalition of the rebels) is responsible for the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest solutions to the issue/problem? 
Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action? 
Nationalisation frame 
Does the article mention a connection between Ukraine and the individual country? 
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Does the article mention corruption, a lack of political freedom, power struggle between 
competing oligarchs, and/or unfair elections as a (possible) cause of the Ukraine crisis? 
Socio-economic causes 
Does the article mention inflation, rising unemployment, poverty or a lack of prosperity, 
limited educational opportunities, social insecurity, and/or generation gap between young 
and old Ukrainians as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Human rights violations 
Does the article mention infringement or lack of freedom of speech, opinion, religion, 
equal rights or human rights in general, and/or war crimes against civilisation or the 
violation of international law as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Religious prescriptions 
Does the article mention Ukrainian Catholics or Christians, disagreement between diverse 
religious groups, and/or the character or culture of religious groups as a (possible) cause 
of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Global dimensions 
Does the article mention disputes between Western powers and Russia, Russian ties, new 
cold war, and/or regional ambitions with limited resources as a (possible) cause of the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Particular triggers 
Does the article mention the shooting of the people, the many (innocent, civilian) victims 
and/or a violent attack as a (possible) cause of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Others  









     Intervention 
     Does the article mention suppressing the fighting with action by their military and/or a 
no-fly zone as a (possible) solution of the Ukraine crisis? 
     Assistance 
     Does the article only mention military assistance as a (possible) solution of the 
continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
     Rejection 
     Does the article mention that any military action is rejected or will only deteriorate the 
Ukraine crisis? 
Change in government 
Does the article mention the dismissal of President Victor Yanukovych or his entire 
regime and/or the appointment of a new government as a (possible) solution of the 
continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Financial intervention 
Does the article mention economic cooperation with other countries from the international 
community to provide financial support and/or economic measures against one or more 
parties involved as a (possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine 
crisis? 
Internal reforms 
Does the article mention internal reforms in terms of political issues, socio-economic 
issues, religious issues, and/or the improvement of human rights as a (possible) solution of 
the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Dismantling military weapons 
Does the article mention the removal of the Russian stockpile of military weapons as a 
(possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
External assistance 
Does the article mention external co-operation or negotiations in terms of political issues, 
socio-economic issues, religious issues, and/or the improvement of human rights as a 
(possible) solution of the continuation/escalation of the Ukraine crisis? 
Others 
This is a residual category for unforeseen remedial element. 
 
 
